'Sho 1' was the Japanese defence plan within the 'Sho' scheme for the Philippine islands group, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf (July/August 1944).

Of the various defence sectors envisaged in the 'Sho' overall defence plan, it was this which the Japanese thought most likely to receive a direct US assault during 1944, so the Japanese believed that it was essential for the assault to be defeated, inflicting on the US forces the number of casualties as heavy as that which the Japanese themselves were prepared to accept. Only thus, the Japanese believed, would the momentum of the US advance be checked and uninterrupted maritime communications maintained between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, whence the Japanese war effort derived almost all its fuel and also a number other vital raw materials.

Should the US forces gain control of the Philippine islands group, the Japanese realised that their navy might be isolated either in the north without fuel, or in the south without ammunition and replacements. There were thus compelling strategic reasons for the retention of the Philippine islands group, and in this area the Japanese thought that they had an operational 'ace' in the fact that for the first time in the Pacific war the US forces would be operating with only carrierborne air power in a region where the Japanese could deploy massively superior land-based air power at short range.

In simple terms, therefore, the object of 'Sho 1' was to use land-based air power to neutralise the carrierborne air power of any US invasion force as it closed the Philippine islands group, and so permit Admiral Soemu Toyoda’s Combined Fleet, despite the tactical and operational weakening it had suffered through its losses in the Battle of the Philippine Sea during the failed 'A' offensive, to destroy the invasion force without hindrance from US aircraft.

The task of neutralising US carrier air power was entrusted to the Japanese navy’s 1^st Air Fleet and 2^nd Air Fleet (the former based in the Philippines under Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi, and the latter training in the Japanese home islands under Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukutome until moved to the Philippine islands group on the implementation of 'Sho 1' to link with the 1^st Air Fleet as Fukutome’s 1^st Combined Base Air Force) supported by the Japanese army’s 4^th Air Army (Lieutenant General Maso Yamase’s 2^nd Air Division and Lieutenant General Bin Kinoshita’s 4^th Air Division) under the command of Lieutenant General Kumaichi Teramoto.

The Japanese appreciated that the Combined Fleet might be unable to prevent the US landings, and so based General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 14^th Area Army in the islands. The Japanese were generally short of shipping, and Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi, commanding the entire 'Southern Resources Area' from Saigon, ordered Yamashita to concentrate on the defence of Luzon, the main island of the Philippines group. Yamashita assumed command on 6 October, and decided to use Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama’s 8^th Division, Lieutenant General Yoshitake Muraoka’s 103^rd Division and Lieutenant General Yoshitake Tsuda’s 105^th Division as well as Major General Tetsuzo Suzuki’s 55^th Independent Mixed Brigade and Major General Bunzo Sato’s 58^th Independent Mixed Brigade for the defence of Luzon. For the central and southern islands, which were of secondary importance, he allocated Lieutenant General Sasuku Suzuki’s 35^th Army with Lieutenant General Makino Spiro’s 16^th Division on Leyte, Lieutenant General Gyosaku Morozumi’s 30^th Division defending Davao in southern Mindanao, Lieutenant General Jiro Harada’s 100^th Division in central and northern Mindanao, and Lieutenant General Shinpei Fukuei’s 102^nd Division and one independent mixed brigade on Panay, Negros and Cebu islands. As a central reserve Yamashita had Lieutenant General Yoshiharu Iwanaka’s 2^nd Armoured Division (promised but still in Manchukuo), Lieutenant General Tadasu Kataoka’s 1^st Division (promised but still in Shanghai) and Lieutenant General Tsuyuo Yamagata’s 26^th Division. Later in the year Yamashita was reinforced by Lieutenant General Rikichi Tsukada’s 10^th Division from Formosa and Lieutenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama’s 23^rd Division from Manchukuo.

The 2^nd Air Division and 4^th Air Division had eight air regiments between them, and the 4^th Air Army had also been allocated the 30^th Fighter Group from Japan with 10 air regiments. The army also controlled the four air regiments of Lieutenant General Einosuke Sudo’s 7^th Air Division on Celebes island, and it was planned to fly in another 13 air regiments (from Malaya, Indo-China, Formosa, China and Japan) to produce a total of 34 air regiments.

Thus was set the scene for the climactic campaign for the Philippine islands group, which resulted in the Japanese loss of the islands and also in the largest naval battle the world has ever seen, the four-part Battle of Leyte Gulf (24/25 October 1944).

The naval element, with which the 'Sho 1' plan was directly concerned, dictated that Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Mobile Force (including Japan’s four surviving aircraft carriers stripped of most of their aircraft and aircrews) should move south and then turn back to the north, so luring Admiral William F. Halsey’s 3^rd Fleet away from the expected US landings, whereupon these latter, deprived of much of the 3^rd Fleet’s air power, would be attacked from the west by three other Japanese forces, which would comprise only surface ships but no aircraft carriers. The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the Japanese forces, but Toyoda later justified it with the assertion that should Japan lose the Philippine islands group, even an intact fleet would have been useless: as noted above, if it pulled back to Japan it would have been left bereft of fuel, while a retreat to southern waters would have isolated it from resupplies of ammunition and other vital supplies.

On 1 August Toyoda ordered the start of practical readiness for 'Sho-1'. To protect the inner defensive perimeter, land-based air forces were stationed in the Philippine islands group and on Formosa, the battle fleet was concentrated in Brunei Bay, near the oil resources on which it was dependent, the carrier force was in the Inland Sea, and the submarine forces were on standby for reconnaissance, transport and attack missions.

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa’s 6^th Fleet, based on the submarine tender Tsukushi Maru, had available Miwa’s own 1^st Submarine Force 1 with which to tackle any US naval forces attempting to penetrate the defensive line. At Truk, Rear Admiral Noboru Owada’s 7^th Submarine Squadron had available Ro-113 and Ro-115 for defence and transport operations, and there was also the Ulithi Attack Group with I-36, I-37 and I-47.

'Sho 1' began tentatively on 15 September, when the US 'Tradewind' and 'Stalemate II' assaults on Morotai and Peleliu islands confirmed Terauchi in his belief that the US invasion of the Philippine islands group was imminent and that he should therefore forward to the islands all the designated reinforcements. The proximate trigger for the implementation of 'Sho 1', however, was the attack undertaken against Japanese air strength in the Ryukyu islands, Formosa and Luzon by the 15 fast carriers of the 3^rd Fleet. During this operation, which lasted from 10 to 17 October, the Americans lost a mere 26 aircraft and suffered comparatively insignificant damage to two cruisers, whereas the Japanese admitted to the loss of 320 aircraft while also claiming, wholly erroneously, that they had sunk two battleships and 11 aircraft carriers.

This overclaim by Japanese land-based air units persuaded the Imperial General Headquarters to alter the parameters of 'Sho 1'. All Japanese land-based aircraft were ordered to implement their part of the operation immediately, and the 350 aircraft of the 2^nd Air Fleet (together with the 150 carrier aircraft of the 3^rd Carrier Squadron and 4^th Carrier Squadron withdrawn from Ozawa’s Mobile Force) were sent to Formosa rather than Luzon, being forwarded to Luzon only on 18 October, the date by which Vice Admiral Kinpei Teraoka’s (from 20 October Onishi’s) 1^st Air Fleet had been reduced to some 100 aircraft. And on Luzon a reluctant Yamashita was ordered to fight the decisive land battle on Leyte rather than on Luzon.

In fact only two days after the start of the US 'King II' invasion of Leyte on 20 October did Yamashita start to obey this order to make a complete change in his operational planning, ordering Suzuki to concentrate his 35^th Army on Leyte even though it was already too late to affect the outcome of the land battle.

Meanwhile Toyoda launched the naval side of 'Sho 1' in all its bewildering and ultimately self-defeating complexity on 17 October, with the constituent forces coming under the control of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa’s South-West Area Fleet as they approached the Philippine islands group. The naval portion of 'Sho 1' called for a four-element descent on the US invasion fleet off Leyte. Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s 5^th Fleet was ordered to sail from Singapore and other points before concentrating and refuelling in Brunei Bay and then dividing into two parts before approaching the US forces via the Sibuyan Sea and San Bernardino Strait (Kurita’s Force 'A' and Force 'B', otherwise the 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force) or the Surigao Strait (Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s Force 'C', otherwise the 2^nd Strike Force, Southern Force). Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima’s detachment, the 2^nd Strike Force, Northern Force, was ordered to sail from the Ryukyu islands group via the Pescadores islands group to join the Southern Force in the attack through the Surigao Strait. And Ozawa’s Mobile Force, Strike Force was ordered to sail from the Inland Sea in the Japanese home islands as a decoy for Halsey’s main offensive formation, namely the nine fleet carriers and eight light carriers of Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 38.

Toyoda planned that with Halsey and Mitscher lured away to the north by the lure of Ozawa’s aircraft carriers, the other three Japanese forces could fall on Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s 7^th Fleet, the US invasion force, off Leyte island and, unhindered by aircraft from TF38’s carriers, destroy its amphibious vessels with gunfire and torpedoes.

The forces involved on each side were prodigious, fully vindicating the description of the Battle of Leyte Gulf as the world’s greatest sea battle in numerical as well as strategic terms. On the Japanese side, Kurita’s Force 'A' and Force 'B' (1^st Strike Force, Centre Force) comprised the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi and the battleship Nagato of Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki’s Battleship Division 1, the battleships Kongo and Haruna of Vice Admiral Yoshio Suzuki’s Battleship Division 3, the heavy cruisers Atago, Takao, Chokai and Maya of Kurita’s Cruiser Division 4, the heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro of Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto’s Cruiser Division 5, the heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma and Tone of Vice Admiral Kazutaka Shiraishi’s Cruiser Division 7, the light cruiser Noshiro and the fleet destroyers Shimakaze, Hayashimo, Akishimo, Kishinami, Okinami, Naganami, Asashimo, Hamanami and Fujinami of Rear Admiral Mikio Hayakawa’s Destroyer Squadron 2, and lthe ight cruiser Yahagi and fleet destroyers of Rear Admiral Susumu Kimura’s Destroyer Squadron 10.

Nishimura’s Force 'C' (1^st Strike Force, Southern Force) was also powerful, comprising the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso and the heavy cruiser Mogami of Nishimura’s Battleship Division 2 and the fleet destroyers Michishio, Asagumo, Yamagumo and Shigure of Destroyer Division 4, supplemented by Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima’s Northern Force of Mikawa’s South-West Area Force, namely the heavy cruisers Nachi and Ashigara of Shima’s Cruiser Division 21, and the light cruiser Abukuma and fleet destroyers Akebono, Ushio, Kasumi, Shiranuhi, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and Hatsuhara of Kimura’s Destroyer Squadron 1.

The South-West Area Force also contributed Vice Admiral Naomasa Sakonju’s Transport Force with the heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, destroyer Uranami, fast attack transport T-6, and landing ships T-101, T-102 and T-131.

And to complete the Japanese offensive disposition there was Ozawa’s Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force of Toyoda’s Combined Fleet, comprising the fleet carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose and Chiyoda of Ozawa’s Carrier Division 3, the hybrid battleship/carriers Ise and Hyuga of Rear Admiral Chiaki Matsuda’s Carrier Division 4, the destroyers Hatsutsuki, Akitsuki, Wakatsuki and Shimotsuki, light cruiser Isuzu and destroyers Maki, Kiri, Kuwa and Sugi of Rear Admiral Heitaro Edo’s Escort Squadron 31, Oyoda, Tama and Isuzu, and the light cruisers Oyodo and Tama. The aircraft strength of the Mobile Force was only 116 machines (80 Mitsubishi A6M Reisen 'Zero' fighters, 25 Nakajima B6N 'Jill' level and torpedo bombers, four Nakajima B5N 'Kate' level and torpedo bombers, and seven Yokosuka D4Y 'Judy' dive-bombers) on the four carriers, while the hybrid battleship/carriers had no aircraft.

Also part of the Japanese force was the Mobile Force Supply Unit with the destroyer Akikaze, six 'Type D' escort vessels (CD-22, CD-29, CD-31, CD-33, CD-43 and CD-132) and two oilers (Jinei Maru and Takane Maru).

If the Japanese line-up of 68 larger warships (although with only 116 aircraft) was impressive, that of the Americans was doubly so, as they were in the position to commit 275 ships and 1,500 aircraft as the surface and air elements of two fleets.

Around Leyte for the escort and protection of the invasion forces was Kinkaid’s 7^th Fleet which, apart from 600 or more vessels in the 3^rd and 7^th Amphibious Forces (Task Forces 79 and 78 respectively), had the Task Force 77 headquarters ship Wasatch escorted by the light cruiser Nashville and fleet destroyers Ammen, Mullany, Abner Read and Bush, and Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s 7^th Fleet Escort Carrier Group (Task Group 77.4) with three task units each comprising six escort carriers and seven or eight fleet destroyers and/or destroyer escorts.

Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s TU77.4.1 ('Taffy 1') comprised the escort carriers Sangamon with Air Group 37 (17 Grumman F6F-3/7 Hellcat fighter-bombers and nine General Motors TBM-1C Avenger level and torpedo bombers), Suwannee with Air Group 60 (22 F6F-3 and nine TBM-1C aircraft), Chenango with Air Group 35 (22 F6F-3 and nine TMB-1C aircraft) and Santee with Air Group 26 (24 General Motors FM-2 Wildcat fighter-bombers and nine TBF/TBM-1C bombers) as well as Rear Admiral George R. Henderson’s Carrier Division 28 with Saginaw Bay carrying one squadron of 15 FM-2 fighter-bombers and 12 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers and Petrof Bay carrying one squadron of 16 FM-2 fighter-bombers and 10 TBM-1C bombers. There were also the destroyers McCord, Trathen and Hazelwood, and the destroyer escorts Edmonds, Richard S. Bull, Richard M. Rowell, Eversole and Coolbaugh.

Rear Admiral Felix B. Stump’s TU77.4.2 ('Taffy 2') comprised the escort carriers Natoma Bay with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft and Manila Bay with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft, as well as Rear Admiral William D. Sample’s Carrier Division 27 comprising Marcus Island with one squadron of 12 FM-2 and 11 TBM-1C aircraft, Kadashan Bay with one squadron of 15 FM-2 and 11 TBM-1C aircraft, Savo island with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft and Ommaney Bay with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 11 TBM-1C aircraft. There were also the destroyers Haggard, Franks and Hailey, and the destroyer escorts Richard W. Suesens, Abercrombie, Oberrender, LeRay Wilson and Walter C. Wann.

Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague’s TU77.4.3 ('Taffy 3') comprised the escort carriers Fanshaw Bay with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft, St Lo with one squadron of 17 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft, White Plains with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft, Kalinin Bay with one squadron of 16 FM-2 and 12 TBF/TBM-1C aircraft, and Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie’s Carrier Division 26 with Kitkun Bay with one squadron of 14 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft, and Gambier Bay with one squadron of 18 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1C aircraft. There were also the destroyers Hoel, Heermann and Johnston, and the destroyer escorts Dennis, John C. Butler, Raymond and Samuel B. Roberts.

TG77.4 thus carried a total of 503 aircraft (304 fighters and 199 attack aircraft). Being slow and essentially unarmoured, and carrying aircraft optimised for the close-support of ground forces rather than attacks on warships, the escort carriers stood little chance in an encounter with any warships more heavily armed and armoured than themselves.

Also part of the 7^th Fleet was Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf’s Battle Line (TG77.2) centred on six old battleships (including five reconstructed after Pearl Harbor) in the form of Mississippi, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, California and Pennsylvania. The first three of these constituted the core of Rear Admiral George R. Weyler’s Fire-Support Unit North in company with the destroyers Cony, Aulick and Sigourney. The second three of the battleships constituted the core of Rear Admiral Theodore E. Chandler’s Fire-Support Unit South in company with the heavy cruisers Louisville, Portland and Minneapolis of Oldendorf’s own Cruiser Division 4, light cruiser Honolulu of Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth’s Cruiser Division 9, light cruisers Denver and Columbia of Rear Admiral Robert W. Hayler’s Cruiser Division 12, and destroyers Leutze, Newcomb, Bennion, Heywood L. Edwards and Richard P. Leary of Destroyer Squadron 56, and Robinson, Ross, Albert W. Grant, Bryant, Halford, Claxton, Thorn and Welles.

Associated with the activities of the Battle Line was Task Group 70.1 (Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons 7^th Fleet) with the small seaplane tenders Oyster Bay, Wachapreague and Willoughby serving as motherships for 39 PT-boats deployed in 13 sections.

While the 7^th Fleet came under the operational control of General Douglas MacArthur’s South-West Pacific Area command as it supported the 'King II' landing of Lieutenant General Walter C. Krueger’s 6^th Army, the primary offensive capability of the US Navy in the area of the Philippine islands group was the 3^rd Fleet under the command of Halsey in New Jersey, whose major offensive component was Mitscher’s TF38, otherwise the Fast Carrier Task Force.

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, TF38 was only at three-quarter strength as Vice Admiral John S. McCain’s TG38.1 was on its way to the advanced fleet base at Ulithi atoll to refuel and resupply its fleet carriers Wasp and Hornet, light carriers Monterey and Cowpens, heavy cruisers Wichita (Cruiser Division 6), Boston (Cruiser Division 5), and Chester, Pensacola and Salt Lake City (Cruiser Division 5), and destroyers Izard, Charrette, Conner, Bell and Burns (Destroyer Squadron 46), Cogswell, Caperton, Ingersoll and Knapp (Destroyer Division 100), Boyd and Cowell (Destroyer Squadron 92), McCalla, Grayson, Brown and Woodworth (Destroyer Squadron 12), and Dunlap, Fanning, Case, Cummings, Cassin and Downes (Destroyer Division 4).

For the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Halsey and Mitscher thus deployed Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan’s TG38.2 (three fleet carriers, two light carriers, two battleships, four light cruisers and 18 destroyers) off San Bernardino Strait, Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman’s TG38.3 (two fleet carriers, two light carriers, four battleships, four light cruisers and 14 destroyers) off Luzon, and Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison’s TG38.4 (two fleet carriers, two light carriers, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and 11 destroyers) off Leyte.

TG38.2 was centred on the fleet carriers Intrepid with a three-squadron air group flying 44 F6F-3/5 Hellcat fighter-bombers, night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, 28 Curtiss SB2C-3 Helldiver dive-bombers and 18 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, Hancock with a three-squadron air group flying 41 F6F-5 fighter-bombers and night fighters, 42 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 18 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Bunker Hill with a three-squadron air group flying 49 F6F-3/5 Hellcat fighter-bombers, night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, 24 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 20 TBM-1 level and torpedo bombers; the light carriers Cowpens with a two-squadron air group flying 21 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and nine TBF/TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Independence with a two-squadron night air group flying 19 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and eight TBM-1D bombers.

Heavy cover for the aircraft carriers was provided by Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger’s Battleship Division 7 with the modern battleships Iowa and New Jersey, and Rear Admiral Francis E. M. Whiting’s Cruiser Division 14 with the light cruisers Vincennes and Miami and the light anti-aircraft cruisers San Diego and Oakland, while the task group’s screen was provided by the destroyers Miller, The Sullivans, Stephen Potter and Tingey of Destroyer Division 52, Hickox, Hunt, Lewis Hancock and Marshall of Destroyer Squadron 104, Halsey Powell, Cushing, Colahan, Uhlmann and Benham of Destroyer Division 50, and Stockham, Wedderburn, Twining and Yarnall of Destroyer Division 106.

TG38.3 was centred on the fleet carriers Essex with a three-squadron air group flying 52 F6F-3/5 Hellcat fighter-bombers, night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, 25 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 20 TBF/TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Lexington with a three-squadron air group flying 41 F6F-3/5 Hellcat fighter-bombers, night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, 30 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 18 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and the light carriers Princeton with a two-squadron air group flying 25 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and nine TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Langley with a two-squadron air group flying 25 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and nine TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers.

Heavy support was provided by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee’s Battleships, Pacific Fleet, with the battleships Washington, Massachusetts of Rear Admiral Glenn B. Davis’s Battleship Division 8, South Dakota and Alabama of Rear Admiral Edward W. Hanson’s Battleship Division 9, and the light cruisers Santa Fe, Mobile and Birmingham and light anti-aircraft cruiser Reno of Rear Admiral Lawrance T. DuBose’s Carrier Division 13, while the task group was screened by the destroyers Clarence K. Bronson, Cotten, Dortch and Healy of Destroyer Squadron 50, Porterfield, Callaghan, Cassin Young, Irwin and Preston of Destroyer Division 55, and Laws, Longshaw, Morrison and Pritchett of Destroyer Division 110.

TG38.4 was centred on the fleet carriers Franklin with a three-squadron air group flying 39 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers, night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, 31 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 18 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Enterprise with a three-squadron air group flying 40 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and night fighters, 34 SB2C-3 dive-bombers and 19 TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and the light carriers San Jacinto with a two-squadron air group flying 29 F6F-3/5 fighter-bombers and five TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers, and Belleau Wood with a two-squadron air group flying 26 F6F-5 fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, and nine TBM-1C level and torpedo bombers.

Support was provided by the heavy cruiser New Orleans and light cruiser Biloxi, and the task group was screened by the destroyers Gridley, Helm and McCall of Destroyer Squadron 6, Mugford, Bagley, Patterson and Ralph Talbot of Destroyer Division 12, and Wilkes, Nicholson and Swanson of Destroyer Division 24.

Mitscher’s carriers thus carried 835 aircraft, of which all were technically more advanced than their numerically inferior Japanese opponents, and there were also a number of other elements constituting the 3^rd Fleet 2.

Submarine reconnaissance and attack were the responsibility of Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwoods TF17 (Supporting Submarines, Pacific Fleet) with Tang, Sterlet, Barbel and Snook, 'Clarey’s Crushers' (Pintado, Jallao and Atule), 'Roach’s Raiders' (Haddock, Halibut and Tuna), 'Banister’s Beagles' (Sawfish, Drum and Icefish), 'Blakely’s Behemoths' (Shark, Blackfish and Seadragon), 'Coye’s Coyotes' (Silversides, Salmon and Trigger), and 'Wogan’s Wolves' (Besugo, Ronquil and Gabilan).

As it sortied from its base in Brunei Bay, Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force comprised the battleships Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo and Haruna, heavy cruisers Atago, Maya, Takao, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma, light cruisers Noshiro and Yahagi and 15 destroyers.

As the ships passed the island of Palawan at about 24.00 on 22/23 October, the US submarines Darter and Dace were positioned together on the surface close by the Japanese ships' track. At 00.16 on 23 October, Darter's radar detected the Japanese formation at a range of 30,000 yards (27430 m), and her captain soon established visual contact. The two submarines quickly moved off in pursuit, and Darter radioed the first of three contact reports. At least one of these was detected by a radio operator on Yamato, but Kurita failed to take appropriate anti-submarine precautions. Darter and Dace travelled on the surface at full power for several hours and thus managed to gain a position ahead of Kurita’s formation with the object of making a submerged attack at first light. This attack was very successful: at 05.24 Darter fired a spread of six torpedoes, at least four of which hit Kurita’s flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago; 10 minutes later Darter secured two hits on Takao, Atago's sister ship, with another spread of torpedoes; and at 05.56 Dace hit the heavy cruiser Maya, sister ship of Atago and Takao, with four torpedoes. Atago and Maya quickly sank, and Takao turned back toward Brunei, escorted by two destroyers, with the two US submarines following. On 24 October, however, as the submarines continued to shadow the damaged cruiser, Darter ran aground on the Bombay Shoal, and after all efforts to get it off the shoal failed, the boat was abandoned, its entire crew being rescued by Dace.

Takao eventually returned to Singapore, where she was joined in January 1945 by Myoko.

Meanwhile, in the Palawan Passage, Atago sank so rapidly that Kurita was forced to swim for his survival before being rescued by one of the Japanese destroyers. Kurita then transferred to the battleship Yamato.

At about 08.00 on 24 October, the 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force was sighted as it entered the Sibuyan Sea and was attacked by the F6F-5 fighters, SB2C-3 dive-bombers and TBM-1C torpedo bombers of Enterprise's air group. Despite its great strength, Halsey’s 3^rd Fleet was not well-placed to deal with the emerging Japanese threat. On 22 October, Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When Darter's contact report was received, Halsey recalled Davison’s TG38.4 but allowed the strongest of TF38’s groups, McCain’s TG38.1, to continue its passage to Ulithi. Halsey finally recalled TG38.1 on 24 October, but the delay meant the most powerful of the US carrier groups could play but little part in the coming battle, and the 3^rd Fleet was thereby effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the engagement. On the morning of 24 October, therefore, only three groups were available to strike Kurita’s force, and that best positioned to do so, Bogan’s TG38.2, happened to be the weakest of the three as it currently comprised only one fleet carrier in the form of Intrepid and two light carriers in the form of Cowpens and Independence. Halsey’s failure to issue a prompt order to TG38.1 on 23 October, it should be noted, also effectively deprived the 3^rd Fleet of four of its six heavy cruisers right through the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Warplanes from Intrepid and Cowpens of TG38.2 attacked at about 10.30, securing hits on the battleships Nagato, Yamato and Musashi, and severely damaging the heavy cruiser Myoko. A second wave from Intrepid, Essex and Lexington attacked later, and SB2C and F6F aircraft scored another 10 hits on Musashi. As the badly damaged super-battleship withdrew, listing to port, a third wave of aircraft from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with another 11 bombs and eight torpedoes.

Kurita reversed course in the Sibuyan Sea, between Luzon, Mindoro, Panay and Samar, in order to fall back out of the range of the US carrierborne aircraft, passing the crippled Musashi as his force retreated. Kurita waited until 17.15 before resuming his original course and made once more for the San Bernardino Strait between the south-eastern tip of Luzon and north-western tip of Samar islands. After being struck by at least 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes, Musashi capsized and sank at about 19.30.

Onishi had meanwhile directed three waves of aircraft from his 1^st Air Fleet from bases on Luzon against the carriers of Sherman’s TG38.3, whose aircraft were also being used to attack airfields on Luzon to prevent Japanese land-based air attacks on Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf. Each of the three attack waves comprised some 50 to 60 aircraft. Most of the Japanese aircraft were intercepted and either shot down or driven off by F6F fighters of TG38.1’s combat air patrol, most notably by two fighter sections from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, who shot down nine aircraft in this action. However, one D4Y3 'Judy' slipped through the aerial defence and at 09.38 hit the light carrier Princeton with a 551-lb (250-kg) armour-piercing bomb. The resulting detonation caused a severe fire on the carrier’s hangar deck and her emergency sprinkler system failed to operate. The fire spread rapidly, and there followed a number of secondary explosions before the fire was gradually brought under control, but at 15.23 there was a very large explosion, probably in the after bomb stowage, causing more casualties aboard Princeton, and even heavier casualties (233 dead and 426 wounded) aboard the light cruiser Birmingham, which was coming back alongside to assist with the firefighting. Birmingham was so badly damaged, indeed, that she had to retire. Another light cruiser and two destroyers were also damaged. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and after the remaining crew had abandoned the stricken ship, she was sent to the bottom at 17.50 by torpedoes from the light cruiser Reno. Princeton lost 108 men killed, and 1,361 survivors were rescued by nearby ships.

The 3^rd Fleet flew 259 sorties, most of them by F6F fighters, against the 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force on 24 October, but the total was wholly insufficient to neutralise the threat of Kurita’s force, and in fact compares unfavourably with the 527 sorties flown by the 3^rd Fleet against Ozawa’s considerably weaker Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force in the course of the following day. Moreover, a large proportion of the Sibuyan Sea attack was directed against just one ship, Musashi, and while this super-battleship was sunk and the heavy cruiser Myoko was crippled, every other ship in Kurita’s force remained battleworthy and able to advance.

As a result of a momentous decision about to be taken by Halsey, Kurita was able to steam through the San Bernardino Strait during the night in order to debouch unexpectedly off the coast of Samar during the morning of the following day.

After Nishimura’s 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force and Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force had been detected, but before the carriers of Ozawa’s Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force had been located, Halsey and the 3^rd fleet staff aboard the battleship New Jersey prepared a contingency plan to deal with the threat posed by Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force. Their intention was to cover the San Bernardino Strait with a powerful task force of fast battleships supported by two of the 3^rd Fleet’s high-speed carrier groups. The battleship force was to be designated TF34 and comprise four battleships, five cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Lee, while Davison of TG38.4 was to command of the supporting carrier groups.

At 15.12 on 24 October, Halsey sent an ambiguously worded telegraphic radio message to his subordinate task group commanders, giving details of this contingency plan: '…Battleship Division 7 (Iowa and New Jersey), Miami, Vincennes, Biloxi, Destroyer Squadron 52 less Stephen Potter, from TG38.2 and Washington, Alabama, Wichita, New Orleans, Destroyer Division 100, Patterson, Bagley from TG38.4 will be formed as Task Force under Vice Admiral Lee, commander Battle Line. TF34 to engage decisively at long range. TG38.4 conduct carriers of TG38.2 and TG38.4 clear of fighting. Instructions for TG38.3 and TG38.1 later.'

Halsey copied this message to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian islands and to Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, in Washington, DC, but not to Kinkaid, commander of the 7^th Fleet. Even so, the message was picked up by the 7^th Fleet as it was common for radio operators to be told to copy all message traffic they detected regardless of addressee. As Halsey intended TF34 as a contingency task force to be formed and detached when he ordered it, with 'will be formed' he meant in the future, but omitted to say when or under which circumstances. This led Kinkaid to the belief that Halsey was speaking in the imperative rather than future tense, and therefore concluded that TF34 had been formed and would take station off the San Bernardino Strait. In Pearl Harbor, Nimitz came to exactly the same conclusion. Halsey then ordered the transmission of a second signal at 17.10 clarifying his intentions for TF34: 'If the enemy sorties [though the San Bernardino Strait] TF34 Will be formed when directed by me.'

Unfortunately, though, Halsey sent this second message as a voice transmission which was not intercepted by the 7^th Fleet, and Halsey did not follow it with a telegraphic message to Nimitz or King. The serious misunderstanding caused by Halsey’s ambiguous wording of his first message and his failure to notify Nimitz, King and Kinkaid of his second clarifying message was to have a major effect on the subsequent course of the battle.

The 3^rd Fleet’s aircraft failed to locate Ozawa’s decoy force, the Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force, until 16.40 on 24 October. This was largely because the 3^rd Fleet had been preoccupied with attacks on Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force and defending itself against the Japanese air attacks from Luzon. Thus the single force which the Japanese wished to be discovered was the only force the Americans had not been able to find. On the evening of 24 October, Ozawa intercepted an erroneous US signal describing Kurita’s withdrawal, and therefore ordered his own force also to withdraw. At 20.00, however, Toyoda ordered all his forces to attack 'counting on divine assistance'. In an effort to draw the attention of the 3^rd Fleet to his decoy force, Ozawa reversed course once again and steamed to the south-west in the direction of Leyte.

Halsey was convinced that the Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force constituted the primary Japanese threat, and was determined to seize what he perceived as the ideal opportunity to destroy Japan’s last remaining carrier strength. Believing that 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force had been neutralised by his 3^rd Fleet’s air attacks earlier in the day in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that this force’s remnants were retiring, Halsey signalled Nimitz and Kinkaid that 'Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn.'

The words 'with three groups' were highly and indeed dangerously misleading. In the light of Halsey’s intercepted 15.12 signal of 24 October '…will be formed as Task Force 34', Kinkaid and his staff assumed, as did Nimitz, that Lee’s TF34 had now come into existence as a separate operational entity. Kinkaid and Nimitz therefore assumed that Halsey was leaving this powerful surface force to guard the San Bernardino Strait, and thus cover the 7^th Fleet’s northern flank, while he took his three available carrier groups to the north in pursuit of the Japanese carriers. But the ships earmarked for TF34 had not been detached from their parent groups, and Lee’s battleships were in fact on their way to the north with the 3^rd Fleet’s carriers: thus Halsey had consciously and deliberately left the San Bernardino Strait totally open with not a single US warship left in this vital passage.

Halsey and his staff ignored information from a night reconnaissance aeroplane launched by the light carrier Independence that Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force had reversed course once more and was heading toward the San Bernardino Strait, and that after a long black-out, the navigation lights in the strait had been illuminated. When Bogan, commanding TG38.2, signalled this information to Halsey’s flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer who told Bogan that Halsey’s command team already had that information. Lee had correctly deduced that Ozawa’s force was on a decoy mission and indicated this in a signal lamp message to Halsey’s flagship, and was similarly rebuffed. Commodore Arleigh Burke and Commander James H. Flatley of Mitscher’s staff had also come to the same conclusion, and were so concerned that they woke Mitscher, who asked if Halsey had the report. On being told that Halsey did indeed have it, and knowing Halsey’s temperament, Mitscher commented that if Halsey wanted Mitscher’s advice he would ask for it, and then went back to sleep.

Thus the whole available strength of the 3^rd Fleet continued to steam to the north, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unguarded.

Nishimura’s 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force comprised the old but modernised battleships Yamashiro and Fuso, heavy cruiser Mogami and four destroyers, and had departed Brunei after Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force at 15.00 on 22 October, making first to the east into the Sulu Sea and then to the north-east past the southern tip of Negros island into the Mindanao Sea. Nishimura then steamed to the north-east with Mindanao island to starboard and into the southern entrance of the Surigao Strait, intending to exit the northern entrance of this strait into Leyte Gulf, where he would add his firepower to that of Kurita’s force in the destruction of the 7^th Fleet’s ships supporting the 'King II' operation against Leyte island.

Shima’s 2^nd Strike Force, Northern Force comprised the heavy cruisers Nachi (flagship) and Ashigara, light cruiser Abukuma and destroyers Akebono, Ushio, Kasumi and Shiranui. This force had steamed almost due south past the western side of Luzon island before altering to the south-east to pass between the main island of the Calamias islands group between Palawan and Mindoro islands, and after passing to the west of Panay and Negros islands had come onto an easterly and then north-easterly course to pass to the south of Bohol island and enter the Surigao Strait behind Nishimura’s force.

The 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force was attacked by US Navy bombers on 24 October, but its ships sustained only minor damage. As a result of the strict radio silence imposed on Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force and Nishimura’s 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force, Nishimura was unable to synchronise the movement of his force with those of Shima and Kurita. Thus, when Nishimura’s 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force entered the narrow Surigao Strait at 02.00, Shima’s 2^nd Strike Force, Northern Force was almost 30 miles (48 km) behind it, and Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force was still in the Sibuyan Sea and therefore several hours' steaming from the 'King II' beaches and lodgement on the eastern side of Leyte island.

As the 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force approached the Surigao Strait, it ran into the trap set by the 7^th Fleet’s Fire Support Unit South which, under Oldendorf’s command, was a notably powerful force based on the battleships West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California and Pennsylvania. Of these all but Mississippi had been sunk or damaged in the Japanese 'Ai' attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequently repaired or, in the case of Tennessee, California and West Virginia rebuilt: between the, the US battleships carried 48 14-in (356-mm) and 16 16-in (406-mm) main guns. There were also the 35 8-in (203-mm) guns of the heavy cruisers Louisville (flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and Australian Shropshire and the 54 6-in (152-mm) guns of the light cruisers Denver, Columbia, Phoenix and Boise. Added to this were the 5-in (127-mm) guns and the 21-in (533-mm) torpedoes of 28 destroyers, and the 21-in (533-mm) torpedoes of the 39 PT-boats of Task Group 70.1 (Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, 7^th Fleet). To pass through the strait and fall on the invasion shipping, Nishimura had to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT-boats followed by the gun fire and torpedoes of the large force of destroyers, and then advance under the concentrated fire of the six battleships and their eight flanking cruisers disposed across the northern mouth of the strait.

At 22.36 PT-131, operating off the island of Bohol, first made contact with the approaching Japanese ships and then for more than 210 minutes PT-boats made repeated attacks on Nishimura’s force as it steamed to the north. Although the PT-boats scored no torpedo hits, they sent a stream of contact reports which kept Oldendorf fully informed of the progress of the Japanese force. Though they managed to pass through the gauntlet of PT-boats unscathed, soon after this Nishimura’s ships suffered a major reversal of fortune as they came under attack by the torpedoes of the destroyers of Destroyer Squadrons 24, 54 and 56 disposed on each flank of the Japanese axis of advance. At about 03.00, both Japanese battleships were hit by torpedoes: Yamashiro was able to continue, but Fuso was again torpedoed and in this instance sunk by the destroyer Melvin. Of Nishimura’s four destroyers, Michishio and Yamagumo were sunk at 03.58 and 04.19 respectively, and Asagumo was hit and forced to retire, but sank at 07.21.

At 03.16, West Virginia's surface-search radar detected the surviving ships of Nishimura’s force at a range of 42,000 yards (38400 m), and the ship had achieved a firing solution at a range of 30,000 yards (27425 m). West Virginia tracked the Japanese ships as they approached in the darkness of the night before, at 03.53, firing the eight 16-in (406-mm) guns of her main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (20850 m), hitting Yamashiro with this first salvo. West Virginia went on to fire a total of 93 shells. At 03.55, California and Tennessee also opened fire, in this instance with their 24 14-in (356-mm) main guns, firing a total of 63 and 69 hells respectively. Their radar fire-control systems made it possible for these US capital ships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese battleship, with its inferior fire-control system, could not return fire effectively.

The three other US battleships, all fitted with less advanced gunnery radar, had difficulty arriving at any realistic firing solution. Maryland eventually succeeded in visual ranging on the splashes of the other battleships' shells, and then fired a total of 48 16-in (406-mm) shells, but Pennsylvania was unable to find a target and did not fire. Mississippi obtained a firing solution only at the end of the battle line action, and then fired just one full salvo of 12 14-in (356-mm) shells. This was the last salvo ever to be fired by a battleship against another heavy ship, and marked the end of the battleship-versus-battleship era of naval history.

Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 16- and 14-in (406- and 356-mm) armour-piercing shells, as well as the fire of Oldendorf’s flanking cruisers. The evidence suggests that the Japanese command had lost its grasp of the tactical picture, for all the Japanese ships fired all their batteries in a number of directions. The destroyer Shigure reversed course and fled, but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at 04.19, with Nishimura on board, and Mogami and Shigure retreated to the south back through the strait and again under PT-boat assault.

Shima’s following 2^nd Strike Force, Southern Force had departed Mako and approached the Surigao Strait about 40 miles (64.5 km) behind Nishimura’s 1^st Strike Force, Southern Force, and its approach to the Surigao Strait was initially thrown into confusion when its ships nearly ran aground on Panaon island after failing to factor into their navigation the effect of the ebbing tide; moreover, the Japanese radar was almost useless as a result of the large numbers of echoes from area’s many islands and islets. The Japanese radar was also wholly incapable of detecting ships, especially PT-boats, under these conditions, and PT-137 hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo which crippled her and caused her to fall out of formation. Nachi and Ashigara, Shima’s two heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers next encountered the remnants of Nishimura’s force. Seeing what he thought were the wrecks of both of Nishimura’s battleships, Shima ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding the latter’s steering room and causing her to fall behind in the retreat; she was sunk by aircraft during the morning of the day which followed. Of Nishimura’s seven ships, only Shigure survived. Moreover, while Shima’s ships did survive the Battle of Surigao Strait, they were subsequently sunk in further engagements around Leyte, while Shigure survived long enough to escape the debacle, but eventually succumbed to the US submarine Blackfin, which sank her off Kota Bharu, Malaya.

It is noteworthy that the Battle of Surigao Strait was one of only two battleship-versus-battleship naval battles in the entire Pacific campaign of World War II, the other being the naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 14/15 November 1942. It was also the last battle in which one force was able to 'cross the T' of its opponent. However, by the time the action was actually joined, the Japanese line was very ragged and comprised only one battleship, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer, so that the 'crossing of the T' was a notional rather than a practical concept, and thus exercised little effect on the outcome of the battle.

As noted above, Halsey’s decision to take all the available strength of 3^rd Fleet to the north to attack the carriers of Ozawa’s Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force had left the San Bernardino Strait completely unguarded. Senior officers of the 7^th Fleet, including Kinkaid and his staff, assumed Halsey was taking his three available carrier groups to the north (with McCain’s TF38.1, the strongest of the 3^rd Fleet’s four carrier groups, still returning from Ulithi), but leaving the battleships of TF34 covering the San Bernardino Strait against Force 'A' and Force 'B' of Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force. In fact, Halsey had not yet formed TF34, and all six of Lee’s battleships were steaming to the north with the carriers, as was every available cruiser and destroyer of the 3^rd Fleet.

Kurita’s 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force therefore emerged from the San Bernardino Strait at 03.00 on 25 October without encountering the slightest opposition, and steamed first to the east and then the south-east along the coast of Samar island in the hope that Halsey had taken the bait dangled by Ozawa and moved most of his fleet away to the north, as in fact he had done. Kurita had been advised that Nishimura’s 2^nd Strike Force, Southern Force had been destroyed in the Battle of the Surigao Strait, and would therefore not be joining his force at Leyte Gulf. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Mobile Force, Main Body, Northern Force to the effect that it had successfully drawn off Halsey’s 3^rd Fleet of battleships and fleet carriers, and throughout most of the imminent Battle off Samar Kurita was to be concerned by doubts about the actual location of the 3^rd Fleet.

In the path of the 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force stood only the 7^th Fleet’s three escort carrier units, 'Taffy 1', 'Taffy 2' and 'Taffy 3', with a total of 16 small, notably slow and wholly unarmoured escort carriers (the other two had been detached to take aircraft requiring major repairs or maintenance to Morotai island and then to return with new aircraft), protected by a screen of lightly armed and unarmoured destroyers and destroyer escorts. Despite its losses in the Palawan Passage and the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the 1^st Strike Force, Centre Force was still very powerful inasmuch as it comprised four battleships, including the super-battleship Yamato, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and 11 destroyers.

Thus was set the scene for the Battle off Samar, in which the main weight of the Japanese attack fell on the most northerly of the three task units of Thomas Sprague’s TG77.4 (Carrier Escort Group), namely Clifton Sprague’s 'Taffy 3'. Ill-equipped to fight armoured warships with heavy guns, the escort carriers of 'Taffy 3' attempted to escape from the Japanese force, while its destroyers, destroyer escorts and warplanes delivered sustained attacks on Kurita’s ships. The US destroyers and destroyer escorts were armed only with torpedoes and guns of up to 5-in (127-mm) calibre, aided in the destroyers but not the destroyer escorts by radar-assisted gun directors, while the Japanese ships had altogether larger guns of up to 18.1-in (460-mm) calibre, but supported by less accurate optical rangefinders. The Americans also had large numbers of aircraft available, but the Japanese had none. The ordnance for the escort carriers' embarked aircraft consisted mostly of HE bombs for use in the warplanes' primary ground support missions, and depth charges used in anti-submarine warfare, rather than the armour-piercing bombs and torpedoes more suitable for operations against armoured warships. Nevertheless, even when they were out of ammunition, the US aircraft continued to harass the Japanese ships, making repeated mock attacks to distract their gunners and disrupt their formations.

Steaming about 70 miles (115 km) to the east of Samar before dawn on 25 October, St Lo launched an anti-submarine patrol of four aircraft as the other carriers of 'Taffy 3' prepared for the day’s air attacks against the Japanese land forces opposing the 'King II' landings. At 06.37, one of St Lo's TBM aircraft spotted a number of ships. Parts of Halsey’s 3^rd Fleet were expected, but these ships appeared to be Japanese. When notified, Thomas Sprague was incredulous and demanded positive identification, and was informed after the aeroplane had closed on the formation that the pilot could see pagoda masts and huge Japanese ensigns on the largest battleship he had ever seen. The Japanese force was approaching from the west-north-west and was only 20 miles (32 km) distant, and as such already well within visual (and therefore gun) range of the closest task unit, 'Taffy 3'. Armed only with depth charges in case of an encounter with a Japanese submarines, the US pilots were nonetheless determined to carry out the first attack of the battle, quickly establishing the tone of the battle by dropping several depth charges, at least one of which bounced off the bow of a cruiser.

Look-outs spotted the anti-aircraft fire to the north as the Japanese closed on 'Taffy 3' at 06.45 with the benefit of total tactical surprise. At about the same time, other ships of 'Taffy 3' had picked up echoes on their surface-search radars and intercepted Japanese radio traffic. At about 07.00 Yamato opened fire at a range of about 40,500 yards (37035 km), and the Americans were soon astonished by the spectacle of coloured geysers of water as the first salvoes of shells found the range: each Japanese ship used a specific colour of dye marker so that it could spot the fall of its own shells. Not finding the silhouettes of the little escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for larger fleet carriers and assumed that he had a 3^rd Fleet task group under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, and therefore ordered a general attack: instead of a carefully orchestrated effort, therefore, each division of the Japanese force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just shifted into a circular formation designed to maximise anti-aircraft capability, and the order caused some confusion and thereby provided the time needed by Sprague to order a course which led the Japanese into a tail chase. This limited the Japanese to the use of only their forward guns, and restricted their anti-aircraft gunnery. Sprague’s ships would not lose as much of their firepower in a tail chase as their rearward-firing weapons were more numerous than their forward guns, and his carriers would still be able to operate aircraft.

Thomas Sprague immediately ordered the escort carriers to turn to launch their aircraft, and then withdraw to the east into a group of heavy rain squalls, in which he hoped that poor visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. Sprague also ordered his destroyers to generate smoke to mask the retreating carriers.

Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked with the defence of the escort carriers from air and submarine attack. The three 'Fletcher' class fleet destroyers possessed the speed which allowed them to operate with a fast carrier task force, but their five single 5-in (127-mm) and numerous 40- and 20-mm light anti-aircraft guns gave them no realistic firepower with which to engage armoured warships. Only their 10 21-in (533-mm) Mk 15 torpedoes, carried in a pair of traversing quintuple launchers amidships, posed a realistic threat to battleships and cruisers. The destroyer escorts were even smaller and slower as they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines: each of these destroyer escorts had only two 5-in (127-mm) single guns without automatic fire control and carried only three torpedoes, and few of their crewmen had been trained for torpedo attacks. Since the Mk 15 torpedo possessed an effective range between 15,000 yards (13715 m) at 26.5 kt and 6,000 yards (5485 m) at 45 kt, any light warship attempting to use the weapon was advised to undertake the effort only at night as, in daylight, the attacker would have to pass through a beaten zone of gunfire extending to a range of 45,950 yards (42000 m). In the Battle off Samar, the torpedoes were to be launched against a fleet led by the largest battleship in history.

After making smoke in an attempt to conceal the carriers from the Japanese gunners, the destroyers and destroyer escorts were soon making desperate torpedo runs. The profiles of the ships and the aggressive nature they revealed served to persuade the Japanese gunnery control officers to think, at least in the short term, that their opponents were cruisers and large destroyers, and in this the US ships' lack of armour tended to provide clean penetration by armour-piercing shells before the Japanese gunnery control officers realised their initial error and switched to HE shells, which detonated and caused considerably greater devastation. The use of their speed and agility enabled some of the US ships to dodge the shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although their decks were inevitably littered with the dead and seriously wounded. Destroyers from 'Taffy 2' farther to the south also found themselves under fire, but as this fact was appreciated by Gambier Bay, which had called for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect carriers of their own task unit.

At 07.00, Commander Ernest E. Evans of the 2,925-ton fleet destroyer Johnston responded to incoming shellfire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting by starting to lay a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 07.10 the destroyer’s gunnery officer started to fire at the closest Japanese attackers, then at a range of 18,000 yards (16460 m) and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese then targeted Johnston and tall splashes confirmed that the Japanese shells were bracketing the ship. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered Johnston, still making smoke and zigzagging, to accelerate to flank speed and head straight toward the Japanese. One gunnery advantage which the Americans possessed was the radar-controlled Mk 37 Gun Fire-Control System. The 'brain' of this system was the Ford Mk 1 Fire-Control Computer, which provided co-ordinated automatic firing solutions for the ship’s 5-in (127-mm) guns merely by pointing the gun director at the target. Crude by comparison, the Japanese fire-control system used optical rangefinders aided by splash colour dye markers in each shell. At this point, the Japanese were unable to find the range of their attacker. At 07.15 the gunnery officer concentrated the destroyer’s fire on the heavy cruiser Kumano, flagship of the leading cruiser squadron. At the 5-inch gun’s maximum range of 18,200 yards (16640 m), Johnston fired and scored several hits on Kumano's superstructure, which erupted into flame and smoke.

At 07.16 Sprague ordered Commander William D. Thomas on board Hoel, in command of the small destroyer screen, to attack the Japanese forces. Thus Hoel, Heermann and Samuel B. Roberts steered at high speed to reach firing position for their torpedoes. Johnston pressed her attack, firing more than 200 shells as she steered evasively to render herself a more difficult target. Jo