'Manhood' was the British attempt by General Sir Claude Auchinleck’s 8^th Army to take the Miteirya Ridge, to the south-west of El Alamein, from the Axis forces of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel’s Panzerarmee 'Afrika' as the last stage of the 1^st Battle of El Alamein (26/27 July 1942).

Fought in the period between 1 and 27 July 1942, the 1^st Battle of El Alamein followed the defeat of the British and commonwealth forces in 'Venezia', otherwise the Battle of Gazala, during June 1942. In the aftermath of this defeat, the 8^th Army had retreated to the east into north-western Egypt as far as Mersa Matruh, about 100 miles (160 km) inside the border with Libya. Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, currently the commander of the 8^th Army, had decided not to attempt to hold the defences on the Egyptian border as this would have required the infantry holding defended localities, while a strong armoured force was held back in reserve to foil any attempts to penetrate or outflank the fixed defences: as the 8^th Army had almost no armoured units left fit to fight, the infantry positions would therefore have been defeated in detail. The original plan to hold at Mersa Matruh also included an armoured reserve, but in the absence of such a reserve, Ritchie believed he could organise his infantry to cover the minefields between the defended localities to prevent Axis engineers from gaining undisturbed access.

To defend the Mersa Matruh line, Ritchie placed Major General J. S. Nichols’s Indian 10^th Division in Mersa Matruh itself and Major General W. H. C. Ramsden’s 50^th Division some 15 miles (24 km) farther to the east along the coast at Gerawla under the command of Lieutenant General W. G. Holmes’s X Corps, whose headquarters was newly arrived from Syria. Inland of the X Corps was Lieutenant General W. H. E. Gott’s XIII Corps with Major General H. R. Briggs’s Indian 5^th Division (with only Brigadier D. W. Reid’s Indian 29^th Brigade and two regiments of artillery) around Sidi Hamza about 20 miles (32 km) inland, and Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg’s newly arrived New Zealand 2^nd Division (less Brigadier G. H. Clifton’s New Zealand 6^th Brigade, which had been left out of combat in case the division was captured and would could therefore become the core of a new division) at Minqar Qaim on the escarpment 30 miles (48 km) inland, and Major General H. Lumsden’s 1^st Armoured Division in the open desert to the south. This last formation had taken over Brigadier A. H. Gatehouse’s (from 26 June Brigadier A. F. Fisher’s) 4^th Armoured Brigade and Brigadier W. G. Carr’s 22^nd Armoured Brigades from Major General J. M. L. Renton’s 7^th Armoured Division, and which by this time had only three tank regiments between them.

On 25 June Auchinleck, the commander-in-chief Middle East Command, relieved Ritchie and assumed direct command of the 8^th Army. Auchinleck decided not to seek any form of decisive confrontation on the Mersa Matruh position as he had concluded that the 8^th Army’s inferiority in armour after the defeat at Gazala meant it could not prevent Rommel either breaking through its centre or enveloping its open left flank to the south in the fashion he had employed at Gazala: this conclusion was based on the assessment at general headquarters in Cairo that Rommel could possibly have as many as 520 serviceable tanks, but more probably 340 (in actuality it was 105) at a time when the 8^th Army had 155 tanks. Auchinleck decided instead to adopt delaying tactics as the 8^th Army fell back another 100 miles (160 km) or more to the east to a more defensible position near El Alamein. Only 40 mi (65 km) to the south of El Alamein, the steep slopes of the Qattara Depression ruled out the possibility of Axis armour moving around the southern flank of his defences and limited the width of the front he had to defend.

While preparing the defences at El Alamein, Auchinleck fought strong delaying actions, first at Mersa Matruh on 26/27 June and then Fuka on 28 June. The late change of orders resulted in some confusion in the two forward formations, the X Corps and XIII Corps, between the desire to inflict damage on the Axis forces and the need not to become trapped in the Mersa Matruh but retreat in good order. The result was poor co-ordination between the two forward corps and their subordinate formations.

Late on 26 June, in 'Aïda', Generalmajor Ulrich Kleemann’s 90^th leichte Division and Generalmajor Georg von Bismarck’s 21^st Panzerdivision worked their way through the minefields in the centre of the British front. Early on 27 June, resuming its advance, the 90^th leichte Division was checked by the artillery of the 50^th Division. Meanwhile, Oberst Eduard Crasemann’s 15^th Panzerdivision and the 21^st Panzerdivision advanced to the east above and below the escarpment to the south of Mersa Matruh. The 15^th Panzerdivision was blocked by the 4^th Armoured Brigade and Brigadier the Viscount Garmoyle’s 7^th Motor Brigade, but the 21^st Panzerdivision was ordered to persevere and attack Minqar Qaim. Rommel ordered the 90^th leichte Division to resume its advance and cut the coast road behind the 50^th Division by the evening.

As the 21^st Panzerdivision advanced on Minqar Qaim, the New Zealand 2^nd Division found itself surrounded but succeeded in breaking out during the night of 27 June without serious losses and withdrew to the east.

Auchinleck had planned a second delaying position at Fuka, some 30 miles (48 km) to the east of Mersa Matruh, and at 21.20 ordered a withdrawal to Fuka. Confusion in communication led the division withdrawing immediately to the El Alamein position.

Meanwhile, after an unsuccessful attempt to secure a position on the escarpment, the X Corps was out of touch with the 8^th Army between 19.30 and 04.30 in the early morning of the next day. Only then did the corps learn that the withdrawal order had been given. The withdrawal of the XIII Corps had left exposed the southern flank of the X Corps on the coast at Matruh, and its line of retreat was compromised by the cutting of the coast road some 17 mi (27 km) to the east of Matruh. The corps was ordered to break out to the south into the desert and then make its way to the east. Auchinleck ordered the XIII Corps to provide support, but the formation was in no position to do so. At 21.00 on 28 June, the X Corps headed to the south in brigade groups, but there was considerable confusion in the darkness and the brigade groups stumbled upon Axis units leaguered for the night. The Indian 5^th Division in particular suffered heavy losses, including the destruction of Reid’s Indian 29^th Brigade at Fuka.

The Axis forces took more than 6,000 prisoners, 40 tanks and an very substantial quantity of supplies.

El Alamein was in itself nothing but an insignificant station on the coastal railway line. Some 10 mi (16 km) to its south lies the Ruweisat Ridge, a rocky ridge whose insignificant height nonetheless offered excellent observation for many miles over the surrounding desert. Another 20 miles (32 km) to the south of the Ruweisat Ridge lies the northern edge of the Qattara Depression. The line which the British chose to defend extended between the coast and the Qattara Depression, which meant that any Axis effort to outflank it would require a very long and arduous detour to the south across the Sahara desert. The British had appreciated the basic strength of the position before the war, and had begun the construction of several 'boxes' as bunkered and entrenched locations surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and minefields: the best developed of these was that round the railway station at El Alamein. In June 1942, though, most of the defensive 'line' was still just open and empty desert.

Lieutenant General C. W. M. Norrie, commanding the XXX Corps, now organised the position and ordered the construction of three defended 'boxes'. The first and strongest of these, at El Alamein on the coast, had been partly wired and mined by Major General D. H. Pienaar’s South African 1at Division. The Bab el Qattara 'box', located some 20 miles (32 km) from the coast and 8 miles (13 km) to the south-west of the Ruweisat Ridge, had been dug but not wired or mined, while that at the Naq Abu Dweis on the edge of the Qattara Depression, some 34 miles (55 km) from the coast, had hardly been started.

The British position in Egypt was currently in a very critical state. The rout at Mersa Matruh had created what was little short of panic in the British headquarters at Cairo, something later called "the Flap". On what came to be referred and staff at British headquarters, in rear-echelon units and at the embassy burned confidential papers in anticipation of the entry of Axis troops into the city. Although he believed that he could still stop Rommel at El Alamein, Auchinleck felt that he could not ignore the possibility that the 8^th Army might once again be outmanoeuvred or outfought and therefore believed that, in order to maintain his army’s survival and a fighting entity, he had to plan for the possibility of a further retreat while maintaining morale and retaining the support and co-operation of the Egyptians. Defensive positions were built to the west of Alexandria and on the approaches to Cairo, and considerable areas in the Nile delta were flooded.

The Axis, too, believed that the capture of Egypt was imminent and the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini, sensing the approach of a historic moment, flew to Libya and arrived at the Comando Supremo headquarters in Cyrenaica to prepare for what he believed would be his triumphal entry to Cairo.

The effective disintegration of the X Corps at Mersa Matruh disrupted Auchinleck’s plan for the occupation of the defences at El Alamein. On 29 June he ordered the XXX Corps (South African 1^st Division, and Indian 5^th and 10^th Divisions) to move into the northern sector of the front along the coast, and the XIII Corps (New Zealand and Indian 5^th Divisions) into southern sector, with what was left of the 1^st and 7^th Armoured Divisions held back as a mobile reserve under army command. Auchinleck intended that the fixed defences would serve to channel and disorganise the Axis advance while mobile units would attack its flanks and rear.

On 30 June, Rommel’s Panzerarmee 'Afrika' approached the El Alamein defences from the west. The Axis formation was now both physically exhausted and numerically well below strength. Rommel had driven his army forward with a single-minded ruthlessness in the confidence that if the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' fell on the 8^th Army before this latter could settle, its offensive momentum would allow it to punch through the El Alamein position and open the way for an advance to Alexandria, Cairo and the Nile river with little further opposition. The German and Italian logistic situation remained a major problem because the Axis staff had originally expected a pause of six weeks after the capture of Tobruk on 21 June. Moreover, the supporting German air units were also exhausted and able to provide only little help against the RAF’s all-out attack on the Axis supply lines. With the arrival of US heavy bombers the Allied attacks on the Axis lines of communication and supply could reach as far to the west as the port of Benghazi on the eastern side of the Gulf of Sirte in western Cyrenaica. Captured supplies proved useful, of course, but water and ammunition were constantly in short supply, and the ever present shortage of transport impeded the distribution of those supplies which the Axis forces did have.

Rommel’s plan for the breakthrough he intended to make at El Alamein was for the 90^th leichte Division, commanded from 13 July by Generalmajor Carl-Hans Lungershausen, and the 15^th Panzerdivision and 21^st Panzerdivision of Generalleutnant Walther Nehring’s Deutches Afrikakorps to punch through the 8^th Army’s line between the El Alamein box and Deir el Abyad, which he believed was defended. The 90^th leichte Division was then to wheel to the north and sever the coastal road, so trapping the defenders of the El Alamein box, which Rommel believed to be held by the remnants of the 50^th Division, and the Deutches Afrikakorps was then to veer to the right to fall on the rear of the XIII Corps. A division of Generale di Corpo d’Armata Enea Navarini’s Italian XXI Corpo d’Armata was to attack the El Alamein box from the west and another was to follow the 90^th leichte Division. Generale di Corpo d’Armata Giuseppe de Stefanis’s Italian XX Corpo d’Armata was to follow the Deutches Afrikakorps and deal with the box on the edge of the Qattara Depression while Generale di Divisione Gervasio Bitossi’s Italian 133a Divisione corrazzata 'Littorio' and German reconnaissance units protected the right flank.

Rommel had planned to attack on 30 June, but logistic difficulties had resulted in a day’s delay, vital to the defending forces reorganising on the El Alamein line. On 30 June the 90^th leichte Division was still 15 miles (24 km) short of its start line, the 21^st Panzerdivision could not move for lack of fuel, and the promised air support elements had yet to move to the advance airfields from which they could deliver effective short-range and therefore timely aid.

In overall terms, at this time the 8^th Army had 150,000 men in three corps (seven infantry and three armoured divisions) with 1,114 tanks and more than 1,000 pieces of artillery, supported by more than 1,500 aircraft, while the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' had 96,000 men (40,000 German and 56,000 Italian) in eight infantry and four armoured divisions (two German and two Italian) and 585 tanks (of which most were Italian), supported by fewer than 500 aircraft. Auchinleck assumed command of the 8^th Army on 25 June, the eve of Rommel’s assault on Mersa Matruh, which the British had hoped to hold as the German and Italian forces swept to the east after their success in the Battle of Gazala and capture of Tobruk.

For 72 hours after Auchinleck had taken command of it, the remnants of the 8^th Army had been in full retreat to the east with the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' in pursuit. On the evening of 28 June the leading Axis forces were at Fuka, and the next important British position lay at El Alamein, which was merely a partially prepared defensive line extending, at noted above, between El Alamein on the south coast of the Mediterranean Sea some 40 miles (65 km) to the south on the northern edge of the Qattara Depression. The line was occupied by a small number of defenders, and toward it were falling back, in considerable disarray, the survivors from Mersa Matruh, including Lieutenant General W. G. Holmes’s X Corps, which had been almost wholly overwhelmed.

In the evening of the same day, Auchinleck sent to London a revised appreciation based on the assumption that the Axis forces were superior in armour and were planning to advance on the great port city of Alexandria and the delta of the Nile river to its east. The seizure of Alexandria would greatly ease Rommel’s supply problem, and must at all costs be prevented. Auchinleck reported that the 8^th Army would offer all the resistance it could at Fuka and then at the El Alamein position, but the Fuka 'front' to which Auchinleck had alluded had already been penetrated.

On 28 June few would have thought it feasible for the 8^th Army to halt Rommel at El Alamein, but Auchinleck intended to pursue his original intentions for a decisive battle in that position. El Alamein need not necessarily have been the final defence of the British position in Egypt, but a stand for as long as possible at El Alamein seemed inevitable, for Major General Sir Leslie Morshead’s Australian 9^th Division, in transit from Syria, could not reach Alexandria before 1 July, so until that date there could be no effective defence of Alexandria unless Norrie’s XXX Corps, supported on its left by Gott’s XIII Corps, could check the Axis advance at El Alamein.

Early on 29 June Rommel launched Kleemann’s 90^th leichte Division (from 26 July the 90^th Afrikadivision) to the east in the direction of Daaba, the Italian formations of the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' being instructed to follow. On the British side, Lumsden’s 1^st Armoured Division, well south of Fuka and effectively separated from the rest of the 8^th Army, did what it could to protect the scattered fugitives of Holmes’s X Corps who had evaded capture at Fuka. Freyberg’s New Zealand 2^nd Division was reorganising itself at Bab el Qattara, and farther to the south, isolated in the unfinished and waterless box at Naqb Abu Dweis was the revitalised Indian 5^th Brigade. In the area of El Alamein, the XXX Corps had Pienaar’s South African 1^st Division and Brigadier R. G. Lochner’s Indian 18^th Brigade Group, just arrived from Iraq. Thus, with only two operative infantry divisions and a troubled armoured division, now weak in M3 Grant medium tanks, Auchinleck set out to occupy and hold the 'Alamein Line'.

The frontage to be covered was some 30 miles (48 km), and of the two main lines of advance available to the Axis forces, one lay at the extreme north along the coast, and the other in the extreme south via the 'Barrel Track' to Wadi Natrun and thence to Cairo. Auchinleck ordered the XXX Corps to cover the northern route, absorbing whatever units of Ramsden’s 50^th Division and Nichols’s Indian 10^th Division could quickly be readied for action. The 1^st Armoured Division was to move into the area to the south of El Alamein. Gott’s XIII Corps was to cover the southern route, and be prepared to support the XXX Corps to its north if it was this formation which was attacked first.

In overall terms, Auchinleck had to rely on mobility rather than numbers to fill the gap between El Alamein and the Qattara Depression. On the front of the XXX Corps, the South African 1^st Division had been allocated the task of holding the El Alamein box, which had been planned as a defensive position but was as yet incomplete: this backed onto the sea, and comprised a 15-mile (24-km) semi-circular perimeter of company and platoon posts astride the coast road and the railway; among the work still to be completed was the erection of barbed wire entanglements and the laying of mines. The main failings of this box were its small size and the ease with which it could be bypassed and thus isolated by an Axis advance round its southern edge to cut the road and rail links to the east. To deter thus, Norrie selected a position 7 miles (11.25 km) farther to the south at Deir el Shein, on the western end of the Ruweisat Ridge, for occupation on 28 June by Brigadier R. G. Lochner’s Indian 18^th Brigade Group supported by the guns of the 97^th and 121^st Field Regiments and an infantry anti-tank platoon newly armed with the excellent 6-pdr (57-mm) anti-tank gun. The ground was rocky, wire and anti-tank mines were scarce, and this position could also be bypassed to the south.

Auchinleck concentrated on redeploying the South African 1^st Division, banking on the fact that Rommel would bypass the El Alamein locality rather than waste time, men and matériel on attacking it. The South Africans, possessing an infantry strength of only 3,000, were instructed to leave Brigadier H. G. Klopper’s 3^rd Motorised Brigade Group inside the box to defend its western face, while the two other motorised brigade groups and their artillery were disposed outside the box to the south: Brigadier J. P. A. Furstenberg’s 1^st Motorised Brigade Group was positioned on the northern slope of the Ruweisat Ridge, 5 miles (8 km) to the south of the box’s perimeter and 5 miles (8 km) to the west-south-west of its companion, and Brigadier C. L. du Toit’s 2^nd Motorised Brigade Group lay some 31 miles (50 km) to the south-east of the El Alamein perimeter. Thus any Axis attempt to bypass the El Alamein box would run into a defence in depth between Deir el Shein and Alam el Onsol, with artillery fire plunging into its left flank from the area round El Alamein. If the Axis forces turned closer in, to the north, they would be taken under concentric fire from all these localities.

To the 'box-minded' 8^th Army, these dispositions marked the advent of a new tactical concept. But to Auchinleck and Major General E. E. Dorman-Smith, now Auchinleck’s director of operations as well as his informal chief-of-staff, they were changes which had been demanded by the current tactical situation. During the first half of 1942 the German qualitative superiority in tank and anti-tank artillery, as a result of the obsolescence of the current British 2-pdr (40-mm) gun together with the non-motorised and therefore relatively immobile nature of the British infantry divisions, had limited the tactical options available to the British. The British infantry formations also lacked adequate defence against armoured attack and had therefore to rely on mine defences, but this left them further liable to encirclement. In theory this problem was solvable by the correct use of the British armoured divisions to defeat the Axis forces' mobile and armoured attacks, but in practice the British armoured formations were incapable of effecting such a defeat. Moreover, although the British forces' army tank brigades were designed for direct co-operation with infantry formations, the tactical doctrine upon which British armoured divisions were trained envisaged combat with the opposing armour in mobile tank-versus-tank combat remote from the infantry battle, in which the armour did not normally become involved.

The Germans made no such distinctions: armour, mechanised and motorised infantry, and artillery (especially anti-tank guns) operated as one in attack and defence, the Germans having a potent edge in their 88-mm (3.465-in) dual-purpose anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun, which while tall as a result of its anti-aircraft origins was nonetheless capable of destroying British tanks at ranges well outside that of the British armour’s own guns.

Besides all this, the British Crusader tank was unreliable and prone to catching fire when hit: only when useful quantities of the M3 Grant medium tank and 6-pdr anti-tank gun arrived from the USA and UK respectively was it possible for the British infantry and armour fight the Axis forces on qualitatively equal terms.

German air/ground co-operation was also distinctly superior in qualitative if not quantitative terms.

Moreover, the British command system, at all levels from brigade to army, lacked both the professional competence and operational experience of its German equivalent.

On the credit side British field artillery was effective, but there was never enough of it and much of that which was available had perforce to be used in an anti-tank role for which it had not been designed.

Of the Axis troops, the Italian element in the Panzerarmee 'Afrika'/e] had only limited capability, and Rommel was normally careful to employ it only in a containing role where it could be kept out of trouble.

By the fall of darkness on 29 June, the 90^th leichte Division had reached Sidi Abd el Rahman, and Nehring’s Deutsches Afrikakorps (Crasemann’s 15^th Panzerdivision and von Bismarck’s 21^st Panzerdivision) had halted near El Quseir. de Stefanis’s Italian XX Corpo d’Armata was farther to the west, and Navarini’s Italian XXI Corpo d’Armata and Generale di Corpo d’Armata Benvenuto Gioda’s Italian X Corpo d’Armata were on the coast road between Daaba and Matruh. With this disposition of the forces available to him under the nominal leadership of Maresciallo d’Italia Ettore Bastico, the Axis supreme commander in North Africa, Rommel had available to him the option of continuing the Axis advance to Alexandria or alternatively to Cairo.

To the south-west of Daaba the 1^st Armoured Division and Garmoyle’s 7^th Motor Brigade Group moved early on 30 June to a position between Italian formations on the coast road and Deutsches Afrikakorps to the south-east. The 7^th Motor Brigade Group checked the Italian XX Corpo d’Armata and also ambushed an Axis column on the road some miles to the west of Daaba. The British armour next clashed, in the area to the south of Daaba, with Bitossi’s Italian 133a Divisione corazzata and in the afternoon again met the Axis forces in the form of part of the 21^st Panzerdivision, which was greatly surprised to be attacked from what had had been presumed to be the friendly west, but a heavy sandstorm ended the fighting. At the fall of night Fisher’s 4^th Armoured Brigade stopped at Tell el Aqqaqir, among the Axis positions, and Carr’s 22^nd Armoured Brigade halted south of the El Alamein defences.

The 1^st Armoured Division mustered some 36 Grant medium, 60 Stuart light, 12 Valentine infantry and eight Crusader cruiser tanks.

Auchinleck’s first 'order of the day' suggested that the Axis threat was more bluff than reality, and did not impress the higher British and commonwealth command elements. Gott was further perturbed by a note from Lieutenant General T. W. Corbett, Auchinleck’s chief-of-staff, which appeared to imply that Egypt might have to be abandoned, and Gott thoughtlessly passed this mistaken information to Freyberg, adding quite erroneously that whoever else wanted to fight, the South Africans did not. Pienaar openly faulted Auchinleck’s decision to fight to the west of the water line on which the 8^th Army was largely dependent, and this opinion was shared by Général de Division René Marie Edgar de Larminat, commanding the Free French forces in the Western Desert. In closer touch with his commander, Norrie was calmly confident, but one of Auchinleck’s problems early in July was how to re-establish confidence among the senior ranks.

On the other side of the front, confidence of success was evident in the Panzerarmee 'Afrika', despite the fact that the Deutsches Afrikakorps had a mere 55 tanks and 500 infantry, while the 90^th leichte Division had only about 1,500 infantrymen. The German artillery, including some captured British 25-pdr weapons, totalled 300, of which a mere 29 were the feared 88-mm (3.465-in) weapons. The strength of the three Italian corps was only 5,500 infantry, 30 tanks, and 200 pieces of artillery including a small proportion of 88-mm (3.465-mm) weapons. Yet with this very small force Rommel proposed to push aside what he wrongly believed to be the battered remains of the X Corps holding the El Alamein strongpoint and Deir el Abyad, 10 miles (16 km) to the south-west.

Rommel assessed that the 8^th Army’s main strength, the infantry and armour of the XIII Corps, covered the route to Cairo, 15 miles (24 km) to the south of his intended blow against El Alamein, and the threat created by the move of the Deutsches Afrikakorps to El Quseir would hold the British armour in the south until it was too late for it to intervene. By night the Deutsches Afrikakorps would move to Tell el Aqqaqir and from there, early on 1 July, to the south via Alam Nayil against the rear of the XIII Corps. For the 90^th leichte Division, Rommel envisaged a reprise of the role the division had played so successfully at Mersa Matruh: the division would move to the south of the El Alamein box and cut the coast road well east of that place. Meanwhile the XXI Corpo d’Armata would contain the box from the west, the X Corpo d’Armata would encircle and attack the box presumed to be at Deir el Abyad, and the XX Corpo d’Armata would provide flank protection. The entire operation was scheduled to start at 03.00 hours on 1 July, although it was realised that the Deutsches Afrikakorps would probably be late in jumping off. The plan was made without reconnaissance of the British and commonwealth positions, and based on false premises as to the degree of resistance to be expected.

During 30 June, a succession of British units arrived from Mersa Matruh, until some three-fifths of the X Corps had been accounted for. Artillery in particular, if capable of further action, was grouped into 'artillery columns'. But, at first light on 1 July, there was still no contact with the headquarters of the 1^st Armoured Division, on which so much depended, so the 1^st Battle of El Alamein would begin, on the British side, without the benefit of armour.

Rommel’s concept of the British and commonwealth situation led him to expect that, by evening of 1 July, the weak and disorganised remains of the X Corps about El Alamein would have been bypassed and overrun, and that his leading troops would be well on their way to Alexandria. He knew that he was driving his forces to the point of exhaustion, if not beyond it, but that this would be their final effort.

The 90^th leichte Division moved off on time, went too far to the north, collided with the defences, and was pinned by defensive fire. A tired Deutsches Afrikakorps left its assembly area at 06.45, some four hours late, after being heavily bombed, but then found Deir el Abyad to be empty, though by 09.00 the 15^th Panzerdivision had met the Indian 18^th Brigade Group’s defences at Deir el Shein. The 21^st Panzerdivision moved to the north-east of Deir el Shein, and the Deutsches Afrikakorps halted to reconnoitre and refuel.

At 12.00, under cover of a sandstorm, the 90^th leichte Division broke contact with the defences on the south-western edge of the El Alamein box to resume its encircling move until coming under heavy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire farther to the east. Forced to halt, the leading German infantry showed signs of panic. However, covered by the sandstorm, the Deutsches Afrikakorps attacked Deir el Shein at 12.00, broke through the perimeter at about 13.00, and fought to overcome the resistance of artillery and tanks.

Satisfied to the point of elation, Rommel ordered the pursuit to begin early in the afternoon, and while 90^th leichte Division and XXI Corps cleaned up resistance at El Alamein, the XX Corps (Generale di Divisione Francesco Arena’s [from 25 July Generale di Divisione Adolfo Infante’s] 132a Divisione corazzata 'Ariete'/e] and Generale di Brigata Arnaldo Azzi’s 101a Divisione motorizzata 'Trieste') and Bitossi’s 133a Division corazzata were ordered to advance via Hamman, to El Amiriya, which was the gateway to Alexandria.

The situation was thus developing as Auchinleck anticipated, and had the 1^st Armoured Division been ready for action all would have been nicely balanced. But early on 1 July, the 22^nd Armoured Brigade, with 28 tanks (10 on tow), had moved south-east of Alam el Onsol, and the 4^th Armoured Brigade, leaving Tell el Aqqaqir at dawn as if to provide the space needed by the Deutsches Afrikakorps, almost led the 90^th leichte Division's opening attack on the El Alamein defences, and indeed received fire from the El Alamein box. The brigade then moved into deep sand near Alam el Onsol, and it was only in the later part of the afternoon that the brigade finally extricated itself from this trap.

The sandstorm inhibited the British defence. It was known that Deir el Shein was under attack and at about 13.30 the XXX Corps ordered the 1^st Armoured Division to its help with the 18 tanks of the 22^nd Armoured Brigade which were still running, but while undertaking a reconnaissance in the direction of Deir el Shein in the sandstorm, the divisional armoured car regiment reported that all quiet there. Thus the 22^nd Armoured Brigade remained out of action on the eastern edge of the Ruweisat Ridge. Gradually the Deutsches Afrikakorps prevailed over the defenders of Deir el Shein, but not until 18.00 was the last resistance quashed, at the cost of 18 of the 21^st Panzerdivision's 55 tanks. Too late to save the situation, the 22^nd Armoured Brigade struck the 15^th Panzerdivision at about 17.00 and drove the German armour away to the west.

Despite of the costly success of the Deutsches Afrikakorps against Deir el Shein, the gains of the Axis forces in this day’s fighting were small. By the evening, however, Auchinleck was confident that his novel artillery plan plus infantry defensive tactics had achieved a qualified success. The loss of Deir el Shein was balanced for the British by the time gained for the 1^st Armoured Division to find its feet on the Ruweisat Ridge. It now had 38 Grant, 61 Stuart, 12 Valentine and eight Crusader tanks, as well as a useful number of 6-pdr guns in the hands of its 7^th Motor Brigade Group.

Unhappy with the lack of action by the XIII Corps, Auchinleck called Gott to army headquarters during the evening. Although the Axis forces might not renew their attacks about El Alamein and might instead turn to the south, Auchinleck considered that XIII Corps should now look to the north and prepare for mobile action against the Axis forces' southern flank if Rommel resumed his attack on the XXX Corps. Since British intelligence continued to insist that the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' was strong in armour and in infantry, caution was still necessary. But the situation as a whole was promising.

During the night British air activity intensified against Rommel’s forward troops and his lines of communication. By 10.00 on 2 July Rommel, facing the fact that the 90^th leichte Division could not succeed on its own, was compelled to change his plan. The Deutsches Afrikakorps was now to move to the east and pass Alam el Onsol to reach the coast road, with the 90^th leichte Division conforming. These operations would begin in the afternoon of 2 July.

However, since Rommel had made no early move, Auchinleck took a hand. The XXX Corps would hold its ground, the 'Robcol' of the Indian 10^th Division would take over the 1^st Armoured Division’s location at the eastern end of the Ruweisat Ridge, and the 1^st Armoured Division, in conjunction with a thrust by the XIII Corps, would advance to the west along the southern slope of the Ruweisat Ridge to fall on the Axis forces' flank. The afternoon clashes on Ruweisat Ridge therefore cancelled each other out. The 15^th Panzerdivision on southern flank of the Deutsches Afrikakorps, was shelled by the artillery of the New Zealand 2^nd Division and attacked frontally by the 30 Grant medium tanks of the 1^st Armoured Division, and thus made no progress, while on the northern flank of the Deutsches Afrikakorps the 21^st Panzerdivision, uninvolved with British armour and supported by heavy artillery fire, twice advanced along the ridge only to be pushed back on each occasion by the fire of the South African 1^st Brigade and 'Robcol'. But with the removal of the 1^st Armoured Division from support of this exposed post, anxiety developed for its future at the South African 1^st Division’s headquarters.

Auchinleck had ordered the XIII Corps to operate against the western end of El Mreir and thence to the north, but the bulk of the New Zealand 2^nd Division’s artillery had already been committed to the support of the 1^st Armoured Division between Alam Nayil and the Ruweisat Ridge, and the move did not materialise. By the evening of 2 July Auchinleck was confident that Rommel had shot his bolt for the time being, and therefore decided to call forward the Australian 9^th Division from 'Delta Force' to join the XXX Corps. This was important as Pienaar, anxious about the exposed position of his South African 1^st Brigade Group, requested the permission of the XXX Corps to withdraw it to a location nearer to Alam el Onsol. When Norrie refused, Pienaar telephoned Dorman-Smith at army headquarters, and on being again denied, asked to speak to Auchinleck. The British commander explained the importance of holding that locality, but then authorised Norrie to replace the South African 1^st Brigade Group with 'Ackcol', an infantry and artillery force of the 50^th Division.

For a time during that night the position was empty and a party of the 90^th leichte Division moved in, to be driven out with loss and prisoners when 'Ackcol' arrived. But early on 3 July 'Ackcol' was itself shelled out and fell back, with some losses, to the south of Alam el Onsol.

Rommel now appreciated that Auchinleck was handling his forces with skill, and believed that increasing numbers of tanks and guns were reaching the British and commonwealth forces at the front. He therefore decided that he would call a temporary halt to the offensive after the end of the following day’s fighting.

His plan for 3 July envisaged an attack to the coast by the Deutsches Afrikakorps in conjunction with the 90^th leichte Division, with the 132aDivisione corazzata and Azzi’s 101a Divisione motorizzata 'Trieste' sent to the south to contain the XIII Corps. But the two Panzer divisions of the Deutsches Afrikakorps were quickly checked by the 1^st Armoured Division. The 132a Divisione corazzata began its movement to the south, was harassed by British tanks from the east, engaged by the New Zealand artillery on Alam Nayil at close range, and halted in some confusion. Shortly after this, a motorised column of New Zealand infantry attacked the 132a Divisione corazzata with the bayonet, taking some 350 prisoners, 44 pieces of artillery including 11 88-mm (3.465-in) weapons, and a large number of vehicles. By noon the 132a Divisione corazzata had only five tanks and two guns left to it.

The fate of the 132a Divisione corazzata shocked Rommel, who had considered this formation as his most reliable Italian division. Patching his southern flank with reconnaissance units, Rommel urged the Deutsches Afrikakorps to a final effort and, with intense artillery support, it went forward again at 16.00 and by 17.15 had arrived at a location some 9 miles (14.5 km) to the east of Deir el Shein, but could proceed no farther. On the south of the Ruweisat Ridge, the 1^st Armoured Division held its ground for the loss of 17 Grant, 19 Stuart and three Valentine tanks.

The Panzerarmee 'Afrika' was exhausted by its final effort and, unable to progress, now lay along an exposed 35-mile (56-km) front and dug in. The gap between the X Corpo d’Armata and the Deutsches Afrikakorps on the Ruweisat Ridge, now that the XX Corpo d’Armata was out of action, lacked a solid plug, and the three reconnaissance units were required to cover this open western flank. Much adjustment would be needed on 4 July. It was at this moment that the Comando Supremo should have taken control before the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' got further involved, ordering Rommel either to halt where he stood or withdrawing him back to the west.

British intelligence’s overestimate of the Axis strength continued to hang over the headquarters of the 8^th Army, leading to a caution later appreciated to have been wrong. Auchinleck was not unduly impressed by the Axis forces' penetration, for with the 1^st Armoured Division on its southern flank, a successful Axis exploitation from there northward to the coast was unlikely. Auchinleck instructed the XXX Corps to hold the Axis forces on 4 July and regain ground to the west wherever this was feasible. The XIII Corps was to exert pressure to the west of El Mreir. The headquarters of the XIII Corps, still concerned for its right flank, responded sluggishly. Except for local pressure about El Mreir by Brigadier H. K. Kippenberger’s New Zealand 5^th Brigade Group, strongly resisted by the X Corps with dive-bomber assistance, little developed.

Nevertheless, Rommel was taking no chances on the southern part of his front. On 4 July the 21^st Panzerdivision was moved from the Ruweisat Ridge to the east of El Mreir, while 15^th Panzerdivision and 90^th leichte Division filled the gap thus made. At about 14.00 the 1^st Armoured Division reported the westward movement of 21^st Panzerdivision, and Auchinleck, suspecting that this might be the first sign of a general Axis withdrawal, warned both of his corps to be ready for pursuit. Under pressure, 15^th Panzerdivision gave ground to the west, and in the follow-up the 1^st Armoured Division almost overran it, but was held off by fire from an 88-mm (3.465-in) gun and the Germans escaped. In the event, the Deutsches Afrikakorps brought the 15^th Panzerdivision back some 4 miles (6.4 km), exhausting the last of its gun ammunition in the process, and the 1^st Armoured Division became almost as exhausted as its opponent.

That morning, Lumsden had pleaded with the commander of the XXX Corps for his division’s immediate relief. During the evening the Deutsches Afrikakorps mustered just 36 tanks in its two Panzer divisions. In terms of Grant medium tanks, the 1^st Armoured Division was little stronger, but in view of the extreme weakness of the 15^th Panzerdivision, more aggressive handling of the 1^st Armoured Division might have brought the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' to a crisis.

Rommel and the Deutsches Afrikakorps felt that the crisis had now been weathered. Rommel’s intention from this point onward was to relieve the 90^th leichte Division and the 15^th Panzerdivision with Generale di Brigata Francesco Scotti’s 102a Divisione autotrasportabile 'Trento' and Generale di Divisione Mario Soldarelli’s 60a Divisione autotrasportabile 'Sabratha' of the XXI Corpo d’Armata, and to strengthen his reduced front between the Ruweisat Ridge and the sea, while reinforcements enabled him to reconstruct his armoured strength. But this implied that, for the first time in his desert campaigns, his Italian infantry would be exposed to direct contact with the 8^th Army on a wide front.

For Auchinleck, the strain on the XXX Corps was eased by the arrival of Brigadier A. H. L. Godfrey’s Australian 24^th Brigade in rear of the 1^st Armoured Division on the Ruweisat Ridge. Although Auchinleck had accepted the Australian condition that brigades would not be committed to battle piecemeal under non-Australian command, the Australian arrival freed the 1^st Armoured Division from a purely defensive role. Auchinleck now hoped to contain the Axis forces' eastern and southern fronts and attack their rear, preventing them from any chance of a withdrawal a 'force in being'.

The 8^th Army would attack El Alamein toward the coast road, the XXX Corps as opportunity offered, and the XIII Corps by initiating operations along the road toward Abu Dweis. Yet Auchinleck pinned no great hopes on the XIII Corps doing more than keeping Rommel fully occupied.

On the morning of 5 July, Gott gave the New Zealand 2^nd Division an axis of advance from Bab el Qattara to Sidi Abd el Rahman, and columns of Brigadier B. C. Fletcher’s Indian 9^th Brigade were directed 10 miles (16 km) to the east of El Daaba. As it happened, the New Zealanders had hardly, as yet, recovered from the temporary loss of their dynamic leader, Freyberg, and operated hesitantly after being struck by an intense dive-bomber attack, while the Indians advanced on the New Zealanders' left flank without making much progress.

By this stage of the battle, Rommel had come to the conclusion that formations were so exhausted that they were incapable of further advance until they had rested and regrouped. Rommel reported to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht that his three German divisions each had no more than 1,200 to 1,500 men, and that resupply was proving very difficult because of the strength of British air power. He expected to have to remain on the defensive for at least two weeks.

Rommel was by this time suffering acutely from the problems associated with the very extended length of his lines of communication and supply. Under the overall command of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Air Vice Marshal A. Coningham’s Air Headquarters, Western Desert was concentrating its efforts ever more strongly on the Axis forces' fragile and over-extended supply routes, and at the same time British mobile columns moving to the west and striking from the south were causing havoc in the Axis rear echelons. The supply situation of the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' was further exacerbated by the fact that attacks on convoys from Italy were becoming ever more effective. The arrival of shipments from Italy had therefore been substantially reduced: in June, for instance, the Axis forces in North Africa received only 4,465 tons of supplies compared with 30.360 tons in the preceding month, and 400 vehicles compared with 2,000.

Deciding that Norrie, who had commanded XXX Corps since November 1941, needed a rest, Auchinleck relieved him on 5 July with Ramsden, command of whose 50^th Division was assumed from 12 July by Nichols, and this exchange in battle largely accounts for the sluggish performance of the XXX Corps in the period 6/7 July. But all the forward commanders needed some respite, and the operation given to the XIII Corps never developed substantially. On 7 July, the New Zealand 4^th Brigade, under the temporary command of Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Burrows since the death in action of Brigadier J. R. Gray on 5 July, advanced to Munga Wahla, but later withdrew, although a column of Renton’s 7^th Armoured Division, then being recast as a 'light armoured division' by the addition of Carr’s 4^th Armoured Brigade Group with three armoured car regiments, did reach Fuka on the evening of 7 July and shelled a landing ground.

Patrols of the Special Air Service and Long Range Desert Group destroyed seven Italian fighter aircraft on the ground. Nothing much occurred elsewhere, but neither Rommel nor Auchinleck was likely to remain inactive for long.

Frustrated about El Alamein, Rommel was considering a blow to the XIII Corps by driving the Deutsches Afrikakorps toward Alam Nayil and Deir el Munassib, where success would open the desert route to Cairo and leave the XXX Corps stranded at El Alamein. Now that a number of raids had revealed that Italian formations and units were deployed from the Ruweisat Ridge to the sea, Auchinleck wished to use the Australian 9^th Division to develop the second phase of his battle plan, namely the destruction of the Italians. A XXX Corps' blow to the west along the coast road in the direction of Tell el Eisa, if successful, would also threaten Rommel’s slender lines of communication.

This operation was allocated to Ramsden’s XXX Corps, and was to be launched on the night 9/10 July. Meanwhile Auchinleck decided to move the XIII Corps farther north to the Alam Nayil Ridge in order to concentrate the artillery of 8^th Army and to position the XIII Corps for a further blow against the Italian forces as soon as the XXX Corps' attack on the coast had taken full effect. This tactical withdrawal of the XIII Corps entailed the evacuation of the Bab el Qattara box and left the southern route to Cairo apparently exposed.

Regrouping began on the night of 7/8 July and, as a distraction, the Australians raided the luckless 15^th Panzerdivision. The Deutsches Afrikakorps treated the Australian raid as a major attack, calling the 21^st Panzerdivision to support the 15^th Panzerdivision, and during the disturbance the New Zealand 2^nd Division’s move to new positions went unobserved. On the following morning an angry Rommel replaced Crasemann with Generalmajor Heinz von Randow as commander of 15^th Panzerdivision, and demanded greater alertness from the officers of the Deutsches Afrikakorps.

Auchinleck hoped that the eastward move of the XIII Corps, and the exposure of the southern route this would seem to indicate, would tempt Rommel to develop operations in the southern quarter, using his German mobile forces, so leaving his northern flank, held by the XXI Corpo d’Armata, exposed to the attack of the XXX Corps. Rommel took the bait. During the night, the XIII Corps regrouped to the east, and by dawn the New Zealand 2^nd Division was some 3 miles (4.8 km) to the east and south-east of the empty Bab el Qattara box, but it was not until about 12.00 on 8 July that the 21^st Panzerdivision reported to the Deutsches Afrikakorps the fact that the New Zealanders had gone from El Mreir, and then the Deutsches Afrikakorps failed to inform Rommel of this fact until he telephoned on another matter during the morning of 9 July. Rommel went straight to the headquarters of the Deutsches Afrikakorps in something of an angry mood after ordering a Kampfgruppe of the 90^th leichte Division to move to the south, with the rest of the division in its wake. He also mounted a full-scale assault by the 133a Divisione corazzata on the empty Bab el Qattara position, well supported by the heavy artillery of the Panzerarmee 'Afrika', whose efforts were watched, with some admiration, by the New Zealanders from a safe distance.

It would seem that Rommel attributed the retreat of the XIII Corps to the development of his own plans. Quite unaware that the XIII Corps had moved 24 hours earlier, Rommel believed that the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' had achieved a decisive breakthrough which had only to be exploited to produce a collapse of the El Alamein position. So, on the evening of 9 July, he prepared to launch an 'eastward thrust which would finally overthrow the El Alamein position', using most of his mobile troops.

Auchinleck had thus got Rommel precisely as he wanted him, with the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' stretched from the sea to the Qattara Depression as a time when 8^th Army was well concentrated toward the northern half of the El Alamein front.

On the coast, the XXX Corps' attack began at 03.30 and the distant artillery bombardment, of particular intensity, alerted Rommel to the error of his thinking, centred on a march on Cairo during 10 July. By 10.00, supported by 32 Valentine tanks, the Australian 9^th Division had captured and largely consolidated the eastern part of Tell el Eisa dominating the road and railway to the east of El Alamein, while the South African 1^st Division, supported by eight Matilda infantry tanks, had secured Tell el Makh Khad between Tell el Eisa and El Alamein. Rommel reported that 'The Sabratha Division had been nearly annihilated. The Italians had left their line, many in panic, with no attempt at defending themselves.'

The headquarters of the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' was about 3 miles (4.8 km) to the north-west of Tell el Eisa, and appeared to be in serious danger. Oberstleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin rallied the headquarters staff and, with the aid of the leading troops of Generalmajor Josef Folttmann’s 164^th leichte Afrikadivision in the process of arriving by air from Crete, formed a defensive front less than 2 miles (3.2 km) to the south-east of army headquarters. Fearing that if the British and commonwealth forces reached Sidi Abd el Rahman, where the lines of communication to the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' would be cut, Rommel reacted with great alacrity. He cancelled the proposed eastward advance and hurried to the north with his Kampfstaffel (battle headquarters), picking up a Kampfgruppe of the 15^th Panzerdivision as he went. By 12.00 Rommel had launched a counterattack which was halted by a great artillery bombardment from El Alamein.

Early on 11 July, the Australians secured the western end of Tell el Eisa, and a raiding group struck to the south toward Deir el Abyad. Rommel wrote that 'several more Italian units, this time of the 'Trieste' Division, were overpowered and taken prisoner. The British drive long the coast had brought about the destruction of the bulk of the 'Sabratha' Division and a large part of the 'Trieste' Division. There could be no question of launching any large-scale attacks in the near future. I was compelled to order every last German soldier up the front, for, in face of the virtual default a large proportion of our Italian fighting power, the situation was beginning to take crisis proportions.'

The Australian raid on Deir el Abyad was checked on the Miteirya Ridge and the Australians later withdrew, while Rommel prepared a full-scale counter-offensive which was to be launched on 13 July by the 21^st Panzerdivision, with the ambitious object of achieving what the Deutsches Afrikakorps and 90^th leichte Division had failed to achieve between 1 and 3 July. But to Rommel’s distress the 21^st Panzerdivision failed. On the following day the same division was committed once again against the Australian forward position, and yet again failed in bitter fighting.

Between 10 and 14 July the activities of the XXX Corps had been very successful. The bulk of two Italian divisions had been destroyed, and Rommel’s German forces, in particular the 21^st Panzerdivision, had suffered major losses in unsuccessful counterattacks. In the meanwhile, the 90^th leichte Division had been committed unsuccessfully against the formations of the XIII Corps, while the main body of that corps faced to the north against the over-exposed and weakly supported divisions of the X Corps. When, during 9 July, the Panzerarmee 'Afrika' occupied El Qattara and extended its front to the south, the X Corpo d’Armata was deployed astride the Ruweisat Ridge, with Generale di Divisione Brunetto Brunetta’s 27a Divisione autotrasportabile 'Brescia' to the north and Generale di Divisione Nazzareno Scattaglia’s 17a Divisione autotrasportabile 'Pavia' to the south. The forward posts lay somewhat to the east of Point 64 on the ridge, and from this point the Italian front extended to Alam el Dihmaniya and thence to Bab el Qattara. To the south of Alam el Dihmaniya the XX Corpo d’Armata continued the Axis front. Thus the X Corpo d’Armata covered the centre of the Axis dispositions.

Point 63, the very western end of the Ruweisat Ridge and overlooking Deir el Shein, was of great tactical significance as in the cover of the Deir el Abyad and El Shein depressions lay the bulk of the reserve artillery available to the Panzerarmee 'Afrika', the headquarters of the Deutsches Afrikakorps and X Corps, and important supply dumps, all protected by a powerful deployment of anti-aircraft guns. To the south of Ruweisat Ridge, behind the forward posts of the 27a Divisione autotrasportabile, lay part of the 15^th Panzerdivision and the 2/382^nd Infanterieregiment of Folttmann’s newly arrived 164^th leichte Afrikadivision.

On the British and commonwealth side of the front, by 11 July the XIII Corps was disposed with the New Zealand 2^nd Division facing to the north on the Alam Nayil Ridge, and the 7^th Armoured Division about Deir el Munassib and Qaret el Himeimat, in touch with the 90^th leichte Division and the German reconnaissance units. The 1^st Armoured Division covered the left flank on the western end of the Alam Nayil Ridge, but the boundary between the XIII and XXX Corps ran roughly from south-east to north-west, giving Point 64 to the XXX Corps. Briggs’s Indian 5^th Division, strong in field artillery and 6-pdr anti-tank guns, faced the Ruweisat Ridge on the south and extended to the north-east to contact with the South African 1^st Division.

From 11 July Auchinleck had been considering a blow against the Axis forces in the area to the east of the track between El Alamein and Abu Dweis, and to the north of the Ruweisat Ridge. The XIII and XXX Corps would both be involved in the operation, the former to take the Ruweisat Ridge from Point 64 eastward, and the latter to capture the remainder of the ridge. The attack would be delivered in darkness and silence, and the 1^st Armoured Division would protect the left flank of the New Zealand attack, about Point 63, from daybreak, while also waiting in readiness to exploit along the boundary between the two corps. In addition, the XXX Corps would attempt to secure the Miteirya Ridge. The 8^th Army envisaged the capture of the whole of the Ruweisat Ridge westward to Point 63, so the XIII Corps included Point 63 in its first objective for the night advance, although this entailed an approach of 6 miles (9.6 km) for the left-hand brigade of the New Zealand 2^nd Division and thus placed Burrows’s New Zealand 4^th Brigade out of range of artillery support at daybreak, the time this was most needed.

Perhaps a more prudent course for the XIII Corps would have been to establish an intermediate objective on which the New Zealanders could consolidate until proper artillery and armoured support could be provided to permit the advance to resume to Point 63. The attainment of such an objective would have overrun the 27a Divisione autotrasportabile without overstraining and overexposing the assaulting troops. The New Zealand 2^nd Division’s two assaulting brigades had been in night patrol contact with the Axis forces since 11 July and were aware of the contemplated night attack. Three days were thus available for preparation.

The XIII Corps' advance began at 23.00 on 14 July, and by dawn on 15 July the New Zealand assault companies had gained their ridge objectives.

Meanwhile, on the XXX Corps' front, the Indian 5^th Division, despite less initial success, had secured all its objectives by 12.00 and taken more than 1,000 prisoners.

Much went awry on XIII Corps' front, however, despite the initial successes of the infantry. Although some New Zealanders swept right into Deir el Shein, where large numbers of Italians surrendered, it proved impossible to get forward the supporting arms to the left flank because Axis pockets lay between the ridge and the start line. On the line of the New Zealand 5^th Brigade’s advance a group of Axis tanks came to life and overran the supporting battalion, and worse still, the 22^nd Armoured Brigade, expected on the left flank, had not left Alam Nayil at first light. With 75 tanks, including 31 Grant vehicles, this brigade would have been well able to deal with whatever Axis armour lay to the south of the ridge, and so protect the infantry during the inevitable period of disorganisation, but when the armoured brigade eventually reached Alam el Dihmaniya, it unexpectedly did little to protect the New Zealand 4^th Brigade from being overrun in a series of armoured and infantry counterattacks which developed during the afternoon and regained Point 63 for the Axis. In all, the New Zealanders lost about 1,500 officers and men to be set against the 1,600 prisoners they had taken and the very many casualties they inflicted on the Axis forces during the night assault.

At one time, it is thought, there were 20,000 Axis prisoners for the taking, including four Italian generals, but most of these were saved by the German counterattacks. From a New Zealand perspective, therefore, the operation was a disappointment, despite the fact that the XIII and XXX Corps eventually consolidated on the objective ordained in the 8^th Army’s orders. Had the XIII Corps limited its objective, the setback to the New Zealand 4^th Brigade would have been avoided, and inevitably the fate of the brigade and of part of Kippenberger’s New Zealand 5^th Brigade led to a measure of bad feeling between the New Zealanders and the British armour.

Nonetheless, the effect of this fresh blow upon Rommel, coming so soon after the coastal attack, was devastating. On 16 July the Deutsches Afrikakorps made two determined attempts to recapture the lost ground on the Ruweisat Ridge, in the area of Point 64. These collapsed under the concentrated fire of the British corps artillery and divisional 6-pdr anti-tank guns, and Rommel was forced to withdraw, leaving behind 24 tanks, including a captured Stuart, six armoured cars, six 88-mm (3.465-in) guns, 10 other anti-tank guns, and 10 field guns. Taking into account the matériel captured in the New Zealand advance to the south of the Ruweisat Ridge, there is little doubt that Auchinleck’s second major attack, at the Ruweisat Ridge, effected the temporary destruction of the X Corps as a fighting formation.

About Tell el Eisa, early on 16 July, the Australians attacked and took several strongpoints held by Generale di Divisione Guido della Bona’s 60a Divisione autotrasportabile 'Sabratha', though the ground gained was later given up as not being worth holding. Again, on 17 July, the Australians attacked toward the Miteirya Ridge and took many Italian prisoners. Rommel summed up the situation on July 17 as follows: 'On that day every last German reserve had to be thrown in. Our forces were now so small in comparison with the steadily growing strength of the British that we were going to count ourselves lucky if we managed to go on holding our line at all. As a result of the immense casualties which the Italians had suffered our line was very thinly manned. We had virtually no reserves.'

On 21 July Rommel reported his situation to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. His German forces had suffered heavy losses, and the Italians had proved to be so unreliable that he had been reduced to interspersing them with Germans. He believed his front would hold, but, until the newly arriving 164^th leichte Afrikadivision was complete, until he had been able to reconstitute a mobile reserve, and until he could completely mine his forward areas, the situation remained critical. His German formations were 60% below strength, the replacement personnel who were arriving were substandard, and although supplies were adequate for day-to-day use, no accumulation of stocks to sustain a