The 'Jatkosota' was the Finnish war against the USSR as the 'Continuation War' of the 'Talvisota' (Winter War) (25 June 1941/19 September 1944).

As such, this was therefore the second of the two wars fought between Finland and the USSR as part of World War II. At the time of the war, the Finns adopted the name 'Jatkosota' to emphasise the war’s relationship to the 'Talvisota', while the USSR saw the war as part of its struggle against Nazi Germany and its allies the Eastern Front campaign of the 'Great Patriotic War', and Germany regarded its operations in the region as part of its overall war efforts on the Eastern Front, and provided Finland with significant matériel support as well as military co-operation.

It is worth noting that Finland and Germany were not treaty bound to each other, and Finland was therefore not a German ally but rather a co-belligerent against the USSR.

Limited fighting between Finnish and Soviet forces began on 22 June, the day of which Germany launched its 'Barbarossa' invasion of the USSR, but open warfare began with a Soviet air offensive on 25 June. Finnish land operations then retook the areas of the Karelian isthmus and Ladoga Karelia which Finland had been compelled to cede to the USSR at the end of the 'Talvisota', and seized East Karelia by September 1941. On the Karelian isthmus, the Finns ended their offensive 18.5 miles (30 km) from Leningrad along the pre-World War II Russo-Finnish frontier. Finnish forces played no direct part in the siege of Leningrad, instead being content to hold their pre-World War II territory on the Karelian isthmus for some 30 months. In 1944 Soviet aircraft made raids on Helsinki and other major Finnish cities, and in the summer of the same year the Soviet 'Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation', 'Vyborg Offensive Operation' and 'Svir-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation' drove the Finns from most of their gains before being halted in July and August 1944. A ceasefire ended hostilities on 5 September, and was followed by the Moscow armistice on 19 September. The 1947 Paris treaty concluded the war formally, Finland ceding Petsamo to the Soviets, leasing Porkkala to them, and paying US $226.5 million in reparations.

The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940 and ended the 'Talvisota' and cost Finland some 9.1% of its national territory and 13% of its economic capacity. Up to the time of the 'Talvisota', Finland had based its foreign policy on a series of multi-lateral guarantees of support from the League of Nations and Nordic countries, and was thus considered a failure. Finnish public opinion desired the reconquest of Finnish Karelia. The Finnish government declared the country’s defence to be its first priority, and military expenditures rose to nearly half of government spending, and Finland either bought or received as donations considerable matériel immediately after the 'Talvisota' to supplement that it had gained during the 'Talvisota'.

On Finland’s southern coast the USSR had acquired a military base in Hanko west of the capital, Helsinki, and this was garrisoned by more than 30,000 Soviet military personnel. Finland also had to resettle some 420,000 evacuees from the the territories it had lost, and to ensure the provision of adequate food supplies it was necessary to clear new land for the evacuees to cultivate. The Finnish government wished to preserve the spirit of national unanimity that had been evident during the 'Talvisota', so the celebration of the White victory over the Reds in the Finnish civil war (January/May 1918) was ended.

Relations between Finland and the USSR remained strained despite, or probably because of, the signature of the one-sided peace treaty, and there were also several disputes about the implementation of the treaty’s conditions. Finland sought security against further Soviet territorial ambitions and proposed mutual defence agreements with Norway and Sweden, but these initiatives were quashed by Moscow.

After the 'Talvisota', Germany was unpopular in Finland as it was considered an ally of the USSR, but the Finnish government nonetheless began to restore practical diplomatic relations with Germany. Finland continued its western-aligned policy and negotiated a war trade agreement with the UK, but the agreement was renounced after Germany’s 'Weserübung' invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, when the UK cut all trade and traffic communications with Scandinavia. With the fall of France in June 1940, a continued policy of western alignment was seem as an impossible option in Finnish foreign policy. On 15/16 June the USSR occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the east coast of the Baltic Sea and installed puppet regimes, but within two months had annexed all three of these states s Soviet republics.

By the middle of 1940, therefore, the two remaining northern democracies, Finland and Sweden, had been encircled by the totalitarian states of Germany and the USSR. On 23 June, a short time after the Soviets began to occupy the Baltic states, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, contacted the Finns to demand a Soviet licence for the nickel mines in Petsamo, or alternately the establishment of a joint Soviet-Finnish company to operate them. The licence to mine the deposit had earlier been granted to a British/Canadian company, and the proposition was rejected. In the following month, the Soviets demanded that Finland destroy the fortifications built in the Åland islands and give the Soviets the right to use Finnish railways to transport troops to the new Soviet base at Hanko. The Finns very reluctantly agreed to these demands. On 24 July, Molotov accused the Finnish government of persecuting the so-called Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and USSR, a pro-communist group, and soon after this he publicly gave this group Soviet support. A Soviet front, the society organised demonstrations, some of which turned into riots.

On 31 July Adolf Hitler gave the order for the German military command to the start the planning of an invasion of the USSR. This meant that Germany had to reassess its position in relation to Finland and Romania on the northern and southern flanks of the planned undertaking. Up to this time Germany had rejected Finnish attempts to buy weapons, but in August the Germans allowed the secret sale of war matériel to Finland. German and Finnish military authorities reached agreement on 12 September, and an official exchange of diplomatic notes followed on 22 September. At the same time, the Finns granted permission for German troops to transit through Finland; a similar agreement was reached by Germany with Sweden.

In practice, this meant Germany had redrawn the northern border of German and Soviet spheres of influence. As a result, Molotov visited Berlin on 12/13 November to demand both the German withdrawal of troops from Finland and the end of German acquiescence to Finnish anti-Soviet sentiments. He also reminded the Germans of the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. When asked by Hitler how the USSR planned to settle the 'Finnish question', Molotov responded that this would be achieved in the same manner that had been employed in Bessarabia (seized from Romania in 1940) and the Baltic states. Hitler rejected this.

During December the USSR, Germany and the UK all expressed opinions about the suitability of the Finnish presidential candidates. Risto Ryti was the only candidate to whom none of the external powers had any objection, and he was elected on 19 December. In January 1941 the USSR demanded control of the Petsamo mining area but, as it by then had a rebuilt its armed forces and had German support, Finland rejected this.

On 18 December 1940 Hitler had officially approved 'Barbarossa', and expected both Finland and Romania to join the German campaign. Two days earlier, the ostensibly retired Kenraalimajuri Paavo Talvela had met Generaloberst Franz Halder, chief-of-staff of the Oberkommando des Heeres, and, two days later, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. This was the first time the Germans advised the Finns, in carefully couched diplomatic terms, that they were preparing for a war with the USSR. The outline of the plan was revealed to the Finns in January 1941, and regular contacts between Finnish and German military leaders started in the following month.

Late in the spring of 1941 the USSR made a number of goodwill gestures in an effort to dissuade Finland from allowing itself to fall completely under German influence. These gestures included the replacement of Ivan Zotov, the current ambassador, by the more flexible Pavel Orlov, and an announcement that the USSR no longer opposed a rapprochement between Finland and Sweden. However, these conciliatory measures did not have any effect on Finnish policy.

On 20 May, the Germans invited a number of Finnish officers to Germany to discuss co-ordination of Finnish operations with 'Barbarossa'. The participants met on 25/28 May in Salzburg and Berlin, and continued their meeting in Helsinki on 3/6 June. They agreed upon the arrival in Finland of German troops, Finnish mobilisation, and a general division of operations. They also agreed that the Finnish army would start mobilisation on 15 June, but the Germans did not reveal their launch date for 'Barbarossa'. The Finnish decisions were made by a small group of political and military leaders, and the rest of the government was kept largely uninformed. In fact, the government was not informed until 9 June that the country would start mobilisation of reservists as a result of tensions between Germany and the USSR.

The Germans took responsibility for the 310-mile (500-km) length of the front in northern Finland (Finnish Lapland). With a strength of 475,000 men, the Finnish army was now much stronger than it had been during the 'Talvisota', and had responsibility for the rest of the Finnish front. The Finnish artillery arm was also relatively strong, but on the debit side of the equation there was only one tank battalion, and motor transport was in short supply. The Finns also had the advantage of local air superiority.

At the beginning of the 'Jatkosota', the USSR had 18 divisions along the front with Finland, which was served by 15 Finnish and four German divisions, and the Soviets had also sensibly appreciated that it needed its best formations and most modern matériel on the main front against Germany. While German troops moved onto the offensive against the USSR on 22 June, they did not do so from Finland, though German minelayers which had been lurking on the Archipelago Sea (mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia between south-west Finland and Sweden) laid two large minefields across the mouth of the Gulf of Finland in the late hours of 21 June. Later in the same night, German bombers flew along the Gulf of Finland to Leningrad to mine the city’s harbour and the lower reaches of the Neva river. On their return trip the bombers landed for refuelling on the Finnish airfield in Utti.

In the early hours of 22 June, Finnish forces launched 'Kilpapurjehdus' and reoccupied the demilitarised Åland islands: an international treaty on the status of the islands allowed Finland to do so should an attack be threatened. The operation was co-ordinated with the start of 'Barbarossa', and the members of the Soviet consulate in the islands were detained.

On 21 June Finnish formations and units had begun to congregate along the border , and were deployed on the defensive. Finland mobilised 16 infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, and two Jäger brigades, which were all standard infantry brigades, except for an armoured battalion in Eversti Ruben Lagus’s (on 11/25 July Everstiluutnantti Väinö Merikallio’s) 1^st Jägerprikaati (light brigade). Independent battalions were mostly formed from border guard units and used primarily for reconnaissance.

Soviet military plans estimated that Finland would be able to mobilise only 10 infantry divisions, as it had done in the 'Talvisota', but failed to take into account the matériel Finland had received in the inter-war period and its expanded training of all available men.

Two German mountain divisions were stationed at Petsam in the form of General Eduard Dietl’s Gebirgskorps 'Norwegen' with Generalmajor Ernst Schlemmer’s 2^nd Gebirgsdivision and Generalleutnant Hans Kreysing’s 3^rd Gebirgsdivision, and two German infantry divisions at Salla in the form of General Hans Feige’s Höheres Kommando zbV XXXVI (soon to become the XXXVI Gebirgskorps) with Generalleutnant Erwin Engelbrecht’s 163^rd Division and Generalleutnant Kurt Dittmar’s 169^th Division.

On the morning of 22 June, the Gebirgskorps 'Norwegen' started to advance from northern Norway toward Petsamo, though Finland did not allow direct German attacks from its soil into the USSR. On the same day, another German infantry division was moved from Oslo to the Ladoga Karelia front.

The southern part of Finnish Lapland, under the command of Generaloberst Nikolaus von Falkenhorst’s Armee 'Norwegen', was the responsibility of Kenraalimajuri Hjalmar Siilasvuo’s Finnish III Armeijakunta (army corps). To the south of the Armee 'Norwegen', the rest of Finland south to the Gulf of Finland was entrusted to Kenraaliluutnantti Erik Heinrichs’s Karjalan Armeija (Army of Karelia), whose four corps were, from north to south, Talvela’s VI Armeijakunta and Kenraalimajuri Woldemar Hägglund’s VII Armeijakunta with some six divisions between them, and Kenraalimajuri Taavetti Laatikainen’s II Armeijakunta and Kenraaliluutnantti Karl Lennart Oesch’s IV Armeijakunta with some eight divisions between them. The overall commander of the Finnish and German forces was Sotamarsalkka Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

On the other side of the front, the Soviet forces were deployed in the three armies of General Leytenant Markian M. Popov’s North Front: from north to south these were General Leytenant Valerian A. Frolov’s 14^th Army (two divisions of the XLII Corps) responsible for the defence of the USSR in the area to the north of Belomorsk on the south-west coast of the White Sea, General Leytenant Fillip D. Gorelenko’s 7^th Army (four divisions) covering Ladoga Karelia, and General Leytenant Piotr S. Pshennikov’s 23^rd Army (six divisions of the X, XIX and L Corps) holding the Karelian isthmus and the north-western approaches to Leningrad. The Soviets also deployed some 40 battalions of a number of independent regiments as well as several fortress units. Leningrad itself was garrisoned by three infantry divisions and one mechanised corps.

As the initial devastating German onslaught against the Soviet air forces had not affected air units located near Finland, the Soviets deployed 700 aircraft as well as a number of naval air force machines against 300 Finnish aircraft.

On the morning of 25 June, the Soviet air forces launched an attack by 460 bombers and fighters against 19 Finnish airfields, but inaccurate intelligence and poor bombing skills meant that several of these raids hit Finnish cities or towns, in which there was considerable destruction. The Soviets lost 23 bombers, while the Finns lost no aircraft. However, the Soviet air offensive provided the Finnish government the opportunity to claim that the country had become the target of a new assault, and the Finnish parliament approved the 'defensive war' as a fait accompli. The USSR claimed that the air offensive had been directed against German targets, especially airfields, in Finland. At the same time Soviet artillery in the base at Hanko started to shell Finnish targets, and a minor Soviet infantry attack was launched over the border in the Parikkala area of southern Karelia.

As the USSR was struggling and failing, right from the start of 'Barbarossa', to contain the German eastward invasion, the Soviet high command had to call all available units to the rapidly deteriorating front line, and as a result the initial Soviet air offensive against Finland could not be followed by a supporting land offensive on the scale originally planned. Moreover, the 237^th Division and the X Mechanised Corps (less its 198^th Motorised Division) were withdrawn from Ladoga Karelia, which is the area to the north of Lake Ladoga, thereby stripping most of the reserves from the Soviet defence’s remaining strength.

In Ladoga Karelia, the Finns were initially deployed defensively, but on 29 June Mannerheim activated Heinrichs’s Karjalan Armeija and ordered preparation of an offensive into Ladoga Karelia. The Karjalan Armeija comprised the VI Armeijakunta (Eversti Eino Koskimies’s 5^th Divisioona (division) and Eversti Kaarlo Heiskanen’s 11^th Divisioona), the VII Armeijakunta (Eversti Antero Svensson’s 7^th Divisioona and Eversti Esa Hannuksela’s 19^th Divisioona) and Kenraalimajuri Woldemar Oinonen’s 'O' Ryhmä (group) (Eversti Gustaf Ehrnrooth’s Ratsuväkiprikaati (cavalry brigade), Lagus’s 1^st Jääkäriprikaati and Eversti Viktor Sundman’s 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati). On their later arrival into the area, Eversti Paavo Paalu’s 1^st Divisioona and two regiments of the German 163^rd Division were added to the Karjalan Armeija.

Opposing these Finnish forces was the 7^th Army with the 168^th Division near Sortavala and the 71^st Division to the north of Jänisjärvi, and the Soviets had prepared field fortifications along the border across Sortavala and at the important crossroads at Värtsilä and Korpiselkä.

The Finnish offensive started on 9 July. The task of breaking through the Soviet defences was given to the VI Armeijakunta under Talvela, who had drawn in as much artillery as possible from other units of the Karjalan Armeija and the 1^st Jääkäriprikaati of the 'O' Ryhmä. With strong artillery support he unleashed the 5^th Divisioona against Korpiselkä on 10 July, overwhelming its defenders by the next morning. Talvela was not satisfied with the level of aggression displayed by Koskimies, however, and replaced him with Lagus. The 5^th Divisiooan pursued the retreating 52^nd Regiment eastward with light units and reached Tolvajärvi lake on 12 July. The division then turned to the south and advanced along lesser roads, some of these being in a condition so poor that the men had to carry the bicycles that constituted their primary means of transport. On 14 July the 5^th Divisioona cut the railway linking Sortavala and Petrozavodsk, and on the next day reached the shore of Lake Ladoga, thereby severing Soviet land routes around the lake. The Soviets had to transfer two regiments and some independent battalions from the Karelian isthmus to close the 'hole' on the eastern side of Lake Ladoga.

By 4 July Heiskanen’s 11^th Divisioona had found that the Soviet forces had abandoned their trenches across the border, and then used its superior mobility to encircle and capture them. By 9 July, when the general offensive began, the 11^th Divisioona had pushed on to the east from the positions it had taken, crossing roadless terrain and cutting the road linking Korpiselkä, Värtsilä and Suistamo on the eastern shore of Jänisjärvi lake. From there the division threatened an encirclement of the Soviet forces to the south of Korpiselkä and those holding fortified positions in Värtsilä. To prevent being encircled, the Soviets had to fall back farther to the east. The Soviet 367^th Regiment was able to hold its positions to the north of Jänisjärvi lake until the defenders of Värtsilä had retreated there by 12 July. Heiskanen maintained the Finnish pressure on the 367^th Regiment round the eastern side of Jänisjärvi lake and reached Jänisjärvi itself before driving forward to Lake Ladoga 16 July, where the 11^th Divisioona went on the defensive.

Lagus’s 5^th Division continued its offensive along the north-east shore of Lake Ladoga. The 452^nd Motorised Regiment was moving to the north from the Karelian isthmus, and its first units were set to hold Salmi, where the Tulemajoki river reaches Lake Ladoga. The Finnish forces arrived there on 18 July, and early on the morning of the following day launched the battle by crossing the river 3.1 miles (5 km) to the north of Salmi and by the afternoon cutting the roads to Salmi. On the next day the Finns were able to push into the village, and only small Soviet units were able to escape the encirclement. Salmi had been taken by the early hours of 21 July.

The strengthened 5^th Divisioona continued its advance as rapidly as it could, and crossed the old border on 22 July at Rajakontu. Meanwhile, a battle group under Eversti Eino Iisakki Järvinen had secured the left flank of the main thrust by crossing the old border at Känsäselkä and, on 19 July, capturing the villages of Kolatselkä and Palalahti near the Tulemajärvi lake, where it secured the roads to the north and east before continuing its advance to the south. And on 23 July the 5^th Divisioona from the west and Eversti Eino Järvinen’s 'Järvinen' Taisteluryhmä (battle group) from the north began their attack on the village of Vitele, which was captured on the following morning. Lagus unsuccessfully tried to encircle the retreating Soviet forces and had by the evening reached the Tuuloksenjoki, but Soviet tanks and artillery managed to stop the advance of his light forces there.

Paalu’s 1^st Divisioona had by now neared the front and been allocated to the VI Armeijakunta on 16 July, but it was not until 20 July that it reached the fast-moving front line and released the 'Järvinen' Taisteluryhmä for its attack toward Vitele. From there the advance continued to the north in the direction of Hyrsylä and to the east in the direction of Vieljärvi, which were both taken a few days later. The Soviet 24^th and 28^th Regiments, parts of the 9^th and 10^th Regiments, and the 2^nd Artillery Regiment began a counteroffensive on 23 July, and after five days the front line was stabilised some 6.2 miles (10 km) to the east of Vieljärvi.

On 21 July the North Front had reorganised its forces by transferring the 168^th Division and one regiment of the 71^st Division to the 23^rd Army, which was responsible for the defence of the Karelian isthmus, and on the same day the 7^th Army was reorganised into two operational groupings, namely General Leytenant Maksim A. Antoniuk’s 'Petrozavodsk' Group with one infantry regiment, two motorised regiments, one armoured regiment and a number of independent units, and General Leytenant Vyacheslav D. Tsvetayev’s 'South' Group with a marine brigade, two motorised regiments and a number of smaller units.

Appreciating the likely change in the operational situation, Mannerheim had on 19 July ordered the halt of the Finnish offensive along the line between Vitele and Vieljärvi as there were still strong Soviet forces on the south-western side of the Jänisjärvi lake, and the speed of the advance had opened a gap on the shore of Lake Ladoga on the 5^th Divisioona's right flank, where a defence had to be created. Mannerheim’s concerns were very real, as on 19 July General Major Pavlov, commanding the defence of Lake Ladoga’s shoreline, ordered the 4^th Marine Brigade to launch probing attacks behind Finnish defences. During the early hours of 24 July the marines landed on the Lunkulansaari and Mantsisaari islands close to Salmi. The 1^st Divisioona, 5^th Divisioona and 11^th Divisioona were committed at the time, so Talvela had to scrape together whatever he could, including a bridge-building company, to drive the attackers back to the lake. With the help of heavy artillery, which destroyed four of the 15 Soviet vessels, the Finns were able to push the marines into three separate mottis (pockets) and defeated the Soviet attempt to reinforce these during the morning of 25 July. The remaining Soviet mottis were destroyed individually.

On 26 July the Soviets landed on Mantsisaari island, and managed to capture almost the whole of this before Talvela could reinforce the Finnish forces there. The fighting continued late into the night of 27 July before the last Soviet resistance had been crushed.

The task of Hägglund’s VII Armeijakunta was to attack on the VI Armeijakunta' right flank toward Sortavala. The isthmus in the area between Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border is comparatively narrow, and the important rail junction of Matkaselkä was only 6.2 miles (10 km) from the border. It was inevitable, therefore, that after the Moscow treaty which had ended the 'Talvisota' the Soviets had started to fortify the border region in some depth. These defences were weakest on the front’s northern sector, so Hägglund decided deliver his corps' main thrust in that region. Reinforced with pioneer units, the 7^th Divisioona and all of the corps' artillery were concentrated there, leaving the 19^th Divisioona to the south to manage with just its own divisional artillery. The Finnish assault began on the evening of 10 July. As a heavy thunderstorm was sweeping the area, it was decided that infantry would attack without artillery support so that surprise could be achieved. The plan succeeded and most Soviet forces were encircled in their pillboxes, which were then eliminated with artillery support. During the next day, the 7^th Divisioona advanced, encircling several Soviet strongpoints. By the morning of 12 July the Finns had broken through the region where the Soviets had prepared minefields and fortifications.

However, Colonel Andrei L. Bondarev’s 168^th Division proved to be very tenacious. The division laid a succession of new minefields as it fell back, and at the same time dug new strongpoints and trenches, and skilfully evaded Finnish units trying to flank and encircle it: the 168^th Division’s defence was later used as a textbook example for defensive warfare in Soviet military schools. The 7^th Divisioona reached the western shore of the Jänisjärvi lake on 13 July and turned to the south. By 15 July the division had reach the rail line linking Sortavala and Petrozavodsk at Pirttipohja, and encircled the defenders there. Hannuksela’s 19^th Divisioona had the demanding task of assaulting the best defended section of the 168^th Division’s position. Hannuksela decided to break through on a very narrow but deep section at the village of Niinisyrjä: this breach was to be only between 220 and 330 yards (200 and 300 m) wide and 2.5 miles (4 km) deep to create a gap in the fortified border region. Everstiluutnantti Juva’s 58^th Rykmentti (regiment) was the spearhead of the assault, which began late in the evening of 10 July. The regiment fought all night and through the next day, advancing 0.9 miles (1.5 km), but it was clear that the regiment lacked adequate artillery for the task, and therefore received additional artillery from the II Armeijakunta. The 58^th Rykmentti continued its attack and reached the rear of the Soviet border defences on 12 July. The 168^th Division counterattacked to close the breach and encircle the 58^th Rykmentti, but the Finns managed to hold their corridor, although the Soviets managed to seal it against effective use with artillery fire. Eversti M. Laurila’s 16^th Rykmentti, following the 58^th Rykmentti, managed to reopen the corridor by the morning of 15 July.

The 7^th Divisioona continued its attack 15 July to the east along the rail line, and two days later breached the Soviet defences on the isthmus between the Jänisjärvi and Vahvajärvi lakes. Meanwhile the 7^th Divisioona's 30^th Rykmentti and 51^st Rykmentti advanced eastward to the Jänisjoki river, where they linked with the 11^th Divisioona on the same day. The 30^th Rykmentti and 51^st Rykmentti cleared the western shore of the Jänisjärvi lake and reached Lake Ladoga by 20 July, then started to clear islands in front of Sortavala. The 7^th Divisioona's 37^th Rykmentti was under orders to advance to the west along the southern shore of the Vahvajärvi lake to link with the 19^th Divisioona and thereby encircle the Soviets between the two divisions. Bondarev appreciated the danger to his division, however, and ordered the 402^nd Regiment to fall back. The 19^th Divisioona had continued its attack to the south-east, and on 15/18 July there were 25 fierce encirclement and counter-encirclement actions before the Finns managed to capture the main road and cut the rail line linking Sortavala and Matkaselkä, which was taken on 18 July. The Soviets managed to hold the 37^th Rykmentti at the village of Särkisyrjä on 18/19 July, and again at the next village, Ilola, on 20/22 July, so securing the line of retreat for the 402^nd Regiment. By 25 July the 168^th Division had managed to straighten its front line to a more defensible line extending from the Kiteen river through the hills of Tirimäki, Okanmäki and Voinmäki to the Tohmajoki river.

As the Soviets were driven back from the Jänisjärvi valley, the remainder of the 7^th Divisioona turned to the south-west and on 25 July crossed the Tohmajoki river. The advance was slow as the Soviets managed to hold their prepared strongpoints on hills, forcing the Finns to encircle them. On 28 July the 7^th Divisioona found a gap in Soviet defences and its 30^th Rykmentti quickly poured through this to take Voinmäki. The advancing Finns managed to ambush a car carrying the 198^th Division’s chief-of-staff, and from him seized documents including the order for a Soviet counterattack on the following day, so all the Finnish units were ordered to halt where they were and prepare to fight a defensive battle.

The Soviet 23^rd Army had transferred the 198^th Division from the Karelian isthmus to Sortavala with orders to join the 168^th Division in this counterattack, whose object was the recapture of the isthmus between the Jänisjärvi lake and Lake Ladoga as this would render parlous the situation of the Finnish forces along the northern side of Lake Ladoga. When the offensive began, on 29 July, it failed to gain ground anywhere as the Soviet forces lacked adequate strength and the captured information had given the Finns time to prepare to meet the attack.

The Finns continued their offensive against the remaining Tirimäki and Okanmäki strongpoints, whose Soviet retention prevent any advance toward Sortavala, on August 3 and captured them two days later.

Meanwhile Laatikainen’s II Armeijakunta had started its own offensive on 31 July at the narrowest point between Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border, quickly penetrated the Soviet defences and advanced toward the north-western shore of Lake Ladoga, threatening Soviet forces with encirclement. The 23^rd Army cancelled its planned offensive and ordered the 198^th Division to proceed south for a counterattack against the II Armeijakunta. The 168^th Division was ordered to withdraw toward Lake Ladoga from 5 August, and the 367^th Regiment was given the responsibility of holding Sortavala. Although Sortavala was insignificant in purely military terms and had been neutralised when the Finns captured the islands controlling access to Lake Ladoga on 27 July, it was politically important. Instead of pursuing the 168^th Division, therefore, the Finns concentrated on the seizure of Sortavala. On 12 August 7^th Divisioona reach the town, which had been taken by 15 August, only small groups of Soviet troops managing to escape the Finnish net.

The II Armeijakunta had severed the rail line linking Viipuri and Sortavala on 6 August.

On 8 August Mannerheim formed the new I Armeijakunta, under the command of Eversti Einar Mäkinen, with Hannuksela’s 19^th Divisioona, the 7^th Divisioona now commanded by Eversti William Häkli, and Eversti Aarne Blick’s 2^nd Divisioona, to clear the western shore of Lake Ladoga. The II Armeijakunta reached Lake Ladoga 8 August at Lahdenpohja, thus capturing the harbour which the 168^th Division had been instructed to use for evacuation on 23 July. The Soviet division, together with a number of independent regiments and battalions, continued its retreat toward Lake Ladoga with the 2^nd Divisioona pressing from the south-west and 19^th Divisioona from the north, while the 7^th Divisioona continued its offensive against Sortavala. By 17 August the Soviets controlled a beach-head only only 7.5 miles (12 km) wide and 6.2 miles (10 km) deep, but in the course of the next few days the Soviets concentrated their naval and air units to protect the evacuation of the 168^th Division and other units. This evacuation was successful, and the Finns thus captured only small quantities of abandoned matériel including 40 pieces of artillery, eight tanks, 310 cars, 35 tractors and 1,500 horses.

At the northern end of the Finnish main offensive, Oinonen’s 'O' Ryhmä, with the Ratsuväkiprikaati and the 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati, was ordered to advance to the old border. Opposing it were parts of the 71^st Division’s 52^nd and 126^th Regiments and the 80^th Border Guard Detachment. Many Karelian, Ingrian and Finnish-born communist men served in the Soviet ranks, together with large numbers of Finnish-born veterans of the People’s Army in the 'Talvisota'. The Finns started with probing attacks on 7 July, then launched the main attack and in the south the 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati had reached the Tolvajärvi lake by 14 July. From there the brigade wheeled to the north and started encirclement toward the Ägläjärvi lake. The Ratsuväkiprikaati was not as successful, and the Finns were forced to encircle the well prepared Soviet defended hill tops as they were unable to take directly for lack of artillery and air support.

By this time Engelbrecht’s German 163^rd Division (less one brigade and a part of the divisional artillery that had been diverted to Salla during transport) had reached the front at the Tolvajärvi lake and attempted to break though the Soviet positions on 21 July with only one brigade, but failed as the Soviet forces were stronger than anticipated. A fresh offensive began on 25 July when two battalions of the German 310^th Infanterieregiment and one battalion of the Finnish 56^th Rykmentti attacked along the rail line near Näätäoja station. At the Tolvajärvi lake, Engelbrecht decided to use the route the 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati had opened and ordered this brigade and one battalion of the German 307^th Regiment to capture the village of Ägläjärvi and sever the Soviet supply route to Lake Tolva. The attack failed and the Soviets managed to keep open the road through Ägläjärvi, though they did lose a supply depot during the fighting. Engelbrecht exchanged the Ratsuväkiprikaati for two infantry battalions, which were ordered to maintain a defensive position, and ordered the Ratsuväkiprikaati to cut the road linking the Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi lakes by means of an advance through the area’s forests. The attack started on 2 August and two days later the Ratsuväkiprikaati had reached the road and started to move on the Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi lakes. On 3 August the 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati and German 1/307^th Infanterieregiment attacked the village of Ägläjärvi, which they captured on 5 August. On the following day the Finnish and German forces linked with the Ratsuväkiprikaati/e] to the south of the village of Ägläjärvi. The Soviets continued their retreat to the Aittojoki river, where they blew up the bridges and dug in.

The Soviet northern forces, also fearing encirclement from the Ägläjärvi area, abandoned their positions there on 8 August and fell back to the east of Kuolismaa.

On 20 July Heiskanen’s 11^th Divisioona had been relieved from Jänisjärvi lake and was moved first into reserve and then to the area between the 1^st Divisioona and the German 163^rd Division in the area of Hyrsylä on 11 August. The Soviets reinforced their forces in the area with the new 272^nd Division on 10 August, and began an immediate attack toward the Vieljärvi lake area against the 1^st Divisioona. In five days the Soviets managed to advance just 1.25 miles (2 km), and then only in a few places, before being halted. On 19 August the 11^th Divisioona itself went over to the offensive from Hyrsylä to the north, and reached the Petrozavodsk railway and the main road on the following day. From there the Finnish division continued to the north-east toward Suvilahti, which it took on 21 August, and to the north toward Tsalkki, the location of the last usable supply road available to the Soviets.

On 19 August the 2^nd Jääkäriprikaati, the Ratsuväkiprikaati and the German 307^th Infasnterieregiment stormed over the Aittojoki river. The Ratsuväkiprikaati tried to encircle the defending Soviet forces, but the latter recognised their precarious situation and quickly pulled back, managing to extricate most of their strength to the east before the 11^th Divisioona cut their line of retreat at Tsalkki on 23 August. With the capture of Suojärvi, the last town in Ladoga Karelia had been liberated.

Farther to the south, the Finns undertook a parallel offensive to liberate the Karelian isthmus under the supervision of Oesch’s Kannaksen V
Voimien Komentajan Päämaja (Headquarters of the Commander of the Isthmus Forces). Here, between the south-western shore of Lake Ladoga and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, the new headquarters, which had come into existence on 14 June, deployed three major formations in the form of Talvela’s II Armeijakunta, Laatikainen’s V Armeijakunta and Oesch’s IV Armeijakunta. The first comprised Blick’s 2^nd Divisioona, Eversti Niilo Hersalo’s 15^th Divisioona and Eversti Aaro Pajari’s 18^th Divisioona to the north of the Vuoksijoki river; the second comprised only Eversti Jussi Sihvo’s 10^th Divisioona; and the last comprised Eversti Kaarlo Viljanen’s 4^th Divisioona, Eversti Einar Vihma’s 12^th Divisioona and Eversti Claes Winell’s 8^th Divisioona defending the coast.

The V Armeijakunta was disbanded on 29 June, its headquarters being revised to become the headquarters of the new VI Armeijakunta, and the 10^th Divisioona was then attached first to the IV Armeijakunta and from a time late in July to the II Armeijakunta as a reserve.

Facing these were the Soviet XIX Corps (142^nd and 115^th Divisions) and L Corps (43^rd and 123^rd Divisions), with the X Mechanised Corps (21^st and 24^th Tank Divisions and 198^th Mechanised Division) in reserve and the divisional-strength 22^nd Karelian Fortified Region holding the coast. At the end of June the X Mechanised Corps was transferred to the area south-west of Leningrad to bolster the Soviet defence against the advance of Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb’s Heeresgruppe 'Nord' from the south-west, but left its 198^th Mechanised Division as the only Soviet reserve.

As the 'Jatkosota' started, each side had remained at first on the defensive, delivering only small company- or battalion-size probing attacks to improve their tactical positions. Their loss of reserves against the more pressing German assault to the south prompted the Soviets to retreat to a more defensible line at the northern end of the front and they also continued to fortify in depth, creating concrete and wooden strongpoints, digging trenches and laying minefields. The Finns advanced to keep contact, and this situation continued until 31 July and the start of the Finnish offensive. The Soviet fortification programme had been concentrated near the Vuoksijoki river and along the roads, so the Finns concentrated their forces for breakthroughs that were narrow but deep over roadless terrain with the support of pioneers building temporary supply roads through the forests and over the swamps.

Pajari’s 18^th Divisioona attacked through the forest against the most northern sector of the 115^th Division: rather than following roads, the Finnish division secured an initial crossroads and then advanced through the forest to the next road, where it repeated the process. The crossroads were occupied by stronger units, which had to defend against several Soviet counterattacks with armoured support. On 4 August the Finns managed to encircle and capture the Ilmee crossroads, thus forcing the Soviets to abandon their prepared positions between Ilmee and the border. The main thrust of Hersalo’s 15^th Divisioona fell on the 588^th Regiment of the 142^nd Division, and was again delivered on a width of only 1.25 miles (2 km) with the aid of concentrated artillery fire. After breaching the border fortifications, the division advanced 3.1 miles (5 km) through the forest before coming to the road, thereby bypassing the Soviet defences, which were encircled and captured individually by following units. After six days the 15^th Divisioona was only 1.85 miles (3 km) from the rail line linking Viipuri and Sortavala and 9.3 miles (15 km) from the western corner of Lake Ladoga, and thus close to encircling Soviet forces on its left side.

Blick’s 2^nd Divisioona decided to trap two battalions of the 461^st Regiment holding the village of Tyrjä by encircling the village from the east and pushing the defenders to the Tyrjänjärvi lake with the 7^th Rykmentti while the 28^th Rykmentti bypassed the village and advanced to the south. With the aid of artillery support the Soviets managed to hold for four days before the encirclement was complete. Some of the men were then able to escape through the forests, but most of them and all their heavy equipment were trapped to the village. The Finns also suffered heavy casualties in the fighting before the capture of Tyrjä opened the road toward the railway crossing at Elisenvaara, and on 5 August 5 the first Finnish units reached the rail line linking Viipuri and Sortavala.

On 4 August General Leytenant Mikhail N. Gerasimov, commanding the 23^rd Army, ordered the 198^th Division to call off its counterattack near Sortavala and move to the south and join the 142^nd Division in an attack on the advancing 2^nd Divisioona, the 43^rd and 115^th Divisions being instructed to check the Finnish reserves. The counterattack failed and the 115^th Division retreated to the Helisevänjoki river at a location where hills and the river formed good defensive positions against the 18^th Divisioona. This formation advanced to the Helisevänjoki river and reached the rail line linking Viipuri and Sortavala at the Inkilä crossroads on 8 August.

Sihvo’s 10^th Divisioona was ordered to advance in the area between the 15^th Divisioona and 18^th Divisioona, and on 6 August reached the rail line connecting Viipuri and Sortavala. The 10^th Divisioona continued to attack in the direction of the rail line linking Käkisalmi and Hiitola, but the Soviet forces managed to keep the rail and road lines open until 8 August, when the 10^th Divisioona captured the village of Hiitola. When the 10^th Divisioona's first troops reached Lake Ladoga on the next day, the last land connection to the Soviet troops on the north-western shore of Lake Ladoga was severed. The Soviets tried to reopen the connection with powerful counterattacks on 10/11 August, but were unsuccessful.

Meanwhile the 2^nd Divisioona's 28^th Rykmentti had captured the Elisenvaara rail junction on 9 August, thereby opening rail supply routes to the front from Finland. After the battle of Tyrjä, the 2^nd Divisioona's 7^th Rykmentti rested for two days as the divisional reserve before continuing the attack along the railway toward Lahdenpohja, which it captured on 8 August, thus dividing the Soviet forces what was now a beach-head. On the same day the 2^nd Divisioona was transferred to Eversti Einar Mäkinen’s new I Armeijakunta with an order to clear the northern part of the Soviet beach-head, while the 10^th Divisioona and 15^th Divisioona cleared the beach-head’s southern part, where the Soviets ordered the 142^nd and 198^th Divisions to withdraw to Kilpolansaari island for naval evacuation. This withdrawal was executed in an orderly fashion and the Finns were unable to encircle any significant Soviet forces. On 11 August the 15^th Divisioona captured the Hiitola railway junction, and on 13 August all the surviving Soviet forces had retreated to the Huiskonniemi peninsula and Kilpolansaari island. Under total air superiority, the Soviets managed to withdraw almost all their men, weapons and equipment from the beach-head and by 23 August the 15^th Divisioona, which had been left to maintain the pressure on the Soviets, had cleared the remaining rearguards from the island.

The Soviets planned to start a major counter-offensive on 10 August, and in expectation of this the 23^rd Army had received the 265^th Division as a reinforcements in the area of Räisälä. The offensive was not directed against the 10^th Divisioona and 18^th Divisioona, though, but rather toward the opening of passages to the the forces encircled on the north-western shore of Lake Ladoga. Coincidentally, the 18^th Divisioona had been resting, and was now ordered to continue its advance on the same day, so when the Soviet attack started at Inkilä, the Finns began their own effort only 3.1 miles (5 km) to the west. The Soviet offensive failed to gain ground, while the Finnish attack cut the Soviets' main supply route and a later Finnish counterattack forced the Soviet forces to retreat south. Finnish troops reached the Vuoksijoki river on 14 August at Antrea (now Kamennogorsk), where they continued clearing the river’s left bank.

The Soviets started to move forces from the south-western side of Viipuri to defend Enso (now Svetogorsk) and to make a counterattack toward Antrea on 16 August, but when the attack failed the Soviets were forced to evacuate the northern bank on 21 August. On the eastern side the Finns advanced to the south-east and reached Vuosalmi and the northern outlet of the Vuoksijoki river on 17 and 18 August respectively. The Finns immediately made an unopposed crossing of the Vuoksi river a short distance to the west of Vuosalmi on 17 August, and by 20 August had secured the beach-head.

The Soviet counterattack on the 10^th Divisioona began on 14 August and managed to push the Finns 1.25 miles (2 km) to the north before Finnish reinforcements arrived and checked the Soviet advance. The 10^th Divisioona left the shore of Lake Ladoga to the 36^th Rykmentti of the 15^th Divisioona and concentrated all of its strength against the 265^th Division at Räisälä (now Melnikovo). On 15 August the 10^th Divisioona began its own attack, which encircled the Soviet defenders of Räisälä on 17 August and captured the town on the next day. From there the division continued clearing the left bank of the Vuoksijoki river’s northern outlet. On 19 August the 43^rd Rykmentti of the 10^th Divisioona continued to attack southward, and reached Suvantojärvi on 21 August. From there it continued to the eastward with the same division’s 1^st Rykmentti.

With all their forces to the north of the Vuoksi river now threatened with encirclement, the Soviets started to retreat from Käkisalmi, which the Finns captured on 21 August. The Finnish attack to the south continued and, as the small border guard units were capable only of delaying this progress, the Finns reached the Taipaleenjoki river and the shore of Lake Ladoga on 23 August. Here the Finnish troops were unable to make an immediate crossing of the river.

The Stavka fully appreciated the serious nature of the Soviet predicament, and on 20 August ordered a retreat to the new but generally unprepared defence line extending from the south-western side of Viipuri northward to the Vuoksi river and then along this waterway to Lake Suvanto and along the Taipaleenjoki river to Lake Ladoga. This decision shortened the front line to a marked degree, but also meant the abandonment of defensive installations the Soviets had prepared along the border during the preceding months. The Finns were preparing to start their own attack along the southernmost part of the border, so when the Soviet retirement was spotted on 21 August, the Finnish forces were ordered into an immediate pursuit.

Although General Major Vladimir V. Kirpichnikov’s 43^rd Division managed to man new positions to the north and west of Viipuri, it was unable to prevent Vihma’s 12^th Divisioona from advancing along the right bank of the Vuoksijoki and establishing contact with the 18^th Division, which was enlarging its bridgehead at Vuosalmi, and during the evening of 22 August the whole right bank was in Finnish hands. General Major Fillip F. Aliabushev’s 123^rd Division was currently holding the south-western side of Viipuri, but much of this division’s strength, together with that of General Major Vasili F. Konkov’s 115^th Division which had retreated from the upper part of the Vuoksijoki river, was still disorganised as a result of its rapid retreat from their positions. Viljanen’s 4^th Divisioona advanced along the Saimaa Canal, pressing the 43^rd Division from the north. By 23 August the most southern Finnish formation, Winell’s 8^th Divisioona, had cleared the western shore of the Bay of Viipuri as far to the east as the Ykspäänjoki river and begun to prepare a crossing of the bay. During August 23, the Finns had managed to advance from the east to a point 5 miles (8 km) from Viipuri, but during the morning of the following day the 115^th and 123^rd Divisions started a counterattack on the Finnish forces to the east of Viipuri, probably trying to regain the initiative and force Finns back to the northern bank of the Vuoksijoki river. Aided by heavy artillery fire, the Soviets managed to push the Finns more than 3.1 miles (5 km) in some places, but could not break though the Finnish front, and with the arrival of the Finnish reserve, in the form of the 12^th Division's 26^th Regiment, which was already moving up as part of a planned troop rotation, the Soviets were in turn driven back to their starting positions on the following day.

The Soviet counterattack did not affect the 12^th Division's drive, which had already been ordered and now severed the main rail link between Viipuri and Leningrad on 25 August.

During the morning of 24 August, the 8^th Divisioona started to cross the Bay of Viipuri to the Lihiniemi peninsula using the 3/45^th Rykmentti, and secured the peninsula in the course of the same day. The Finns continued the attack on the next day, cutting last rail link from Viipuri during the afternoon, and enlarging their beach-head a short distance in width and depth during next two days.

The 12^th Divisioona had continued its offensive to the south-west, and cut the main road linking Viipuri and Leningrad on 27 August. On the next day the Stavka authorised the 23^rd Army to withdraw from Viipuri and establish a new defensive line along the course of the previous 'Mannerheim Line'. The Soviet forces began an immediate retreat and tried with great vigour to open the roads they needed. At Ylä-Somme they managed to open one road in the evening of 28 August, and during the night they were able to move several truck convoys along this, although under Finnish fire. The artillery fire caused Soviet losses of men and trucks, and the road gradually became so congested that only men on foot were able to pass. During the next two days, the Soviets tried repeatedly to open the rail line along the Bay of Viipuri, but late in the evening of 30 August the 3^rd Rykmentti of the 12^th Divisioona linked with the 8^th Divisioona, and the motti at Porlampai was overrun.

As their attempts to break out of the Finnish encirclement during the next day failed and as this encirclement tightened round them, the Soviets made a final attempt to save the men by abandoning all vehicles and trying to escape on foot through the forests. The ring was already too tight, however, and only small groups managed to escape during this last night. In the morning of the next day the remaining and now completely demoralised Soviet troops started to surrender: 9,000 men surrendered and bodies of another 7,000 were buried, but almost 12,000 men had managed to escape before the ring closed. In this victory the Finns also took 306 pieces of artillery, 55 tanks, 673 trucks, almost 300 tractors and about 4,500 horses.

Along the main road and rail lines between Viipuri and Leningrad, the Soviet order to retreat and form a new defensive line along the old 'Mannerheim Line' came too late, for on the same day the 12^th Divisioona captured Leipäsuo and continued its advance to the south-west in the direction of the Kuolemanjärvi river, and to the south-east along the rail line. The Soviet defences at the main road junction of Summa held, but the Finns encircled these defences by breaching the defences at Munasuo. Here the remnants of the 123^rd Division managed to check the Finnish advance in only few places, and continued their retreat toward Leningrad.

During the morning of 30 August the 12^th Divisioona cut the rail line linking Koivisto and Leningrad on the Kuolemanjärvi river, and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland during the same day. At Vammelsuu the 12^th Divisioona cut the rail line during the evening of the same day, but failed to cut the main road. The division reached the Gulf of Finland here on the following morning. The attack continued east to the Terijoki river, which it reached on 31 August, and arrived at the old border at the Raja river on the next day.

The encircled Soviet forces at Koivisto retreated to the islands, from which they were evacuated to Leningrad by ships of the Soviet navy. The last Soviet defenders of Koivisto were evacuated on 1 November.

On the 12^th Divisioon's left flank, from 23 August the 18^th Divisioona attacked toa the south-east between the Muolaanjärvi river and the Vuoksijoki river and, by 26 August the division had broken through first lake isthmuses.

Meanwhile the first units of the 2^nd Divisioona were starting to relieve the 18^th Divisioona in the isthmus between the Kirkkojärvi and Punnusjärvi lakes, and the 10^th Divisioona those between the Punnusjärvi lake and the Vuoksijoki river.

After the mottis on the north-western shore of Lake Ladoga had been cleared, the I Armeijakunta was moved to the Vuoksi river, and here took the 10^th Divisioona and 15^th Divisioona under command. The 18^th Divisioona breached the second of the lake isthmuses on 27 August, and after a one-day pause continued its attack towards the Kivennapa (now Pervomaiskoye) crossroads, which it took on 29 August. The attack continued and reached the old border on 31 August. The 2^nd Divisioona also reached the old border on the same day. The 10^th Divisioona had a harder time of it as the 198^th Division had started to counterattack on 29 August.

The Finnish offensive started to gather greater momentum during 30 August, the day on which the 15^th Divisioona joined the attack from the other side of the Vuoksi river. The Valkjärvi lake railhead was captured on 31 August and, threatened with yet another encirclement, the Soviet forces were ordered to withdraw from the southern side of the Vuoksijoki river to positions behind the old border. The 15^th Divisioona followed the retreating Soviets closely, and by 2 September the Finns had reached the old border along its full length in the Karelian isthmus.

On 20 August, meanwhile, General Waldemar Erfurth, the senior German liaison officer at the Finnish headquarters, notified Mannerheim that Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, was about to request Finnish aid in the assault on Leningrad. Mannerheim explained the practical difficulties of the proposal and also revealed the opposition of both the Finnish political and military leadership to such aid. The government had decided at a time before the start of the campaign that Finland would not attack Leningrad, and only after the military leadership had exerted considerable pressure had the government accepted a modest advance across the old border to take superior defensive positions. When Keitel’s letter arrived, both President Ryti and Mannerheim prepared a negative answer. On 31 August Erfurth again contacted Mannerheim with the proposal that the Finns should cancel their attack into East Karelia and instead attack Leningrad. Ryti and Mannerheim again refused.

On 31 August Mannerheim ordered that the Finnish offensive be halted along the line linking the mouth of the Rajajoki river and Ohta, while the exact halt line on the stretch between Ohta and Lake Ladoga would be determined later, after the Finns had reached the old border there. The object was to shorten the front line without the need to attack the the 22^nd Karelian Fortified Region, which was the Soviet defensive area to the north of Leningrad.

In this last phase of the fighting on the Karelian isthmus, the Soviets had six infantry divisions and a number of independent battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north, but this nominally potent force was not as effective as it appeared since all of its formations and units were at half strength as a result of the previous hard fighting with the Finns.

The 12^th Divisioona had reached its objective by 1 September, but elsewhere the attack started on 2 September. The 18^th Divisioona took Mainila on this day and Valkeasaari (now Beloostrov) on the following day. By 7 September both the 18^th Division and 2^nd Divisioona had reached their objectives between the Rajajoki river and Ohta. Mäkinen, the commander of the I Armeijakunta, ordered his forces to advance to the line linking Ohta, Lempaalanjärvi lake and the old border at Lake Ladoga with the proviso that in the event of determined resistance was met the offensive was to be called to a halt.

On 4 September the attack began, and two days later the 10^th Divisioona encircled and destroyed the 941^st Regiment at Kirjasalo. The Finnish forces had reached all of their final objectives by 9 September, halted and assumed a defensive posture.

The Soviets quickly learned of the lessened Finnish pressure, and capitalised on this fact: on 5 September two divisions were transferred from the Karelian isthmus into the area lying to the south of the Leningrad to fight the German onslaught. Although the Finnish troops on the Karelian isthmus played no active part in the great siege of Leningrad, their mere presence contributed to the German effort by hampering the delivery of supplies of the city round and across Lake Ladoga.

Farther to the north, the Finnish offensive in East Karelia by the forces of the Karjalan Armeija followed the effective end of Finnish operations in Karelia Ladoga and the Karelian isthmus, and this period of more than one month was used for the strengthening of the forces in this area and the completion of their offensive plans in light of the fact that the Soviets had developed new fortified areas and strengthened their own forces.

When the encirclement battles on the western shore of Lake Ladoga were resolved, Svensson’s 7^th Divisioona was redeployed to the junction of the VI Armeijakunta and VII Armeijakunta, a position from which it could assist either of them. The Finnish offensive was launched during the early hours of 4 September at Tuulos, where the largest Finnish artillery barrage to date was unleashed. Immediately after the end of this barrage, the 5^th Divisioona crossed the Tuulosjoki river some 4.3 miles (7 km) from its mouth on Lake Ladoga at 05.00. While the river crossing was in itself easily accomplished, the Soviet defence soon strengthened. The Finnish armoured battalion followed the spearhead and helped to destroy strongpoints, and finally the shore road was severed at 11.00. A Soviet counterattack, launched two hours later, managed to encircle the Finns who had reached the shore road, however. When the situation seemed increasingly dangerous to his forces at 14.00, Karhu committed his reserve, the 4^th Valon Irrotus (light detachment), and with tank support this managed to break the encirclement at 17.30, and in the battle that followed scattered the Soviet forces and reached the coast of Lake Ladoga, thus cutting the retreat route of the forces still between them and the Tuulosjoki river. During the night the encircled Soviet forces were destroyed. The battle effectively shattered the Soviet 3^rd Marine Brigade and the