'E' (ii) was the Japanese seizure of Thailand and north-eastern Malaya (8 December 1941/15 February 1942).

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The origins of the Japanese invasion of Thailand can be found in the concept of hakko ichiu ('eight crown cords, one roof', i.e. all the world under one roof) which began to gain popularity in Japan from the middle of the 19^th century. The concept’s first major proponent was Tanaka Chigaku, who saw in the concept the divine destiny of Japanese imperial power to grow and unite the entire world. To Tanaka the concept was posited on the emperor’s moral leadership, but Japanese nationalists increasingly saw it as the foundation of Japan’s task of liberating Asia from the European colonising powers and of establishing Japan as the leading influence in East Asia and the creation of a 'New Order in East Asia'.

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In 1940, the concept was expanded by Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye, who sought to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, comprising Japan, Manchukuo, China and parts of South-East Asia. According to Japanese propaganda, this would establish a new international order of 'co-prosperity' for Asian countries which, under the leadership of a benevolent Japan, would share prosperity and peace free from Western colonialism and economic domination.

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The Taiwan Army Unit 82 (Strike South Planning) was established in 1939 or 1940 to bring this about. As part of freeing South-East Asia from Western colonialism, the Japanese military planned to invade Malaya and Burma. In order to do this, the Japanese needed to make use of Thai ports, railways and airfields. They wished no conflict with Thailand as such, for this would delay the invasion and significantly reduce the element of surprise.

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By the late 1930s Thailand possessed armed forces which were, by local standards, well disciplined and well armed. Early in January 1941 Thai forces invaded French Indo-China in order to recover provinces lost in the Sino-French War of 1994/85) and Franco-Siamese War of 1893, triggering the Franco-Thai War (5 January/28 January 1941). Under the command of Vice-amiral Jean Decoux, the governor of French Indo-China, the Vichy French forces in Indo-China at this time comprised an army of about 50,000 men (including 12,000 French regulars) organised into 41 infantry battalions, two artillery regiments, and one engineer battalion. The Vichy French army’s most obvious deficiency was both the shortage and the obsolescence of its armour: it could only field 20 Renault FT-17 light tanks against the Thai army’s 134 tanks. Most of the Vichy French forces stationed near the frontier with Thailand were Indo-Chinese troops of the 3^rd and 4^th Tirailleurs Tonkinois, together with one battalion of Montagnards, French regulars of the colonial infantry branch, and Foreign Legion units. The Vichy French air strength was about 100 aircraft, of which about 60 could be considered modern: these were 30 Potez 25 general-purpose machines, four Farman F.221 heavy bombers, six Potez 542 medium bomber/transports, nine Morane-Saulnier MS.406 fighters and eight Loire 130 flying boats.

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The Thai army was relatively well equipped, and comprised 60,000 regular soldiers disposed in four armies. Of these, the largest was the Burapha Army, with five divisions. Independent formations under the direct control of the army high command included two motorised cavalry battalions, one artillery battalion, one signals battalion, one engineer battalion, and one armoured regiment. The artillery was a mixture of aged Krupp and modern Bofors howitzers and field guns, while 60 Carden Loyd tankettes and 30 Vickers 6-Ton medium tanks made up the bulk of the army’s armour. The Thai air force possessed both a quantitative and qualitative edge over the Vichy French air units in Indo-China. Among the 140 aircraft that composed the service’s first-line strength were 24 Mitsubishi Ki-30 light bombers, nine Mitsubishi Ki-21 medium bombers, 25 Hawk 75N fighters, six Martin B-10 medium bombers, and 70 Vought O2U Corsair light bombers. The Thai navy possessed two Japanese-built 2,500-ton armoured coast-defence vessels each armed with four 8-in (203-mm) guns, two older British-built armoured gunboats each armed with two 6-in (152-mm) guns, 12 torpedo boats and four submarines, and was technically and tactically inferior to the Vichy French naval element.

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As nationalist demonstrations and anti-French rallies were held in Bangkok, border skirmishes erupted on the frontier along the upper reaches of the Mekong river. The Thai air force flew daylight bombing sorties over Vientiane, Sisophon and Battambang without being intercepted, and the Vichy French retaliated but were unable to inflict comparable damage.

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On 5 January 1941, after a reported French attack on the border village of Arayanprathet, the Thai forces of the Burapha and Isan Armies launched an offensive into Laos and Cambodia. The Vichy French forces resisted, but many of their units were swept aside by the better equipped Thai forces. The Thais took Laos rapidly, but then faced a more difficult task in Cambodia. On 16 January the Vichy French launched a major counterattack on the Thai-held villages of Yang Dang Khum and Phum Preav, initiating the fiercest battle of the war. As a result of overly complex tactical planning and dismal intelligence, the Vichy French counterattacks were stopped and fighting ended with a Vichy French withdrawal from the area. Yet the Thais were unable to pursue the retreating Vichy French as their armour and infantry were checked by the accurate artillery fire of Foreign Legion units.

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With the situation on land deteriorating, Decoux ordered all available Vichy French naval forces (light cruiser Lamotte-Picquet, modern colonial sloops Dumont d’Urville and Amiral Charner, and older colonial sloops Tahure and Marne) into action in the Gulf of Thailand under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau Régis Bérenger. The Vichy French commander’s were simple: attack the Thai coastal cities from Rayong to the Cambodian frontier and thereby force the Thai government to withdraw its forces from the Cambodian frontier.

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On the evening of 15 January the squadron got under way at 21.15 and closed the Thai coast at 14 kt, which was the best speed of the older sloops (avisos). The Vichy French ships remained undetected as they entered the Gulf of Siam, but their opponents were not as fortunate, for Loire 130 flying boats from the base at Ream had completed a sweep of the coast between Trat and Sattahip, in the process locating one coast-defence ship and two torpedo boats at Koh Chang, and one gunboat, four torpedo boats and two submarines at Sattahip. The flying boats signalled the fact to the naval headquarters in Saigon, from where the information was transmitted to Lamotte-Picquet. Bérenger decided to make a dawn attack on the Thai ships at Koh Chang. He ignored Sattahip because the sloops could not reach there until later in the day, by which time the element of surprise would have been lost, and because the nature of Sattahip’s coast defences was not known. Moreover, the force at Koh Chang was the weaker of the two and offered the better chance of victory.

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Bérenger’s plan was for the squadron to approach at dawn from the south-west. As the anchorage at Koh Chang is surrounded by islands and islets, many of them more than 655 ft (200 m) high, the squadron would divide and use the cover of the islands to concentrate their fire on portions of the Thai squadron while at the same time covering all the avenues of escape. The easternmost channel was regarded as the most likely route by which a breakout would be made, and this was also the area in which the air reconnaissance report had placed the largest Thai ships. Lamotte-Picquet would make for the eastern side of the anchorage to block this route while the colonial sloops blocked the centre and pounded the Thai ships there. The smaller French ships would concentrate to the west. The French squadron closed on the anchorage at 05.30 on 17 January, and 15 minutes later divided into the three groups as planned, Lamotte-Picquet heading for the eastern part of the anchorage, Dumont d’Urville and Amiral Charner continuing to the central position, and Tahure and Marne heading for the western side. The weather was good, and the sea almost flat. Sunrise was due at 06.30, and the area was lit only by the first rays of light on the horizon and by the dim moonlight. A final aerial reconnaissance of the target area had been arranged using one Loire 130 flying boat from the shore base at Ream for, despite the fact that she carried two such 'boats, Lamotte-Picquet could launch neither of these as a result of catapult problems. At 06.05, the 'boat flew over the anchorage and reported the presence of two torpedo ships. This came as an unpleasant surprise to the Vichy French as previous reports had led them to believe that only one of the torpedo boats was present, but during the night Chonburi had arrived to relieve Chandraburi, which was to return to Sattahip later that day for repairs. The 'boat attempted a bombing attack, but was forced off by a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft fire. The effect of this air mission was two-edged: the Vichy French were now aware that they faced two Thai ships, but the element of surprise had been wasted and there was still 30 minutes to sunrise.

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Caught off their guard by the approaching Vichy French, the Thais desperately began to raise steam and prepared to slip their anchors, but the torpedo boats were sunk by the fire of Lamotte-Picquet's 6.1-in (155-mm) guns. At 06.38, look-outs on the Vichy French flagship sighted the modern coast-defence ship Dhonburi, armed with 8-in (203-mm) guns, heading to the north-west at a range of 10,935 yards (10000 m). There followed a running battle in which the fire of both ships was frequently blocked by the islets. The fire from the Thai ship was heavy but inaccurate, and by 07.15 fires could be seen on Dhonburi, which then found herself engaged not only by the cruiser but also by the Vichy French sloops. In the beginning of the engagement, a lucky shot from Lamotte-Picquet killed Chonburi's captain, Commander Luang Phrom Viraphan, and thus severely disrupted her command capability. Believing they had a better chance of hurting the smaller French ships, the Thais shifted their fire onto Amiral Charner, which soon found 8-in (203-mm) salvoes falling around her. Dhonburi shifted fire back to Lamotte-Picquet after a 6.1-in (155-mm) salvo from the Vichy French cruiser’s main battery put her after turret out of action. Soon she reached the safety of shallow water which the French ships could not enter for fear of grounding, but it all came too late for the hapless Thais as Dhonburi was burning fiercely and listing heavily to starboard. Her remaining turret was manned but jammed, and therefore could not fire effectively unless the whole ship was manoeuvred to train these two guns. At 07.50 Lamotte-Picquet fired a final salvo of torpedoes at a range of 16,400 yards (15000 m) but lost sight of Dhonburi behind an island from which she was not seen to emerge.

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At 08.40, Bérenger ordered his squadron to head for home, but this coincided with the start of the expected Thai air attacks. Thai aircraft dropped several bombs close to Lamotte-Picquet and also achieved one hit, although the bomb failed to explode. Lamotte-Picquet's anti-aircraft guns put up a vigorous barrage and further attacks were not pressed home. The final raid departed at 09.40, and the Vichy French squadron returned to Saigon. The Vichy French left behind them total devastation. Dhonburi was heavily damaged and grounded on a sand bar in the mouth of the Chanthaburi river, with about 20 dead, but was later raised and repaired by the Japanese. The torpedo boat Chonburi had been sunk with a loss of two men, and Songhkli also sank with the loss of 14 men.

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The survivors were rescued by the torpedo boat Rayong, minelayer Nhongarhai and fishery protection vessel Thiew Uthok. These three ships, which had been sheltering to the north of Koh Chang, had chosen not to break cover and thus had not been seen by the Vichy French.

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On 24 the last air battle of the war took place when Thai bombers raided the Vichy French airfield at Angkor near Siem Reap, and the last Thai effort began at 07.10 on the following day, when the B-10 bombers of the 50^th Bomber Squadron set out on a raid on Sisophon, escorted by 13 Hawk 75N fighters of the 60^th Fighter Squadron.

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By the time of the armistice, the Vichy French army had lost 321 men, with another 178 missing. The Thais had captured 222 men. The Thai army suffered a total of 54 men killed in action and 307 wounded, while the navy lost 41 men killed and 67 wounded. The Thai air force lost 13 men. The number of Thai military personnel captured by the Vichy French amounted to just 21.

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At this time Japan intervened to mediate the conflict. A Japanese-sponsored conference was held at Saigon and preliminary documents for an armistice between the governments of Maréchal de France Philippe Pétain’s Vichy France and the Kingdom of Thailand were signed aboard the Japanese light cruiser Natori on 31 January, so paving the way to a general armistice. On 9 May a peace treaty was signed in Tokyo, the Vichy French being coerced by the Japanese to relinquish their hold on the disputed border territories.

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The resolution of the conflict was received with wide acclaim among the Thai people as, for the first time, Thailand had been able to extract concessions from a European power, albeit a weakened one. For the Vichy French in Indo-China, the conflict was a bitter reminder of their isolation following the fall of France to the Germans in June 1940. In the French view, an ambitious neighbour had taken advantage of a distant colony cut off from her weakened parent. Without hope of reinforcements, the French had little chance of offering a sustained resistance.

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The greatest beneficiaries of the conflict were the Japanese, however, for they were then able to expand their influence in both Thailand and French Indo-China. The Japanese won from Thailand a secret verbal promise to support them in the attacks on the British possessions of Malaya and Burma in 'E' (ii) and 'B' (iii) respectively.

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Japan’s intervention had been far from disinterested, however, for the Japanese had seen this as an opportunity to pave the way toward their use of Indo-Chinese ports and air bases. As part of the process, the Japanese held secret discussions were held with the Thai prime minister, Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, in which the Japanese military sought free passage through Thailand. Phibunsongkhram had responded positively, but his later actions showed that he may in fact have been uncertain, as he had concluded the British-Thai Non-Aggression Pact on 12 June 1940. By February, the British had started to suspect that the Japanese were planning to attack their possessions in South-East Asia, and were therefore increasingly concerned that the Japanese might establish bases in Thailand in order to further that end.

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The situation with which Phibunsongkhram was faced was that France had been defeated by Germany in June 1940, and that the UK was heavily engaged in the west against Germany and Italy; that up to this time the USA had taken a neutral stance on both the European war and the Japanese war with China; and that Japan was at that time the local super-power with increasing military strength in French Indo-China. It is probable that in such circumstances Phibunsongkhram believed that he had little alternative, for Thailand’s would have been unable on their own to check, let alone defeat, any Japanese military foray into Thailand. Moreover, Thailand’s aggression against French Indo-China in 1940 made it politically difficult for the US government to support Phibunsongkhram.

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In the middle of 1941, Phibunsongkhram sought British and US guarantees of effective support in the event that Thailand was invaded. Neither the UK nor the USA could give any such guarantee although the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, favoured the issue of a public warning to Japan that an invasion of Thailand would result in a British declaration of war. The USA could not support this proposition, though, and the UK was not prepared to make the declaration alone.

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By August, the UK and USA had instituted severe economic sanctions against Japan. The Japanese attempted to have the sanctions lifted by promising not to encroach into Thailand and to withdraw its forces from French Indo-China provided that the USA withdrew its support for China, but this proposal was unacceptable to the UK ands USA because of its wholly negative impact on China.

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Late in November, the rapid strengthening of the Japanese forces in French Indo-China persuaded the British that there was a high probability of a Japanese attack on Thailand. On 1 December, General Hideki Togo, the prime minister of Japan stated that he was uncertain of Thailand’s position vis-à-vis Thailand’s stance on allowing Japanese troops free passage through its territory, but was hopeful a clash could be avoided. Further negotiations took place between the Japanese diplomatic representative and Phibunsongkhram on 2 December. Phibunsongkhram was prepared to ignore any Japanese operations on the isthmus of Kra, but wished the Japanese not to pass through the Bangkok plain. After further discussions on 3 December, Phibunsongkhram agreed to the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand in exchange for the territories it had ceded in the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, and also the Shan state of eastern Burma.

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On 2 December, the Japanese issued the order setting in motion the final events which triggered the Pacific War between Japan and the USA, UK and Netherlands. The main invasion fleet for 'E' (ii), as the invasion of Thailand and Malaya was codenamed, departed Sanya (otherwise Samah) on the Chinese island of Hainan during the morning of 4 December. The core of the force was provided by 18 transport vessels carrying 26,640 men of Lieutenant General Takuro Matsui’s 5^th Division and the 56^th Regiment of Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi’s 18^th Division. The transport vessels were escorted by the 3^rd Destroyer Flotilla, comprising the light cruiser Sendai and destroyers of the 12^th Destroyer Division (Murakumo, Shinonome, Shirakumo and Usugumo), 19^th Destroyer Division (Isonami, Uranami, Shikinami and Ayanami) and 20^th Destroyer Division (Amagiri, Asagiri and Yugiri). Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s flagship, the heavy cruiser Chokai, escorted by the destroyer Sagiri, provided heavy support, and at the same time Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita’s 7^th Cruiser Squadron (heavy cruisers Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami and Suzuya) and the 11^th Destroyer Division (Fubuki, Hatsuyuki and Shirayuki) departed as the covering force.

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On 4 December Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commander of the 2^nd Fleet, departed the Pescadores island group, a concentration point in the South China Sea to the west of Formosa, with the 1^st Division of the 4^th Cruiser Squadron, comprising the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the 2^nd Division of the 3^rd Battleship Squadron, comprising Haruna and Kongo, as a distant escort force, for the landings on the east coast of Malaya and on Luzon in the Philippine islands group. These heavy warships were screened by the 4^th Destroyer Division (Arashi, Hagikaze, Maikaze and Nowake), the 2^nd Group of the 6^th Destroyer Division (Ikazuchi and Inazuma) and the 8^th Destroyer Division (Asashio, Oshio, Michishio and Arashio).

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On 5 December the convoy was joined by the minesweepers W-2, W-3 and W-4 from Cam Ranh Bay in French Indo-China, and W-1, W-5 and W-6, a division of submarine chasers, the minelayer Hatsutaka and two transports from Poulo Condore island to the south-east of French Indo-China’s southern tip.

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In the afternoon of 5 December Ozawa’s 1^st Southern Expeditionary Fleet departed Saigon with the light cruiser Kashii and four transports and the escort vessel Shimushu with three transports, carrying units of the 143^rd Regiment of Lieutenant General Hiroshi Takeuchi’s 55^th Division, and these joined the convoy to the south of Cape Camao on 6 December.

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It was in this area, at about 12.00 on 6 December, that one of three Lockheed Hudson maritime reconnaissance aircraft of the RAAF’s No. 1 Squadron on a reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea, located three Japanese ships steaming to the west, and then, some 15 minutes later, sighted the 1^st Southern Expeditionary Fleet's convoy, and reported it as comprising one battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and 22 transports. Kamikawa Maru, one of the two merchant seaplane tenders with the convoy, launched a Mitsubishi F1M 'Pete' floatplane to intercept the Hudson, but the Australian aeroplane took cover in cloud and thereby evaded the Japanese aeroplane. A few minutes later, a second Hudson also sighted the convoy.

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Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British commander-in-chief of the Far East Command, was advised of the sightings at 14.00. Not authorised to take any action against the convoy as the UK was not then at war with Japan, the Japanese intentions were unclear, and no aggressive action had been taken against British or Thai territory, Brooke-Popham could only put his forces in Malaya on full alert and order continued surveillance of the convoy.

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To cover the Japanese operation, the submarines I-121 and I-122 had laid barrages, each comprising 42 mines, off the north-eastern exits from Singapore during the night of 6/7 December. The auxiliary minelayer Tatsumiya Maru laid a field of 456 mines between Tioman and Anamba islands, and, slightly farther to the north, the submarines I-54 and I-55 took up positions to the north-east of Kuantan and I-53 to the north of Anamba. Off Trengganu, I-57, I-58, I-62, I-64 and I-66 established a patrol line, and I-57 was stationed to the north-east of Redang.

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At about 12.00 on 7 December the convoy split into its attack groups. From the 1^st Southern Expeditionary Fleet, one transport proceeded to Prachuab, two to Jumbhorn, one with Kashii to Bandon, and three with Shimushu to Nakhorn to block the Kra isthmus. The main force, now comprising 17 transports, the destroyers of the 20^th Destroyer Division and 12^th Destroyer Division, four minesweepers, the submarine chaser division and nine assault vessels, proceeded to Singora (otherwise Songhkla) and Patani in south-eastern Thailand, and Sendai, the destroyers of the 19^th Destroyer Division, the minesweepers W-2 and W-3, submarine chasers and three transports, proceeded to Khota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya. Chokai and Sagiri joined Kurita’s warship group to the south of Cape Camao.

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While the Japanese were preparing and starting the commitment of their invasion forces, meanwhile, the British and Americans were formulating their response to the Japanese troop buildup and the potential invasion of Thailand. Phibunsongkhram, on the same day he reached an agreement with the Japanese, advised the British that Thailand was about to be invaded by the Japanese.

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At 03.00 on 7 December, Ozawa ordered patrols into the area between Malaya and the convoy, which was at this time about 115 miles (185 km) from Kota Bharu and proceeding to the west through heavy rain and zero visibility. Kamikawa Maru and Sagara Maru, the other merchant seaplane tender, launched 11 F1M2 and six Aichi E13A 'Jake' reconnaissance floatplanes. At 08.20, at a point about 20 miles (32 km) to the west north-west of Panjang island, one of the E13A floatplanes from Kamikawa Maru spotted a Consolidated Catalina flying boat of the RAF’s No. 205 Squadron, and attacked this, in the process destroying its radio equipment. The Japanese aeroplane shadowed the Catalina for 25 minutes until five Nakajima Ki-27 'Nate' land-based fighters of the Imperial Japanese army air force’s 1^st Sentai in southern Indo-China arrived and shot down the flying boat. This was, in point of time, the first military action of the 'Greater East Asian War'. Unaware of this incident, the British took no action.

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At 11.00 on 7 December, the Japanese presented the Thai government with an ultimatum to allow the Japanese military to enter Thailand, and demanded an answer within two hours.

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On this date Thailand had an army of 26,500 regulars and about 23,500 reservists. It also had an air force of some 270 aircraft, of which 150 were combat aircraft, many of them of US origin, and Japan had provided Thailand with 93 more modern aircraft in December 1940. The Thai navy was poorly trained and equipped, and had lost a substantial number of vessels in its conflict with French Indo-China.

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The forces in the Kra isthmus included the 38^th Battalion stationed at Ban Na Nian near Chumphon, the 39^th Battalion, 15^th Artillery Battalion and headquarters of Major General Luang Senanarong’s 6^th Division at Tambon Pak Phoon near Nakhon Si Thammarat, the 40^th Battalion at Trang, the 5^th Battalion at Khao Kho Hong near Singora, the 41^st Battalion at Suan Tun near Singora, the 13^th Artillery Battalion at Suan Tun near Singora, and the 42^nd Battalion at Tambon Bo Thong near Patani.

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The Japanese had entrusted operations in Thailand and Malaya to Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida’s 15^th Army and Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 25^th Army. Both of these formations were stationed in French Indo-China, and each had its own air support elements. The 15^th Army was tasked with the attack on Thailand and thence Burma, and the 25^th Army with the seizure of Malaya and the capture of Singapore. In order to attack Burma, the 15^th Army needed to pass through the Bangkok plain, while the 25^th Army needed to attack Malaya via the Kra isthmus. The Japanese attack Malaya and Singapore through southern Thailand had been planned by Colonel Masanobu Tsuji while he was on the strength of Taiwan Army Unit 82 (Strike South Planning), as noted above, and the Japanese needed to pass about 100,000 troops through Thailand.

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As noted above, it was ships of Kondo’s 2^nd Fleet which provided support and cover for the landings in Thailand and at Khota Bharu in Malaya. The most important ships involved in the Thai operations were the light cruiser Kashii escorting seven transports carrying troops of the 143^rd Regiment from Saigon in French Indo-China; the destroyers Asagiri, Amagiri, Sagiri, Yugiri, Shirakumo and Shinonome supporting the landings of the 25^th Army in southern Thailand, the escort Shimushu convoying the transports Zenyo Maru, Miike Maru and Toho Maru to Nakorn Sri Thammarat in southern Thailand with more men of the 143^rd Regiment, and the merchant seaplane carriers Kamikawa Maru and Sagara Maru. In total, there were 18 transports involved, this total including used to land troops at Khota Bharu.

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Japanese invaded Thailand overland from French Indo-China and with landings to the south of Bangkok and at various points along the Kra isthmus because Thailand had not responded to the ultimatum. The problem for the Thai government was that it could not contact Pribunsongkhram in this period.

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At first light on 8 December Lieutenant General Takuma Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division, Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai’s 33^rd Division and Lieutenant General Hiroshi Takeuchi’s 55^th Division of Iida’s 15^th Army advanced advanced across the border from French Indo-China into Thailand’s recently reclaimed Phra Tabong Province at Savay Donkeo near Battambang. The Japanese met no Thai resistance, and from Sisophon swung to the north-west into the Aranyaprathet district of Prachinburi Province along the nearly finished railway link between Aranyaprathet and Monkhol Bourei.

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The 1/143^rd Regiment of the 55^th Division landed from two transport ships at Chumphon on the morning of December and, while managing to establish perimeter round their beach-head, were pinned down by the determined resistance of the 52^nd Youth Army Training Unit of the Thai Youth Army’s Sriyaphai School, the 38^th Battalion and Provincial Police of Chumpon. Fighting ended in the afternoon when the Thais received orders to cease fire.

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The Japanese transport vessels Zenyo Maru, Miike Maru and Toho Maru anchored off the south-east coast of Thailand near Nakorn Sri Thammarat, under the cover of Shimushu's guns, during the evening of 7 December. The transport ships carried 1,510 men and 50 trucks of the 3/143^rd Regiment, the 18^th Air District Regiment along with an army air force signals unit, the 32^nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion and the 6^th Labour Construction Company. Shortly after 24.00 on the night of 7/8 December, the ships began to land their troops at Tha Phae (otherwise Pak Phoon) canal. This was just to the north of Camp Vajiravudh, the Thai army’s main base in the area. Notified earlier of the Japanese invasion at Songkhla, the Thais immediately went into action, and the resulting battle lasted until 12.00, when Phibunsongkhram’s cease fire order was received.

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Prachuap Khiri Khan was the base of the Royal Thai Air Force’s 5^th Wing, under the command of Wing Commander M. L. Pravat Chumsai. The 2/143^rd Regiment under Major Kisoyoshi Utsunomiya landed at 03.00 from one ship, and occupied the town after having crushed police resistance there. More landings took place near the airfield to the south. The Japanese laid siege to the airfield, but the Thai airmen along with the Prachuap Khirikhan Provincial Police managed to hold out until 12.00 on the next day, when they received orders from the Thai government to cease fighting. The Japanese lost 115 dead according to Japanese estimates, and 217 dead and more than 300 wounded according to Thai estimates. The Thais lost 37 dead and 27 wounded.

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The 3/Imperial Guards Regiment landed at Samut Prakan in the early hours of 8 December with orders to take Bangkok, the Thai capital. The force was met by a small Thai police detachment. Despite a tense confrontation, fighting did not occur and the Japanese subsequently agreed not to enter the Thai capital until formal negotiations had been concluded.

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Japanese aircraft bombed Bangkok. While police rounded up Japanese residents, the Thai cabinet debated its options. Some favoured continued resistance, including the establishment of a government in exile, but when Phibunsongkhram arrived the decision was made to accede to the Japanese demands. Japanese warplanes also attacked the Thai air base at Don Muang, and here the Thais lost six fighters in combat against a numerically superior Japanese force.

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One company of the 1/143^rd Regiment landed from a transport ship at the coastal village of Ban Don in the early hours of 8 December, and marched to Surat Thani, where it was opposed by Royal Thai police and civilian volunteers. There was desultory fighting amid a rainstorm, and this ended only in the afternoon when the hard pressed Thais received orders to lay down their arms after losing about 17 men killed and an unknown number of wounded. The Japanese then moved into Bangkok, occupying Chinatown (Sampeng) and turning the chamber of commerce building into their headquarters.

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As a result of its proximity to the border with Malaya, Patani was the second most important objective of the 25^th Army. Here the landing involved five transport vessels escorted and supported by eight destroyers including Shirakumo and Shinonome. The landing of the 5^th Division's 42^nd Regiment, under the command of Major Shigeharu Asaeda, was made despite the roughness of the sea and the unsuitability of the selected landing beach. Earlier a member of the Taiwan Army Unit 82 (Strike South Planning), Asaeda had been involved with pre-war gathering of intelligence in Burma, Thailand and Malaya, and it had been he who selected Patani as a suitable landing site. Unknown to Asaeda, however, behind the sandy beach was an area of mud which gave the invaders considerable difficulty. The invaders were effectively opposed by the 42^nd Battalion, Patani Provincial Police and 66^th Youth Army Training Unit of the Benjama Rachoothit School of the Thai Youth Army until the regular battalion was ordered to cease fire at 12.00. The Thai deaths were the regular battalion commander, 23 other ranks, five men of the Patani Provincial Police, four members of the Thai Youth Army and nine civilians.

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The port city of Singora was one of the 25^th Army's primary objectives, and during the early hours of 8 December, three regiments of the 5^th Division under the command of Colonel Tsuji came ashore from 10 transport vessels, supported by the destroyers Asagiri, Amagiri, Sagiri and Yugiri. The Thai garrison at Khao Khor Hong (the 41^st Battalion and the 13^th Artillery Battalion) immediately occupied positions flanking the roads south toward Malaya, but were brushed aside into secondary positions which the main Japanese advance could ignore. A further clash occurred at Hat Yai, and in the Singora area the Thais lost 15 men killed and between 30 and 55 men wounded before the fighting ended with the orders for an armistice were received.

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Once the fighting had ended, the 15^th Army's 143^rd Regiment moved to the north to replace the Imperial Guards Division, which then headed to the south to join the 25^th Army in the campaign to take Malaya and Singapore, and the 15^th Army moved to the west for the 'B' (iii) invasion of Burma.

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Phibunsongkhram’s decision to sign an armistice with Japan effectively ended Churchill’s hope, never more than illusory, of forging an alliance with Thailand. Phibunsongkhram also granted Japan permission to use Thailand as a base of operations for the invasion of Malaya. Within hours of the armistice, numbers of Japanese aircraft had flown into Singora airfield from French Indo-China, and this allowed the Japanese to make comparatively short-range bombing attacks on strategic bases in Malaya and Singapore. From the time of the armistice, the UK and USA regarded the whole of Thailand as Japanese-occupied territory.

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On 14 December, Phibunsongkhram signed a secret agreement with the Japanese committing Thai troops in the Malaya and Burma campaigns, and on 21 December a formal alliance between Thailand and Japan was signed. On 25 January 1942 the Thailand declared war on the UK and USA, and in response all Thai assets in the USA were frozen by the government. While the Thai ambassador in London delivered the declaration of war to the British government, Seni Pramoj, the Thai ambassador to the USA, refused to do so and instead began to organise a Free Thai movement.

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The occupation of Thailand secured the south-western flank of the first phase of Japan’s primary objective in entering World War II, namely the seizure of the resources-rich 'Southern Resources Area' centred on the Dutch East Indies which, among it other resources, had a major oil industry and also large stocks of refined oil products. The Japanese reckoned that the advantages of seizing and holding this vital resources area, together with the area that flanked this southward expansion on the east and west, more than offset the dangers of committing Japan to war with the Netherlands, the UK and the USA.

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The Japanese estimated that the British had 70,000 men and 320 aircraft in Malaya to the south of Thailand (southern flank) and 35,000 men and 60 aircraft in Burma to the west of Thailand (western flank), the Americans 42,000 men and 170 aircraft in the Philippine islands group (eastern flank), and the Dutch 85,000 men and 300 aircraft in the East Indies (south-eastern flank) which were the primary objective.

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The Japanese also reckoned that these 232,000 men and 850 aircraft, supported by not insignificant naval forces, were of indifferent quality, however. According to the Japanese, many of the army formations were 'colonial' and thus poorly trained, equipped and motivated, the aircraft were obsolete, and the majority of the ships also of second-line quality.

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The Japanese therefore believed that 'B' (ii) against Borneo, 'H' against Celebes, 'J' against Java, and 'L' against Sumatra, together with 'M' against the Philippines, 'E' (ii) against Malaya and 'B' (iii) against Burma could be accomplished successfully by comparatively small but higher-quality forces.

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Thus the Japanese expansion to the south was to be undertaken by 11 army divisions and a number of army and naval special forces totalling 200,000 men, 700 army and 1,600 navy first-line aircraft supported by 1,500 army and 3,300 navy reserve aircraft, and naval forces which were superior in numbers as well as quality.

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Moreover, the Japanese believed that so long as they retained the strategic initiative, they could use their greater maritime capability to ensure local superiority of force to ensure victories that were both complete and, just as importantly, timely so that men and equipment could them be switched to other areas should this prove necessary.

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Another element rated very highly in the Japanese plans was complete air superiority over the land battlefield, largely through the range capabilities of their two most important aircraft types, the supremely agile and well-armed Mitsubishi A6M Reisen 'Zero' fighter and the high-performance Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bomber.

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The Japanese invasion of Malaya began just after 00.00 on 8 December 1941 (local time), which was before the 'Ai' attack on Pearl Harbor, and was the first major campaign of the Pacific War. At the time of the Japanese assault, Khota Bharu, the capital of Kelantan State on Malaya’s north-east coast, was the Royal Air Force’s and Royal Australian Air Force’s base of operations in northern Malaya. There was an airstrip at Kota Bharu and two others at Gong Kedah and Machang. Japanese losses in the first phase of their invasion were significant as a result of sporadic Australian air attacks, the Indian-manned coastal defences, and British artillery fire.

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The Japanese invasion plan involved landing men of the 5^th Division at Patani and Singora on Thailand’s south-east coast, and men of the 18^th Division at Khota Bharu. The forces in Thailand were to push almost straight to the south and thereby reach the western coastal area of Malaya in the region of Taiping (from Patani) and Alor Star (from Singora) and thus invade Malaya from the north-western province of Kedah, while the eastern forces would attack from Khota Bharu down the east coast of Malaya.

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The British plan against an attack from Thailand into north-western Malaya was based on the 'Krohcol' pre-emptive strike into southern Thailand with the object of taking operationally vital positions and thereby delay the Japanese attack. The British plan for the defence of the east coast was based on fixed beach defences manned by Major General A. E. Barstow’s Indian 9^th Infantry Division along the northern stretch of the coast and by two-thirds of Major General H. G. Bennett’s Australian 8^th Division along the southern stretch. (The other third of the Australian 8^th Division was on Ambon and West Timor in the Dutch East Indies, and at Rabaul on New Britain island in the Bismarck islands group.)

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The Japanese attackers were part of Yamashita’s 25^th Army which, as noted above, departed Sanya on the island of Hainan on 4 December in a convoy later supplemented by other transport vessels from Saigon in the southern part of French Indo-China. It was when this convoy was spotted by air reconnaissance, as noted above, that Admiral Sir Thomas Phillips, the British commander-in-chief, China Station, ordered the cancellation of the planned visit of the battle-cruiser Repulse to Darwin in northern Australia and the ship’s immediate return to Singapore to rejoin the battleship Prince of Wales, which was Phillips’s only other capital ship.

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Before their invasion, the Japanese had recruited a small number of disaffected Malays into a 'fifth column' organisation called the Tortoise Society. The Malayan police knew of the society’s existence and had arrested a number of its leaders just before the Japanese landings, but at Khota Bharu members of the society were on hand to provide assistance and act as guides.

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Brooke-Popham feared that the Japanese were hoping to provoke a British attack and thus provide a casus belli, and thus hesitated on 7 December to launch the 'Matador', the British plan to destroy the invasion force before or during its landing. Brooke-Popham decided to delay the operation, at least for the night. Shortly after 00.00 on 8 December, Indian soldiers patrolling the beaches at Khota Bharu spotted the transport ships Awazisan Maru, Ayatosan Maru and Sakura Maru as they anchored about 1.9 miles (3 km) off the coast. These ships were carrying some 5,200 men of Major General Hiroshi Takumi’s 'Takumi' Detachment, otherwise the 23^rd Brigade. Most of these troops were veterans of the war in China.

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The Japanese invasion force consisted of units from Mutaguchi’s 18^th Division. The initial landing force comprised men of Colonel Yoshio Nasu’s 56^th Regiment on board Sakura Maru, supported by one battery of Lieutenant Colonel Katsutoshi Takasu’s 18^th Mountain Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ichie Fujii’s 12^th Engineer Regiment, the 18^th Division Signals Unit, one company of the 12^th Transport Regiment, one company of the 18^th Division Medical Unit and No. 2 Field Hospital of the 18^th Division Medical Unit. The transport vessels were escorted by the warships Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto’s Kota Bharu Invasion Force, namely the light cruiser Sendai, destroyers Ayanami, Isonami, Shikinami and Uranami, minesweepers W-2 and W-3, and submarine chaser Ch-9.

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The invasion began with a bombardment at about 00.30 on 8 December at a time when the Japanese carrierborne warplanes flying toward Pearl Harbor were about 50 minutes away from their targets, which were attacked from 01.18 local time, although it is usually known as the 7 December attack as it occurred during the morning of 7 December, US time. Loading of the landing craft began almost as soon as the transport vessels had anchored, but was hampered by rough water and strong wind, which caused several of the smaller craft to capsize with the loss of some men drowned. Despite these difficulties, by 00.45 the first wave of landing craft was heading for the beach in four lines.

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The defending force was Brigadier B. W. Key’s Indian 8^th Brigade of Barstow’s Indian 9^th Division, supported by four 3.7-in (94-mm) howitzers of Major J. B. Soper’s Indian 21^st Mountain Battery. Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Preston’s 3/17^th Dogra Regiment was responsible for the defence of the 10-mile (16-km) stretch of coast which the Japanese had chosen as their landing site. The Indian troops had fortified the narrow beaches and islands with land mines, barbed wire and pillboxes, and were supported by the 73^rd Field Battery of the British 5^th Field Regiment deployed just beside the nearby airfield. The area defended by the 3/17^th Dogras consisted of the narrow beaches of Badang and Sabak at Khota Bharu, and was split by two estuaries leading from the mouth of the Pengkalan Chapa river through a maze of creeks, lagoons and swampy islands, behind which was the Kota Bharu airfield and the main road inland.

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By midnight, the first waves of landing craft were carrying Japanese troops toward the beach front, but the Japanese first and second waves were pinned by the intense fire from the Dogras' pillboxes and trenches. After vicious hand-to-hand fighting the Japanese effected a breach in the defences on the southern bank of the estuary. On the northern bank the Japanese were pinned on an island, where dawn found them trapped in the open. Allied aircraft began to attack the invasion fleet and the soldiers trapped on the island.

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The Japanese managed to get off the beach only after the two pill box positions and supporting trenches had been destroyed, and the Dogras were forced to retreat to their defences in front of the airfield. Key now committed his reserve, namely the 2/12^th Frontier Force Regiment and the 1/13^th Frontier Force Rifles, in support the Dogras. At 10.30 Key ordered an attempt to retake the lost beaches with attacks by the 2/12^th Frontier Force Regiment from the south and the 1/13^th Frontier Force Rifles from the north. The fighting was heavy, and each side suffered more casualties. The British forces made some progress but were unable to close the breach, and during the afternoon a second attack was launched but again failed again to seal the breach.

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The airfield at Kota Bharu had been evacuated, and by dusk on 8 December, in very poor visibility, Japanese troops were able to infiltrate between the British units. Given that landings might also be made farther to the south, Key asked Barstow and Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath, commander of the Indian III Corps, for authority to withdraw if necessary.

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The RAAF’s No. 1 Squadron, based at Khota Bharu, committed 10 Hudson bombers, each carrying four 250-lb (113-kg) bombs to attack the Japanese transports. In the 17 sorties flown, the squadron lost two Hudson aircraft shot down and three badly damaged. One Hudson crashed into a fully laden landing craft after being hit while strafing the beach-head, killing some 60 Japanese soldiers on board. Only five Hudson bombers remained airworthy at the end of the battle. All three Japanese transport vessels were severely damaged, but while Ayatosan Maru and Sakura Maru were still able to steam, the 9,794-ton Awazisan Maru was left burning and was abandoned after attacks by aircraft of No. 1 Squadron had killed or wounded at least 110 of her crew. The wreck later sank on its own or, possibly, was torpedoed by the Dutch submarine K XII on 12 December.

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Despite the strength of the defence, Takumi had three full battalions ashore by mid-morning on 8 December. Key’s counterattacks failed and the Japanese took Khota Bharu town on 9 December. After fierce fighting during the night, which threatened the airfield, Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Cumming’s 2/12^th Frontier Force Regiment attempted to hold the airfield and fought a superb rearguard action, but Key then received permission to withdraw from Khota Bharu.

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The Japanese claim that the landings at Khota Bharu saw some of the most violent fighting of the whole Malayan campaign, and it is estimated that they suffered an estimated 300 killed and 500 wounded.

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The battle for Khota Bharu was merely the first step in the Malayan campaign now launched by the Japanese. In December 1941 the Japanese had been engaged for four years in their effort to seize control of China, and were heavily reliant on import the import of raw materials, and especially oil, for the industries supplying their army and navy, but in 1940 and 1941 embargoes on the supply of oil and war materials to Japan were introduced by the USA, UK and Netherlands. The object of the embargoes was to assist the Chinese and persuade the Japanese to halt military action in China. The Japanese considered that pulling out of China would result in loss of face, however, and therefore opted to take military action against the US, British and Dutch territories in South-East Asia, whose important raw material resources would nourish Japanese industry as well as the Japanese military.

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As noted above, the planning of this grand strategic offensive was undertaken by the branch of the Japanese Military Affairs Bureau in Taiwan. Intelligence on Malaya was gathered by mans of agents including Japanese embassy staff, disaffected Malayans (particularly members of the Japanese-sponsored Tortoise Society), and Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese business people and tourists. Japanese spies, which included a traitorous Indian army intelligence officer, also provided intelligence and assistance. Through these means the Japanese had good information about the strengths and locations of the British-led defenders of Malaya, as well as accurate maps of the Malayan peninsula, and had arranged for local guides to provide them with directions.

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The 25^th Army had some 70,000 men and more than 200 Type 95 Ha-Go light, Type 97 Chi-Ha medium and Type 89 I-Go medium tanks, as well as Type 97 Te-Ke tankettes, and was supported by 568 combat aircraft, most of them on the strength of Lieutenant General Michio Sugawara’s 3^rd Air Group (later 3^rd Air Division) of the Imperial Japanese army air force and Rear Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga’s 22^nd Air Flotilla of the Imperial Japanese navy air force.

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Yamashita’s 25^th Army was centred on Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division of three regiments totalling 12,600 men as each regiment had 2,600 men, Matsui’s 5^th Division comprising the 9^th Brigade and 21^st Brigade (each of two regiments) totalling 15,300 men as each regiment had 2,600 men excluding service and rear-area elements, and Mutaguchi’s 18^th Division comprising the 23^rd Brigade and 35^th Brigade (each of two regiments) totalling 22,200 men as each regiment had 3,500 men excluding service and rear-area elements. There were also the 1^st Independent Tank Battalion, eight independent anti-tank companies, and the 3^rd Tank Group, this last comprising the 1^st, 2^nd and 6^th Medium Tank Regiments, and the 14^th Light Tank Regiment. Other elements included two regiments and one battalion of heavy field artillery, one mountain artillery regiment, three mortar battalions (two of them horsed), one field anti-aircraft unit with four battalions, three independent field anti-aircraft battalions, four engineer regiments, and the usual complement of bridging, police, railway, signals, medical and logistic echelons.

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On 8 December 1941 the 88,600 British-led imperial and commonwealth troops were equipped with the Lanchester 6x4 armoured cars, Marmon-Herrington armoured cars, Universal Carriers and just 23 obsolete light tanks, none of them of significant combat value. Under the command of Air Vice Marshal C. W. H. Pulford’s Far East Air Force, there were also 161 combat aircraft including three Dutch flying boats, but half of these were destroyed during the first few days of combat. The aircraft were in the hands of 13 squadrons (four Australian, one New Zealand and eight British), of which seven were based on three airfields on Singapore island, and six on five airfields in northern Malaya.

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On 8 December, Lieutenant General A. E. Percival’s Malaya Command had as its core the majority Indian army component of Heath’s Indian III Corps with its headquarters at Kuala Lumpur. This corps comprised Barstow’s Indian 8^th Division at Kuala Lumpur (Key’s Indian 8^th Brigade at Khota Bharu with four battalions and Brigadier G. W. A. Painter’s Indian 22^nd Brigade at Kuantan with two battalions), Major General D. Murray-Lyon’s Indian 11^th Division at Sungai Petani (Brigadier W. O. Lay’s Indian 6^th Brigade at Jitra with three battalions, Brigadier K. A. Garrett’s Indian 15^th Brigade at Jitra with three battalions as the Indian III Corps' reserve, and the Gurkhas of Brigadier W. St J. Carpendale’s Indian 28^th Brigade at Ipoh with three battalions). The Indian III Corps also had light tank, artillery, anti-tank and engineer elements.

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Brigadier R. G. Moir’d Line of Communications Brigade had four battalions of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces at Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembiland and Pahang, together with one light field artillery regiment and one armoured car squadron. Brigadier C. A. Lyon’s Fortress Penang had one reinforced infantry battalion, one coastal defence artillery regiment and one anti-aircraft regiment. Support units for the Indian III Corps took the form of five Indian infantry battalions (three of them supplied by the Indian States Forces) and one signals regiment.

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Bennett’s Australian 8^th Division was headquartered at Kluang, and comprised Brigadier H. B. Taylor’s Australian 22^nd Brigade at Mersing and Endau with three battalions, and Brigadier D. Maxwell’s Australian 27^th Brigade at Kluang with three infantry battalions, one machine gun battalion and one anti-tank regiment.

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Under the command of Major General F. K. Simmons, and headquartered at Singapore, the Fortress Singapore had Simmons’s own Fortress Singapore Division with Brigadier G. C. R. 1^st Malaya Brigade of three battalions, Brigadier F. H. Fraser’s 2^nd Malaya Brigade with three battalions, Colonel R. G. Grimwood’s Straits Settlements Volunteer Force Brigade with three infantry battalions and one armoured car company, Brigadier I. Simson’s Royal Engineers Brigade with four fortress companies of the Royal Engineers, and Brigadier A. W. G. Wildey’s Artillery Brigade with two coastal regiments of the Royal Artillery, one defence regiment of the Royal Artillery, two heavy anti-aircraft regiments, and four other anti-aircraft regiments.

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Support was provided by two half-strength infantry battalions.

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Brigadier A. C. M. Paris’s Malaya Command Reserve comprised Paris’s own Indian 12^th Brigade headquartered at Port Dickson with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion.

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Between the wars, British strategy in the Far East was undermined by the twin vices of lack of attention and lack of adequate funding. In 1937, Major General W. G. S. Dobbie, the officer commanding the Malaya Command (1935/39), undertook an examination of Malaya’s defences and reported that during the October/March monsoon season, enemy landings could be made on the east coast and bases established in Siam (from June 1939 Thailand). Dobbie warned that landings could be made at Singora and Patani in south-eastern Siam, and at Khota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya, and recommended the immediate despatch to Malaya of large reinforcements. Dobbie’s predictions proved to be prescient, but his recommendations were ignored. The British government’s plans for the defence of Malaya were posited on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore naval base in the event of hostilities, in order to defend both the UK’s Far Eastern possessions and the maritime route to Australia and New Zealand. It was also believed that a strong naval presence would serve as an effective deterrent to possible aggression.

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By 1940, however, Dobbie’s successor, Major General L. V. Bond, conceded that a successful defence of Singapore demanded the defence of the whole peninsula, and that the naval base alone would not be sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion. Military planners concluded that the desired air strength in Malaya was some 300 to 500 aircraft, but this was never reached because of the higher priorities in the allocation of men and matériel for the UK and the British possessions in the Middle East.

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The British strategy for the defence of Malaya was posited on two primary assumptions: firstly, that there would be warning of an invasion in time to allow for the reinforcement of British troops, and secondly, that US aid would be provided in the event of an attack. By a time late in 1941, it had become clear that neither of these assumptions was valid. Moreover, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed that in the event of the war spreading to Asia and the Pacific, priority would be given first to finishing the war in the west against Germany. Up to that time, the war in the east would have only a secondary priority, and thus containment was considered the primary strategy for operations in the east.

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In was in November 1941 that the British became aware of the major enlargement of Japanese military strength in French Indo-China. Thailand as well as Malaya was seen as threatened by this development. British strategists had foreseen the possibility that the Japanese might use the Kra isthmus of Thailand as a stepping stone to an invasion of Malaya, and it was to counteract this potential threat that the 'Matador' plan was developed for a pre-emptive invasion of southern Thailand. However, by the time the invasion became probable, the British had decided for political and diplomatic reasons not to implement any such plan.

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As noted above, the Malayan campaign began on 8 December as the 25^th Army landed at Khota Bharu and then began to advance to the south along the east coast of Malaya. This began at the same time as the Japanese landings at Patani and Singora in Thailand, whence the Japanese started to move directly to the south across the Thai/Malay frontier to attack the north-western portion of Malaya.

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With the collaboration of the Vichy French, the Japanese had gained access to naval facilities and supplies in French Indo-China, and it was here that they massed their forces for the invasions of Thailand and Malaya. The Japanese then coerced the Thai government, in a short campaign, into letting them use Thai military bases to launch attacks into Malaya. At 04.00, 17 bombers of the Imperial Japanese naval air force attacked Singapore, the first ever air raid aimed at the colony, and it thus became clear that Japanese bombers operating from the area of Saigon in French Indo-China were within range of Singapore.

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The Japanese were initially resisted in northern Malaya by Heath’s Indian III Corps and several British battalions. The Japanese quickly isolated individual Indian units defending the coast before concentrating their forces to surround the defenders and force them to surrender.

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The Japanese forces held only a slight numerical advantage on the ground in northern Malaya, but were significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience, for most of the Japanese formations and units were combat veterans of the war in China. The British had no effective armour, which had put them at a severe disadvantage. The Japanese also used bicycle infantry and light tanks, the former able to carry significant loads, which allowed swift movement overland across terrain covered with thick tropical rain forest, albeit criss-crossed by native paths. Although the Japanese had not brought bicycles with them (in order to speed the disembarkation process), they knew from their intelligence that suitable machines were plentiful in Malaya and quickly confiscated what they needed from civilians and retailers.

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A replacement for 'Matador', the 'Krohcol' undertaking was implemented on 8 December, but the Indian troops were easily defeated by the 5^th Division, which had already landed at Patani in Thailand.

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Phillips’s Force 'Z', known until recently as Force 'W', comprised the new battleship Prince of Wales, older battle-cruiser Repulse and modern destroyers Electra, Encounter, Express and Jupiter. Force 'G' had arrived just before the outbreak of hostilities. The force had been despatched to Singapore for deterrence or, failing that, the interception and destruction of any Japanese invasion fleet to the north-east of Malaya.

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In December 1941, as a deterrent to Japanese territorial expansion, recently demonstrated by the invasion of French Indo-China, it had been proposed that a force of Royal Navy warships be sent to the Far East with a view to providing reinforcement for the British possessions there, most especially Singapore. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, maintained that Singapore could be defended adequately only if the Royal Navy sent the majority of its capital ships there, to achieve parity with an estimated force of nine Japanese battleships. However, the despatch of so large a British force was impossible as the British were already at war with Germany and Italy and needed as great a strength as possible for current commitments in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, and in the Mediterranean Sea. Even so, Churchill was optimistic about the improving situation in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and therefore advocated sending two capital ships along with an aircraft carrier to defend Malaya, Borneo and the Straits Settlements. The plan was cut back to the battleship and battle-cruiser after the fleet carrier Indomitable suffered damage when she ran aground in the Caribbean Sea. Another carrier, the older and smaller Hermes, which was with Prince of Wales at Cape Town, was on passage to Singapore, but was not deployed as a result of her lack of speed.

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The despatch of capital ships to Singapore had been part of the Admiralty’s strategic planning since the establishment of the naval base. The scale of this planned deployment had been reduced during the 1930s as Germany and Italy came to present new and greater threats to British interests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that a significant force of capital ships would deter Japanese expansion. Churchill’s plan was based on the assumption that the USA would agree to send its Pacific Fleet, including eight battleships, to Singapo