'Ka' (ii) was the Japanese counter-offensive in the Solomon islands group in response to the US invasion of Florida and Guadalcanal islands in the 'Ringbolt' and 'Watchtower' operations (16 August/31 December 1942).

The two US operations had been undertaken by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift’s US 1^st Marine Division on 7 August 1942 under the local command of Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher and overall command of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley’s South Pacific Force of the Pacific Fleet, Fletcher having a task force centred on three fleet carriers with which to cover the assault.

The Japanese considered Guadalcanal to be essential to the security of their outer defence perimeter, for they planned to develop the island as a base from which the Allied lines of maritime communication across the Pacific (from the USA to New Zealand and Australia) could be interdicted, so preventing the build-up of forces for a riposte against the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. In the circumstances, therefore, the Japanese planned and launched 'Ka' (ii) to drive the marines and their supporting naval forces from the south-eastern end of the Solomon islands group.

Strong Japanese air attacks started later on 7 August as a precursor to 'Ka' (ii), and Fletcher felt compelled on 8 August to take the tactical decision to pull his vulnerable carriers and transport vessels back to the islands of Espíritu Santo and New Caledonia, leaving 16,000 US Marines on Guadalcanal and 6,000 more on Tulagi, together with rations for 37 days and only limited artillery and small arms ammunition. A brief respite was then granted to the marines as the Japanese prepared 'Ka' (ii), and they put this time to good use completing the airfield which the Japanese had started as Henderson Field, a forward strip for fighters and light attack aircraft. Though no land reinforcements for the Japanese on Guadalcanal had arrived by this time, the marines still had to endure daily bomber and naval gunfire attacks.

By this time the Imperial Japanese army had taken over from the Imperial Japanese navy the responsibility for land operations on Guadalcanal. Lieutenant General Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commander of the 17^th Army headquartered at Rabaul on New Britain island, believed that there were only 2,000 US troops on Guadalcanal, and that a force of 60,00 Japanese troops would be sufficient to defeat them. This was a radical underestimation of the real strength of the US forces, and resulted from an intelligence failure whose effects lasted well into the Guadalcanal campaign. The estimate’s origins were initially a cable from the Japanese military attaché in Moscow reporting that there were only a few thousand panic-stricken US troops were on the island, and that these were undertaking nothing more than a large-scale raid: the attaché's source for this faulty information has never been identified. The Japanese also deceived themselves about the implications of the large number of US transport vessels by persuading themselves that these reflected not the presence of larger numbers of men but rather the softness of the US forces and their need for the amenities which could be provided only on board ships.

For the expulsion of the Americans from Guadalcanal, Hyakutake was assigned the 28^th Regiment of the three-regiment 7^th Brigade of Lieutenant General Koichi Koito’s 7^th Division, reinforced with artillery and engineers and currently located on Saipan in the Mariana islands group, and Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi’s 6,000-man 35^th Brigade (based on the 124^th Regiment of Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi’s 18^th Division) and currently located on Mindanao in the Philippine islands group. However, rather than take the time needed to gather the full force at his disposal from two different locations, Hyakutake immediately decided to commit the 2,328 men of the reinforced 28^th Regiment, known as the 'Ichiki' Detachment after its commander, Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, was more concerned than his army counterparts about the implications of the US landing on Guadalcanal, and saw in an immediate counter-offensive not only the way to solve a local problem rapidly and efficiently, but also an opportunity to avenge his defeat in the Battle of Midway, which had ended his 'Mi' (ii) offensive against Midway island. Yamamoto therefore moved the headquarters of his Combined Fleet farther to the south to Truk atoll in the Caroline islands group, and committed Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo’s 2^nd Fleet and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s 3^rd Fleet to the campaign to retake Guadalcanal. The 3^rd Fleet had been created as a reorganisation of the aircraft carriers of Nagumo’s 1^st Air Fleet which had survived the Battle of Midway and were now bolstered by powerful surface units including the battleship Mutsu, and comprised two divisions each with two fleet carriers and one light carrier. The navy also committed the 600 men of the 5^th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force in support of the army troops.

Meanwhile Nimitz had rejected the concept of redeploying the Pacific Fleet’s older battleships to the South Pacific Area, where they would be operationally hampered by lack of adequate logistical support, but on 17 August did despatch the fleet carrier Hornet to replace the slightly smaller fleet carrier Wasp, which was instructed to leave part of her air group as a source of replacements for the other carriers. Nimitz also made plans for the newer battleships South Dakota and Washington to reach the South Pacific Area by the middle of September.

The 'Ichiki' Detachment had arrived on Truk by 15 August, but the 35^th Brigade would not reach the island until 23 August. The Japanese were anxious to start their counter-offensive as soon as possible, before the US forces had the opportunity to get Henderson Field into anything like service, and on 15 August Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, commander of the 8^th Fleet headquartered at Rabaul on New Britain island, ordered Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, commander of the 2^nd Destroyer Squadron, to use six ships of his Destroyer Division 4 and Destroyer Division 7 to land Ichiki and the initial 917 of his men on Guadalcanal. Tanaka was ordered to depart on this mission during the morning of the following day and reach Guadalcanal on the night of 17/18 August. The other 1,411 men of the 'Ichiki' Detachment and the detachment’s artillery were to depart Truk on the same day, but only in two elderly army transport vessels which could manage no more than 9 kt and could therefore not arrive until 22 August. These ships were routed well to the east to avoid discovery Allied air reconnaissance aircraft operating from the Milne Bay area at the extreme eastern end of the island of New Guinea, but the Japanese were as yet unaware of the fact that the Allies had an operational airfield on Espíritu Santo in the New Hebrides islands group and believed that current air searches from the south-east originated at Efate, also in the New Hebrides islands group.

The operation to expel the US forces from the south-eastern end of the Solomon islands group received the designation 'Ka' (ii), and was scheduled to begin on 24 August. On that date, two battalions of the 35^th Brigade were to depart Truk for Tulagi; by 27 August the 'Ichiki' Detachment was to have retaken Henderson Field, making it possible for Mitsubishi A6M Reisen 'Zero' fighters to be flown into it for the provision of local air superiority; and on 28 August the 35^th Brigade was to arrive and start the process of clearing Guadalcanal and retaking Tulagi. Port Moresby was also to be taken over this same period in 'Mo' (ii).

It was on 17 August that the first Japanese reinforcements reached Guadalcanal, and these landed to the east of the US Marines' perimeter round Lunga Point. These initial arrivals were 113 men of the 5^th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force and about 100 men of the 3^rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, who were delivered by the destroyer Oite, which made high-speed dashes to and from Guadalcanal without being spotted. On the same day, the ships of Kondo’s 2^nd Fleet arrived at Truk atoll, and those of Nagumo’s 3^rd Fleet arrived about four days later, followed closely by Yamamoto himself with the super-battleship Yamato supported by an escort carrier and three destroyers. All these movements were detected by Allied intelligence, but the Japanese put into effect a major revision of their signalling codes on 15 August, and this greatly hindered the work of the Allied code breakers in the provision of timely and accurate information.

Ichiki and the first 917 of his men landed undetected at about 24.00 on 17/18 August at Taivu Point, about 25 miles (40 km) to the east of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal’s north coast and slightly to the east of the point at which the men of the special naval landing forces had been delivered. On the morning of the next day, three of the Japanese destroyers were still in the area and undertook a gunfire bombardment of Tulagi. At this time Fletcher’s forces were some 450 miles (725 km) to the south-east covering the movement of Long Island, an escort carrier being used to ferry the first US warplanes to Henderson Field, but the other Japanese destroyers, including Hagikaze, which had been damaged by Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, were driven off.

The same day also saw the 1^st Battle of the Matanikau, a river debouching into the sea at a location to the west of the US Marines' perimeter round Lunga Point. Vandegrift had received intelligence that the remnants of the original Japanese garrison of the island had gathered in that area, and despatched three companies of the 5^th Marines to trap and destroy them. The marines assembled at their start line on the evening of 18 August and Company B began to advance along the coastal trail at 14.00. Some Japanese snipers and look-outs were encountered, as too were the bodies of several members of the local population who had been murdered, and Japanese attempts to infiltrate the marine positions during the night were unsuccessful. On the following morning, an artillery barrage at 08.50 took the Japanese by complete surprise, but the marines nonetheless encountered heavy machine gun fire near the river. Even so, by 16.00 the marines had fought their way into the village of Matanikau, but the main body of the Japanese had already escaped into the jungle and the marines were urgently recalled to the main perimeter because of the threat posed to the other flank of the marines' perimeter by the 'Ichiki' Detachment.

Believing that the US forces round Lunga Point were both weak and low in morale, immediately after landing Ichiki had embarked on a difficult approach march toward Lunga Point and Henderson Field without waiting for the remainder of his unit to arrive. At this time there were, in fact, 17,000 US troops on the island, and these were well dug in and very far from demoralised. The Americans knew very rapidly of the Japanese landing and advance, for men of the local population under the leadership of the Australian coast watcher Major Martin Clemens were scouting the area to the east of the marine perimeter, and a marine patrol ambushed a careless Japanese patrol on 19 August. On the body one of the Japanese killed in this ambush were documents detailing the Japanese plan and also revealing that the Japanese had excellent maps pinpointing most of the marine positions around the airfield.

On 20 August three high-speed destroyer transports of the US Navy delivered 120 tons of rations, which were enough to feed the US garrison for only three or four days. Meanwhile the 1^st Marine Engineer Battalion had completed the airstrip. Though still primitive, Henderson Field was now ready to receive its first aircraft, a group of 19 Grumman F4F fighters and 12 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers of Marine Air Group 23 flown off Long Island. Thus the marines on Guadalcanal now had at least a measure of local air cover and air support.

Ichiki launched his men in a series of determined assaults on the eastern side of the marine perimeter round the airfield during 20/21 August in what became misnamed as the Battle of the Tenaru River despite the fact that it was fought on the Ilu river mid-way between the Tenaru river and Henderson Field. The Japanese attack was repulsed by the marines' rifle and machine gun fire, supplemented by canister rounds fired from a 37-mm anti-tank gun. Totally disordered, the Japanese survivors fell back into a coconut grove to the east of the river, where they were counterattacked by men of Vandegrift’s reserve regiment, supported by light tanks, and rolled up from the south. The 'Ichiki' Detachment was driven toward the sea and annihilated, and Ichiki’s fate has been variously reported either as being killed in action or committing suicide after he had burned his regimental flag. The marines suffered the loss of 35 men killed and 75 wounded, but themselves killed more than 900 Japanese.

On 20 August a Japanese flying boat operating from the Shortland islands group discovered Long Island and Fletcher’s fleet carriers some 240 miles (385 km) to the south-east of Tulagi, and Tanaka immediately carried out his orders to retire if US carriers were spotted. Considering the situation, Yamamoto rightly concluded that the Americans were involved merely in an aircraft ferry undertaking and had not spotted Tanaka’s convoy, and ordered Tanaka to postpone his landings by two days, to 24 August, by which time Yamamoto expected to have neutralised Henderson Field.

The Japanese reinforcement was Kawaguchi’s 35^th Brigade, a comparatively powerful force which arrived from the Palau islands group between 27 August and 4 September, and on arrival absorbed the minuscule remnants of the 'Ichiki' Detachment.

The operation to land the first 1,500 men of the 35^th Brigade had meanwhile resulted in the naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons between 23 and 25 August. This battle eventuated from the fact that the Japanese landing was covered by ships of Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet as two Japanese forces attempted to intercept and destroy the US carrier groups to the east of the Solomon islands group after they had been diverted by a special force. Kondo’s 2^nd Fleet had as its primary strength Kondo’s own Support Force, Main Body with the heavy cruisers Atago, Takao, Maya, Myoko and Haguro, the light cruiser Yura, the destroyers Asagumo, Yamagumo, Kuroshio, Oyashio and Hayashio, and the seaplane tender Chitose; Kondo also controlled the Standby Force with the light carrier Junyo, and the Support Force, Fleet Train with the battleship Mutsu and the destroyers Natsugumo, Murasame, Harusame and Samidare.

Nagumo’s 3^rd Fleet, Carrier Strike Force, Mobile Force, Main Body comprised the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, and the destroyers Akigumo, Yugumo, Makigumo, Kazegumo, Shikinami and Uranami. This was supported by another element of the 2^nd Fleet, namely Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe’s Vanguard Force, Close Support with the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya and Chikuma, the light cruiser Nagara, and the destroyers Akizuki, Hatsukaze, Maikaze, Nowake, Tanikaze and Yukikaze.

The planned diversion was the responsibility of Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara’s 3^rd Fleet, Detached Carrier Strike Force, Mobile Force, Main Body with the light carrier Ryujo, the heavy cruiser Tone, and the destroyers Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze. Finally, distant support was provided by Yamamoto’s Support Force, Main Body with the super-battleship Yamato, the light carrier Taiyo and the destroyers Akebono and Ushio.

Fletcher’s Task Force 61 was organised in a number of smaller task groups. Fletcher’s own TG61.1 (otherwise Task Force 11) had the fleet carrier Saratoga, the British Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley’s heavy cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans and Australian Australia, the Australian light cruiser Hobart, and the destroyers Phelps, Farragut, Worden, MacDonough and Dale; Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s TG61.2 (otherwise Task Force 16) had the fleet carrier Enterprise, the battleship North Carolina, Rear Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale’s heavy cruiser Portland, the light cruiser Atlanta, and the destroyers Balch, Benham, Maury, Ellet, Grayson and Monssen; and Rear Admiral Leigh H. Noyes’s TG61.3 (otherwise Task Force 18) had the fleet carrier Wasp, Rear Admiral Norman Scott’s heavy cruisers San Francisco and Salt Lake City, the light cruiser San Juan and the destroyers Farenholt, Aaron Ward, Buchanan, Lang, Stack, Sterett and Selfridge.

Under cover of operations by the primary Japanese naval forces against the US carrier groups, Mikawa’s 8^th Fleet, Outer South Seas Force, Reinforcement Force was to deliver and land the 1,500 troops from the patrol boats PB-1, PB-2, PB-4 and PB-35 and three transport vessels: Tanaka’s Convoy Escort Force, with the light cruiser Jintsu and destroyers Suzukaze, Umikaze and Uzuki was to escort the troop-carrying vessels and support the landing on Guadalcanal after the US positions on the island had been shelled during the night 23/24 August by the destroyers Kagero, Isokaze, Kawakaze, Mutsuki and Yayoi under cover of Mikawa’s own Close Cover Force comprising the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Kinugasa and Furutaka patrolling to the north-west.

Simultaneously, the submarines I-121, I-123 and Ro-34 patrolled in the seaward approaches to Guadalcanal, I-121 being damaged by carrierborne aircraft in the process. I-11, I-174 and I-175 of the 3^rd Submarine Flotilla patrolled to the west of the Solomon islands group, and I-9, I-15, I-17, I-19, I-26 and I-31 of Rear Admiral Shigeaki Yamazaki’s 1^st Submarine Flotilla patrolled to the east of Santa Cruz island.

On 23 August US air reconnaissance from the island of Ndeni in the Santa Cruz islands group located the Japanese landing force, and Saratoga launched an attack force which did not locate the Japanese vessels and then landed at Henderson Field. Shortage of fuel then compelled TG61.3 to pull back to the south for replenishment. During the night of 23/24 August the Japanese destroyer Kagero undertook a gunfire bombardment of Henderson Field but inflicted only minor damage. Saratoga's aircraft returned to their carrier in the morning of 24 August.

On this day US air reconnaissance located the Japanese force centred on Ryujo, and Saratoga launched her attack force, which sent the Japanese light carrier to the bottom with bombs and torpedoes, and also damaged Tone. Meanwhile Japanese aerial reconnaissance had spotted the US carrier groups, and Shokaku and Zuikaku both launched their attack forces. The bombers secured three hits on Enterprise despite of strong US fighter cover over the carriers, which shot down many aircraft. Enterprise's attack force had meanwhile failed to locate the Japanese, while Saratoga's aircraft damaged the seaplane carrier Chitose.

During the night of 24/25 August the destroyers Isokaze, Kagero, Kawakaze, Mutsuki and Yayoi undertook a gunfire bombardment of Henderson Field and then joined Tanaka’s Convoy Escort Force. This was attacked during the morning of 25 August by US Marine Corps aircraft from Henderson Field, which sank the 9,310-ton transport vessel Kinryu Maru and damaged the light cruiser Jintsu. The destroyer Mutsuki became another Japanese casualty when she was sunk 45 miles (72.5 km) to the north of Santa Isabel island by a B-17 bomber of the USAAF: this was the first such success during the Solomon islands campaign. The Japanese now broke off the operation without seeking a decision.

Although it was a draw in tactical terms, the battle was a US success in operational terms. It had pitted a US strength of two fleet carriers, one battleship, four cruisers, 11 destroyers and 176 aircraft against a Japanese force of two fleet carriers, one light carrier, two battleships, 16 cruisers, 25 destroyers, one seaplane tender, four patrol boats, three transport vessels and up to 177 aircraft. The US force suffered severe damage to one fleet carrier, 29 aircraft destroyed and 90 men killed, while the Japanese force lost one light carrier, one destroyer and one transport vessel sunk, suffered severe damage to one light cruiser and one seaplane tender, and lost 75 aircraft and more than 290 men killed.

Of the Japanese submarines, I-17 was damaged on 27 August by one of Wasp's aircraft. On 30 August I-19's floatplane undertook a reconnaissance flight over Ndeni island, and in an attack of 31 August on TG61.1, I-26 torpedoed and damaged Saratoga, which was out of service for two months as repairs were effected. As Enterprise was already absent for repair of the damage she had suffered a few days earlier, Wasp was thus left as the only operational US carrier in the Pacific.

The 2^nd Destroyer Flotilla continued to despatch supply transports to Guadalcanal, though now by night rather than by day in an effort to minimise the change of being spotted and attacked by US aircraft. On 26 August the destroyers Suzukaze, Umikaze and Isokaze set out with 390 men from the Shortland islands group but were recalled on 27 August so that the troops could be landed in concert with the vessels of Captain Arita’s 20^th Destroyer Division, newly arrived from Borneo carrying more men of what was now generally called the 'Kawaguchi' Detachment. As a result of poor co-ordination, however, the 20^th Destroyer Division was caught on its own to the north of Guadalcanal on 28 August and heavily attacked by US Marine Corps dive-bombers from Enterprise and also by 11 shore-based SBD dive-bombers. Asagiri was sunk, Shirakumo and Yugiri were severely damaged, and Amagiri was slightly damaged.

However, Nagumo had transferred 30 'Zero' fighters from his carriers to the airfield on Buka island, to the north of Bougainville island, and the run on the night of 28 August succeeded in landing 1,000 men and artillery without loss. This set the pattern for much of the rest of the campaign in the Solomon islands group: the US forces had superiority by day, but at night control passed to the Japanese with their better practised night fighting tactics. So regular were the Japanese reinforcement runs that they became known to the Americans as the 'Tokyo Express'. By 9 September Hyakutake himself had landed with much of Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama’s 2^nd Division.

Having returned on 28 August, Umikaze, Kawakaze, Suzukaze and Isokaze now departed once again, followed by Fubuki, Hatsuyuki and Murakumo, and landed their troops near Cape Taivu during the night of 28/29 August. In this same period Japanese aircraft sank Colhoun from a small US supply force comprising one transport and the troop-carrying destroyer conversions Little and Colhoun. During the night of 29/30 August Yudachi, PB-1 and PB-34 landed more troops, and during the following night 1,000 men of the 'Kawaguchi' Detachment came ashore from the destroyers Kagero, Fubuki, Hatsuyuki, Murakumo, Umikaze, Kawakaze, Suzukaze and Amagiri.

In trying to attack a US reinforcement convoy, the Japanese submarine I-123 was sunk on 29 August by the US minesweeping destroyer Gamble.

On 1 September the US transport ship Betelgeuse delivered 392 men of the 6^th Naval Construction Battalion in what was the first deployment of 'Seabee' construction troops to a combat zone. Betelgeuse also delivered six 5-in (127-mm) coast defence guns and early warning radar equipment, and the Seabees brought brought with them two bulldozers and other construction equipment, allowing them to set promptly to work improving the facilities at Henderson Field.

Back on land, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson’s 1^st Marine Raider Battalion, with marines of the 1^st Parachute Battalion attached, attacked the Japanese positions at Cape Taivu on 8 September, with 501 raiders delivering the initial assault and 312 paratroops providing the reserve. The raid temporarily drove the Japanese rear echelon out of its base at Tasimboko and, before pulling out, the raiders destroyed much of the Japanese artillery and supplies. It was one of the most successful raids of the war: for the loss of just two men killed and six wounded, the marines had disrupted the Japanese preparations for their next major assault on Henderson Field, killing at least 27 Japanese and capturing documents of great intelligence value. However, the Japanese had their own intelligence that a transport convoy with reinforcements and supplies had arrived in the Fiji islands group on 5 September, and Kawaguchi moved up the date of his attack to 12 September.

On this date the 'Kawaguchi' Detachment launched another series of attacks against Henderson Field. The first of these was directed against the southern perimeter, where Kawaguchi rightly estimated that the US defence was weakest. The main weight of the attack fell on the marine raiders and paratroops, who, after their Tasimboko raid, had been moved inland to recuperate in what Vandegrift anticipated would be a quiet sector: in fact Vandegrift moved his own headquarters to the area at about the same time. Edson, the raider commander, had anticipated the Japanese attack, however, and had instructed his men to dig in on what soon became known as Bloody Ridge. In attacks on two consecutive nights, the Americans were pushed back to within 1,000 yards (915 m) of the airstrip in the so-called Battle of Edson’s Ridge, but on each night managed, but barely managed, to break the attack. The Japanese attacked without reserves, and their attacks suffered from a lack of co-ordination as a result of the difficulties of movement and communication in the jungle. The Japanese also attacked on each flank, but these proved to have been an unnecessary diversion of Japanese strength and the troops involved showed an unusual lack of night combat discipline. The marine artillery was repositioned after the first night attack, and gave crucial support during the stronger Japanese attack on the second night. The marines' casualties were 104 men killed and 278 wounded, while those of the Japanese were very considerably greater: regrouping at Kokumbona after the battle, Kawaguchi found that almost half his original force of 3,450 men had been lost. The Japanese left 1,200 casualties behind them as the 'Kawaguchi' Detachment effectively disintegrated.

On 14 September the fleet carrier Wasp was attacked by the submarine I-19 while escorting a major reinforcement and resupply convoy to Guadalcanal. The carrier was struck by three torpedoes, whose detonations destroyed water mains and started fires. The aviation fuel pumping system was in use at the time, and fuel spilling from fractured lines fed the fires, which raged out of control and forced the crew to abandon ship. Wasp was then sunk by torpedoes from the destroyer Lansdowne. The loss of Wasp left Enterprise, newly arrived after repair, as the only US carrier active in the theatre.

The battleship North Carolina was also damaged and the destroyer O’Brien sunk. However, the transports continued, and on 18 September 4,157 men of the reinforced 7^th Marines were landed on Guadalcanal, a success which raised the US strength to 23,000 men. The transports also delivered 137 vehicles, 4,323 barrels of fuel, food, engineering equipment and ammunition, the last including 10,000 rounds of 37-mm canister and 10,000 hand grenades. Vandegrift also had the 3/2^nd Marines redeployed from Tulagi to Guadalcanal.

The Japanese had also landed reinforcements, however, in the form of 1,100 men of the 4^th Regiment delivered on the night of 15/16 September by seven destroyers.

Meanwhile, the Americans were tightening their daylight control of the air over Guadalcanal: on 27/28 August the US aircraft shot down 32 raiding Japanese aircraft without loss. The Japanese responded with fighter sweeps, using a few bombers as bait, and these briefly evened the score.

On 23 September the 1/7^th Marines, supported by the 1^st Marine Raider Battalion and the 2/5^th Marines, launched a strong reconnaissance in force toward Matanikau and points still farther to the west. The US intelligence was in error, however, and instead of the 400 Japanese believed to be in this area, the marines ran into 1,900 men of 124^th Regiment. The US undertaking was further beset by poor maps and a confused command structure. A rapidly improvised attack against the entrenched Japanese on the Matanikau river on 27 September nearly ended in disaster. A landing by elements of the 1/7^th Marines behind the Japanese line left the marines trapped on a ridge near the coast, and the other marine battalions were unable to cross the Matanikau river and relieve the trapped battalion. Air observation spotted an improvised message laid out on the ridge, and gunfire support from destroyers blasted a route for the trapped marines to pull back to the coast for evacuation. This 2^nd Battle of the Matanikau was a defeat for the marines, who lost 91 men killed and 100 wounded at a cost to the Japanese of perhaps 30 men killed.

On 7 October the 7^th Marines delivered a third attack toward the Matanikau river area in an effort to deny the Japanese the use of artillery positions within range of Henderson Field. The marines made some progress, but because of intelligence indicating another Japanese effort against the main position round Henderson Field, the marines were ordered to pull back.

'Ka' (ii) was now in full swing as Hyakutake’s 17^th Army responded to orders to hold Guadalcanal and oust the Americans from their lodgement round Henderson Field, using the cruisers and destroyers of Tanaka’s Destroyer Escort Force to land some 25,000 troops at Tassafaronga Point during the hours of darkness between 10 and 14 October. Soon the headquarters of the 17^th Army, together with Maruyama’s 2^nd Division (4^th Regiment, 16^th Regiment and 29^th Regiment) reinforced by part of the 230^th Regiment detached from Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano’s 38^th Division, had been established on Guadalcanal to supervise 'Ka' (ii).

This was the primary Japanese strength now available for the prosecution of 'Ka' (ii) against the 1^st Marine Division, reinforced to a strength of 23,000, as noted above, by the arrival of the 7^th Marines and also the US Army’s 164^th Infantry.

The major Japanese reinforcement effort also set the scene for the Battle of Cape Esperance, also known as the 2^nd Battle of Savo Island and, to the Japanese, as the Sea Battle of Savo Island, on 11/12 October 1942 as the second of four major surface engagements during the Guadalcanal campaign. The battle was fought at the entrance to the strait between Savo island and Guadalcanal, Cape Esperance being the most northern point on Guadalcanal.

The Japanese had scheduled their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 October, and in preparation for this had redeployed, as noted above, most of the 2^nd Division and much of Sano’s 38^th Division, totalling 17,500 men, from the Netherlands East Indies to Rabaul on New Britain island in preparation for their onward movement to Guadalcanal. Also noted above, between 14 September and 9 October, a number of 'Tokyo Express' runs had delivered men of the 2^nd Division and Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the seaplane tender Nisshin, which delivered heavy equipment including vehicles and heavy artillery, which other warships could not carry. The Japanese navy promised to support the Japanese army’s planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment and supplies to the island, increasing its air attacks on Henderson Field, and sending warships to undertake gunfire bombardments of the airfield.

It was on the night of 11 October that Mikawa despatched the major supply and reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal. Under the command of Rear Admiral Takaji Joshima (otherwise Takatsugu Jojima), commander of the 11^th Seaplane Tender Division, this convoy comprised the seaplane tenders Chitose and Nisshin with normal provision for a total of 49 seaplanes between them, and destroyers Akizuki, Asagumo, Murakumo, Natsugumo, Shirayuki and Yamagumo. The convoy was carrying 728 men of the 2^nd Division as well as four medium howitzers, two field guns, one anti-aircraft gun, and a substantial assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the Shortland islands group and at Buin on the south-eastern end of Bougainville island. At the same time, but in a separate operation, the heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka and Kinugasa, and destroyers Fubuki and Hatsuyuki, under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, were to undertake a gunfire bombardment of Henderson Field with special high explosive shells to destroy aircraft and the airfield’s facilities.

On 9 October the US reinforcement convoy, under the command of Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of the amphibious forces in the South Pacific Area, departed Nouméa on New Caledonia island for Guadalcanal. Comprising the transports McCawley and Zeilin, and destroyer transports carrying the 164^th Infantry, the convoy was escorted by destroyers. Cover for the undertaking was provided by Rear Admiral George D. Murray’s TF17 with the fleet carrier Hornet, the heavy cruisers Northampton and Pensacola, the light cruisers San Diego and Juneau, and the destroyers Anderson, Barton, Hughes, Morris, Russell and Mustin. Some 210 miles (340 km) to the south of Guadalcanal, Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee’s force comprising the battleship Washington, two cruisers and five destroyers was just less than 60 miles (100 km) to the east of Malaita, and Scott’s TF64, comprising the heavy cruisers Salt Lake City and San Francisco, the light cruisers Boise and Helena, and the destroyers Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey and McCalla, was cruising near Rennell island to intercept any Japanese ships advancing from the north-west.

Shortly before 24.00 on the night of 11/12 October, therefore, TF64 was ideally located to intercept Goto’s force as it approached Savo island. Taking the Japanese by surprise in the Battle of Cape Esperance, in overall terms Scott’s ships sank one of the Japanese cruisers and one of their destroyers, heavily damaged another cruiser, mortally wounded Goto, and forced the rest of Goto’s ships to abandon their bombardment mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire, one of Scott’s destroyers was sunk and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged. In the meantime, the Japanese supply convoy had successfully completed unloading at Guadalcanal and begun its return journey without being discovered by Scott’s force. Later on the morning of 12 October, four Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned back to assist Goto’s retreating ships. Air attacks by US aircraft from Henderson Field sank two of these destroyers later that day.

As with the preceding naval engagements around Guadalcanal, the strategic outcome was inconsequential because neither the Japanese nor US navies secured operational control of the waters around Guadalcanal as a result of this action. However, the Battle of Cape Esperance provided a significant morale boost to the US Navy after the disaster of the Battle of Savo Island, and also represented the US Navy’s first major attempt to wrest nocturnal operational control of waters around Guadalcanal from the Japanese.

However, as no US warships had yet attempted to interdict any 'Tokyo Express' nocturnal missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from US surface forces on this night.

It was at 08.00 on 11 October that Joshima’s reinforcement group departed the anchorage in the Shortland islands group to make the 250-mile (400-km) run down 'The Slot' (New Georgia Sound between the northern and southern chains of islands to the south-east of Bougainville) to Guadalcanal. Eight hours later, at 14.00, Goto’s force also departed the Shortland islands group.

To protect the reinforcement group’s approach to Guadalcanal from US air attack, Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka’s 11^th Air Fleet, based at Rabaul on New Britain, Kavieng on New Ireland and Buin on Bougainville, planned two air attacks on Henderson Field for execution on 11 October. A fighter sweep of 17 'Zero' fighters flew over Henderson Field just after 12.00 but failed to engage any US aircraft, and 45 minutes later a second wave, this time of 45 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' medium bombers and 30 'Zero' fighters, arrived over Henderson Field. In the air battle which followed, one Japanese bomber and two US fighters were shot down. Although the Japanese attacks inflicted no major damage, the disruption caused by their attack did prevent US attack aircraft from finding and attacking the reinforcement group. As this latter passed along 'The Slot', relays of 11^th Air Fleet 'Zero' fighters from Buin provided escort. The importance of this convoy for the Japanese plans is indicated by the fact that the pilots of the last flight of the day were ordered to remain on station over the convoy until the fall of night, and then to ditch their aircraft and await recovery by the reinforcement group’s destroyers: all six 'Zero' fighters ditched, but only one pilot was recovered.

At 14.45 US reconnaissance aircraft sighted Joshima’s convoy 210 miles (340 km) from Guadalcanal between Kolombangara and Choiseul islands in 'The Slot', and reported the Japanese force as two cruisers and six destroyers. Goto’s force, which was following basically the same course to the rear of Joshima’s convoy, was not sighted. In response to the sighting, at 16.07 Scott turned the ships of TF64 toward Guadalcanal for an interception.

Scott’s plan for the imminent battle was simple. The US ships were to steam in column with destroyers to the front and rear of the cruisers, searching across a 300° arc with their advanced SG surface search radar in an effort to gain a position offering the tactical advantage over the oncoming Japanese force. The destroyers were then to illuminate any targets with their searchlights and launch torpedo salvoes while the cruisers were to open fire at any available targets without awaiting further orders. The cruisers' floatplanes, launched in advance, were to find and illuminate the Japanese warships with flares. Although the light cruisers Helena and Boise carried the new SG search radar, which was a major improvement over the preceding SD equipment, Scott opted to use the less well equipped heavy cruiser San Francisco as his flagship.

It was at 22.00, as TF64 approached Cape Hunter at the north-western end of Guadalcanal, that three of Scott’s cruisers launched their floatplanes: one of these crashed on take-off, but the other two patrolled over Savo island, Guadalcanal and 'Ironbottom Sound' (the area to the west of the Ngello, Sealark and Lengo Channels) between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. As the floatplanes were launched, Joshima’s force was just passing around the north-western shoulder of Guadalcanal, and neither force sighted the other. At 22.20, Joshima signalled Goto by radio to inform him that there were no US ships were in the vicinity. Although Joshima’s force later heard the US floatplanes overhead while unloading along the north shore of Guadalcanal, this fact was not reported to Goto.

Just after passing Cape Esperance, at 22.33 Scott’s ships assumed their planned battle formation as a column with Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey in the lead, San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City and Helena in the centre, and Buchanan and McCalla at the rear. The distance between each ship was in the order of 500 to 700 yards (460 to 640 m). Visibility was poor because the moon had already set, leaving neither ambient light nor any visible sea horizon.

Goto’s force passed through several rain squalls as the ships approached Guadalcanal at 30 kt. Goto’s flagship Aoba led the column of Japanese cruisers, followed by Furutaka and Kinugasa. Fubuki was to starboard of Aoba and Hatsuyuki to port. At 23.30, as they emerged from the last squall, Goto’s ships were spotted on radar by Helena and Salt Lake City. Lacking radar, the Japanese remained unaware of TF64’s ships.

At 23.00, a floatplane launched by San Francisco sighted Joshima’s force off Guadalcanal and reported the fact to Scott. Believing that more Japanese ships were probably still approaching, Scott maintained his course toward the western side of Savo island. At 23.33, Scott ordered a turn toward the south-west onto a heading of 230°. All but Scott’s own flagship, San Francisco, understood the order as a column movement: as the three destroyers in the lead executed the column movement, San Francisco turned simultaneously. Immediately behind, Boise followed San Francisco, thereby throwing the three van destroyers out of formation.

At 23.32, Helena's radar showed the Japanese warships to be about 27,700 yards (25330 m) distant, and at 23.35 the radars of Boise and Duncan also detected the Japanese ships. Between 23.42 and 23.44, Helena and Boise reported their contacts to Scott, who mistakenly believed that the two cruisers were actually tracking the three US destroyers which had been thrown out of position during the column turn. Scott radioed Farenholt to ask if the destroyer was attempting to resume its station at the front of the column. Farenholt replied in the affirmative and added that she was coming up San Francisco's starboard side, further confirming Scott’s belief that the radar contacts were in fact those of his own van destroyers.

At 23.45, Farenholt and Laffey were still unaware of the approaching Japanese warships and increased speed to resume their stations at the front of the US column. The captain of Duncan, however, believing that Farenholt and Laffey were starting an attack on the Japanese warships, increased speed to launch a solitary torpedo attack on Goto’s force without telling Scott what he was doing. San Francisco's radar registered the Japanese ships, but Scott was not informed of the sighting. By 23:45, the Japanese ships were only 5,000 yards (4570 m) distant from TF64 and visible to Helena's and Salt Lake City 's look-outs. At this time the US formation was ideally situated to 'cross the T' of the Japanese formation, giving Scott’s ships a significant tactical advantage. At 23.46, still assuming that Scott was aware of the rapidly approaching Japanese warships, Helena radioed for permission to open fire, using the general procedure request 'Interrogatory Roger' (meaning in essence 'Are we clear to act?'). Scott answered with 'Roger', meaning only that the message had been received, and not that he was confirming the request to act. Upon receipt of Scott’s 'Roger', however, Helena's captain thought that he now had the permission for which he had asked and gave the order to open fire. Helena was quickly followed by Boise, Salt Lake City and, to Scott’s further surprise, San Francisco.

The Japanese force was taken almost completely by surprise. At 23.43, Aoba's look-outs sighted Scott’s force, but on being informed of the fact Goto assumed that these were Joshima’s ships. Two minutes later, Aoba's look-outs identified the ships as American, but Goto was still not convinced and directed his ships to flash identification signals. As Aoba's crew complied, the first US salvo smashed into the ship’s superstructure. Aoba was quickly hit by as many as 40 8-, 6- and 5-in (203-, 152- and 127-mm) shells from Helena, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Farenholt and Laffey, whose fire severely damaged the Japanese heavy cruiser’s communications systems and demolished two of her main gun turrets as well as her main gun director. Several large-calibre projectiles passed through Aoba's flag bridge without exploding, but the force of their passage killed many men and mortally wounded Goto.

Still unsure at whom his ships were firing, and afraid that they might be firing on his own destroyers, at 23.47 Scott ordered his ships to cease fire, but not every ship complied. Scott ordered Farenholt to flash her recognition signals, and upon observing that Farenholt was close to his formation, ordered the resumption of fire resumed at 23.51.

Still taking damaging hits, Aoba turned to starboard to head away from TF64, and began laying smoke, which persuaded most of the Scott’s ships that she was sinking. Scott’s ships thus shifted their fire to Furutaka, which was following Aoba. At 23.49, Furutaka was hit in the area of her two quadruple torpedo tube mountings, triggering a large fire that attracted even more fire from the US ships. At 23.58, a torpedo from Buchanan hit Furutaka in her forward engine room, causing severe damage. During this time, San Francisco and Boise sighted Fubuki only about 1,400 yards (1280 m) distant and raked her with fire, joined soon by most of the rest of Scott’s ships. Heavily damaged, Fubuki began to sink. Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki turned to port instead of to starboard and escaped the immediate attention of the US ships.

During the exchange of gunfire, Farenholt received several damaging hits from both the Japanese and US ships, killing several men. She escaped from the crossfire by crossing ahead of San Francisco and passing to the disengaged side of Scott’s column. Still engaged in her solitary torpedo attack on the Japanese formation, Duncan was also hit by gunfire from both sides, set on fire, and looped away in her own effort to escape the crossfire.

As the Japanese tried to escape, Scott’s ships tightened their formation and turned in pursuit of the retreating Japanese warships. At 00.06, two torpedoes from Kinugasa barely missed Boise. Boise and Salt Lake City turned on their searchlights to help target the Japanese ships, but this also provided Kinugasa's gunners with clear targets. At 00.10, two shells from Kinugasa exploded in Boise's main ammunition magazine between the two foremost turrets. The resulting explosion killed almost 100 men and threatened to blow the ship apart. Seawater rushed in through rents opened in the hull by the explosion, but this also helped to douse the fire before it could explode the ship’s powder magazines. Boise immediately veered out of the column and retreated from the action. Kinugasa and Salt Lake City exchanged fire, each hitting the other several times, causing minor damage to Kinugasa and damaging one of Salt Lake City's boilers, reducing her speed.

At 00.16, Scott ordered his ships to turn to a heading of 330° in an attempt to pursue the fleeing Japanese ships. The US ships soon lost sight of the Japanese ships, however, and all firing had ended by 00.20. The US formation was beginning to scatter, so Scott ordered a turn to 205° to disengage.

During the Battle of Cape Esperance, Joshima’s reinforcement group completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey unseen by Scott’s warships, using a route that passed to the south of the Russell islands group and New Georgia. Despite the extensive damage she had sustained, Aoba was able to join Kinugasa in retiring to the north-west through 'The Slot'. Furutaka's damage caused her to lose power at about 00.50, and the cruiser sank at 02.28, 22 miles (35 km) to the north-west of Savo island. Hatsuyuki recovered Furutaka's survivors and then joined the retreat to the north-west.

Boise's crew had extinguished their ship’s fires by 02.40, and at 03.05 the cruiser rejoined Scott’s formation. Still on fire, Duncan was abandoned by her crew at 02.00. Unaware of Duncan 's fate, Scott detached McCalla to search for her and retired with the rest of his ships toward Nouméa on the island of New Caledonia, arriving during the afternoon of 13 October. McCalla located the burning and abandoned Duncan at about 03.00, and several members of McCalla's crew made an attempt to keep her from sinking. By 12.00, however, they had to abandon the effort as Duncan's interior bulkheads collapsed, causing the ship to sink 6 miles (9.7 km) to the north of Savo island. US servicemen in boats from Guadalcanal as well as McCalla recovered Duncan's scattered survivors from the sea around Savo island. In total, 195 of Duncan's men survived, and 48 died. As they rescued Duncan's crew, the Americans came across more than 100 of Fubuki's survivors in the same general area. The Japanese initially refused all rescue attempts but a day later allowed themselves to be picked up and taken prisoner.

Learning of the bombardment force’s crisis, Joshima detached the destroyers Shirayuki and Murakumo to assist Furutaka or her survivors, and Asagumo and Natsugumo to rendezvous with Kinugasa, which had paused in her retreat to cover the withdrawal of Joshima’s ships.

At 07.00, five shore-based SBD dive-bombers attacked Kinugasa but managed to inflict no damage. At 08.20, another 11 SBD aircraft found and attacked Shirayuki and Murakumo. Although they scored no direct hits, a near miss caused Murakumo to begin leaking oil, marking a trail for other Guadalcanal-based aircraft to follow. A short time later, seven more SBD dive-bombers and six Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, accompanied by 14 Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters, found the two Japanese destroyers some 170 miles (275 km) from Guadalcanal. In the ensuing attack, Murakumo was hit by a torpedo in her engineering spaces, leaving her without power. In the meantime, Aoba and Hatsuyuki reached the safety of the Japanese base in the Shortland islands group, off the south-eastern tip of Bougainville island, at 10.00.

Rushing to assist Murakumo, Asagumo and Natsugumo were attacked at 15.45 by another group of 11 Guadalcanal-based SBD and TBF warplanes escorted by 12 fighters. One of the SBD dive-bombers placed its bomb almost directly amidships on Natsugumo while two more near misses contributed to her severe damage. After Asagumo had taken off her survivors, Natsugumo sank at 16.27. Guadalcanal’s aircraft also scored several more hits on the stationary Murakumo, setting her on fire. After her crew had abandoned ship, Shirayuki sent her to the bottom with a torpedo, picked up her survivors, and joined the rest of the Japanese warships for the remainder of their return trip to the Shortland islands group.

The Battle of Cape Esperance had pitted a US force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and five destroyers against a Japanese force of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, while the reinforcement convoy of two seaplane tenders and six destroyers was not directly involved. The US losses were one destroyer sunk, one light cruiser damaged and one destroyer damaged, as well as 163 men killed, while those of the Japanese were one heavy cruiser sunk, three destroyers sunk, one cruiser damaged, between 341 and 454 men killed, and 111 men rescued and taken prisoner.

Captain Kikunori Kijima, Goto’s chief-of-staff and commander of the bombardment force during the return trip to the Shortland islands group after Goto’s death, claimed that his force had sunk two US cruisers and one destroyer. Furutaka's captain survived the sinking of his ship and laid the blame for her loss on poor aerial reconnaissance and poor leadership by the staff of the 8^th Fleet. Although Goto’s bombardment mission failed, Joshima’s reinforcement convoy was successful in delivering the crucial men and equipment to Guadalcanal. Aoba had to steam to Kure in Japan for repairs, which were completed on 15 February 1943.

On the other side of the coin, Scott claimed that his TF64 had sunk three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers. Damaged severely enough to require a trip to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for repairs, Boise returned to service only on 20 March 1943.

Although a US tactical victory, the Battle of Cape Esperance had little immediate or strategic effect on the situation on Guadalcanal. Just two days later, on the night of 13/14 October, the Japanese battleships Kongo and Haruna undertook a gunfire bombardment which almost destroyed Henderson Field. One day after that, a large Japanese convoy delivered 4,500 troops and equipment to the island. These troops and equipment helped complete Japanese preparations for the large land offensive, scheduled to begin on 23 October.

However, the convoy carrying US Army troops, which reached Guadalcanal on 13 October as planned, was a decisive moment in the climactic land battle for Henderson Field which was fought between 23 and 26 October.

Conversely, the victory in the Battle of Cape Esperance helped prevent an accurate US assessment of Japanese skills and tactics in naval night fighting. The US Navy remained unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes, the excellence of Japanese night optics, and the skilled fighting ability of most Japanese destroyer and cruiser commanders. Incorrectly applying the perceived lessons learned from this battle, US commanders in future naval night battles in the Solomon islands group attempted consistently to prove that US naval gunfire was more effective than Japanese torpedo attacks. This belief was severely tested just two months later during the Battle of Tassafaronga.

During this period Maruyama’s 2^nd Division was completing its preparations for another major effort against Henderson Field but, like the previous efforts, this too was poorly co-ordinated. The Battle of Henderson Field, known to the Japanese as the Battle of Lunga Point, lasted from 23 to 26 October and was the third major land offensive undertaken during the Guadalcanal campaign. In this three-day period US Marine Corps and US Army forces, under the overall command of Vandegrift, repulsed an attack by Hyakutake’s 17^th Army as they defended and held the perimeter based on Lunga Point and including Henderson Field. During this final major effort of the 'Ka' (ii) land campaign, the Japanese made several assaults at various points round the Lunga perimeter, all of which were repulsed with heavy Japanese losses. At the same time, aircraft operating from Henderson Field successfully defended US positions on Guadalcanal from attacks by Japanese naval air and sea forces.

As the Japanese regrouped after their second offensive, which had ended in their defeat in the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, the US forces had made a major effort to improve and strengthen their Lunga perimeter, and in this they had been aided by the arrival, on 18 September, of the convoy delivering the 4,157 men of the 7^th Marines, which had previously been an element of the 3^rd Provisional Marine Brigade and as such were fresh from garrison duty in Samoa. The reinforcement made it possible, from 19 September, for Vandegrift to establish a continuous perimeter round the Lunga lodgement. Vandegrift and his staff were fully aware that that remnants of the 'Kawaguchi' Detachment had retreated into the area lying to the west of the Matanikau river after the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, and that several groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga perimeter and the Matanikau river. Vandegrift therefore decided that his forces would undertake a series of small-unit operations around the Matanikau river valley to keep the Japanese off balance and also to make it more difficult for them to coalesce into a single force of significant military value.

The first marine operation against Japanese forces to the west of the Matanikau river, between 23 and 27 September by elements of three marine battalions, was repulsed by Kawaguchi’s troops under the local command of Colonel Akinosuke Oka. In the second action, between 6 and 9 October, a larger marine force crossed the Matanikau river, attacked the newly landed Japanese forces of Maruyama’s 2^nd Division, whose infantry group was commanded by Major General Yumio Nasu, and inflicted significant losses on the 4^th Regiment. This second action forced the Japanese to retreat from their positions to the east of the Matanikau river.

Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, commander of the US Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, had meanwhile convinced Ghormley that the marine forces on Guadalcanal should immediately be reinforced if Guadalcanal was to be held against the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 October, the 2,837 men of the 164^th Infantry of Major General Alexander McC. Patch’s Americal Division embarked at New Caledonia for the passage to Guadalcanal, where they were scheduled to arrive on 13 October.

Mikawa’s ships continued their nocturnal programme to deliver men and matériel to Guadalcanal. As indicated above, between 1 and 17 October a number of ferry operations delivered to the island 15,000 more troops, comprising the rest of the 2^nd Division and one regiment of Sano’s 38^th Division, as well as artillery, tanks, ammunition and provisions. One of these operations, on 9 October, also delivered Hyakutake to take personal command of the forces in the planned offensive. Mikawa also sent heavy cruisers on several occasions to bombard Henderson Field and, on the night of 11 October, it was the interception of one of these bombardment missions which had led to the Battle of Cape Esperance.

In order to help protect the movement of an important supply convoy, comprising six slower cargo vessels and 11 destroyers of Rear Admiral Tamotsu Takama’s 4^th Destroyer Flotilla to land 4,500 men at Tassafaronga, Yamamoto on 13 October despatched a naval force from Truk atoll under the command of Kurita to undertake a gunfire bombardment of Henderson Field. Kurita’s force, comprising the battleships Kongo and Haruna escorted by the light cruiser Isuzu (Tanaka’s flagship) and destroyers Takanami, Makinami, Naganami, Hayashio, Oyashio, Kuroshio and Kagero, approached Guadalcanal without being detected and opened fire on Henderson Field at 01.33 on 14 October and in the following 83 minutes lobbed 973 14-in (356-mm) shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of them falling in and around the area of the airfield. The bombardment included 300 special high explosive shells, and inflicted heavy damage on the airfield’s two runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, destroyed 48 of the Cactus Air Force’s 90 aircraft and damaged all but one of the others, and killed 41 men including six aircrew. The attempt by PT-46, PT-48, PT-60 and PT-38 to sortie from Tulagi and attack Kurita’s force was frustrated by the patrolling Naganami.

Ground personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours, however, and over the next few weeks the Cactus Air Force gradually recovered as more aircraft, fuel, equipment, spares and personnel reached Guadalcanal.

The 2^nd Fleet and 3^rd Fleet reached the area of Ndeni, the largest of the Santa Cruz islands group to the south-east of Guadalcanal, on 14 October, the day on which Japanese air reconnaissance reported the presence of US convoys to the south of Guadalcanal and US air reconnaissance sighted Japanese naval forces to the north-east of the Solomon islands group. During the night of 14/15 October Mikawa’s force again shelled Henderson Field, this time with 752 8-in (203-mm) rounds from the heavy cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa, but only to much less devastating effect. It was during this bombardment that Takama took the opportunity to land the 4,500 men of the 2^nd Division and 38^th Division at Tassafaronga. During the morning of 15 October the 7,623-tonAzumasan Maru, 8,666-ton K