'Watchtower' was the US seizure of Guadalcanal island toward the south-eastern end of the Solomon islands group (7 August 1942/9 February 1943).

Part of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Guadalcanal played a major role in the South Pacific campaign and is a large island, with a maximum length and width of 80 and 34 miles (129 and 55 km) respectively, and an area of 2,047 sq miles (5302 km²), toward the south-eastern end of the Solomon islands chain, some 1,300 miles (2090 km) to the north-east of Townsville in north-eastern Australia, 540 miles (870 km) to the north-west of Espíritu Santo island, and 300 miles (485 km) to the south-east of Rabaul on the island of New Britain. The southern half is mountainous, reaching heights of 7,661 and 7,580 ft (2335 and 2310 m) at the summits of Mt Popomanaseu and Mt Makarakomburu respectively. The south coast is precipitous, and edged by a reef, and therefore possessed only a very few good landing beaches. The interior is crossed by sharp ridge lines divided by fast streams. The climate is characterised by the south-west trade winds from April to October, with temperatures ranging between 70° and 90° F (21° and 32° C), while in the period from November to March the north-west monsoon brings torrential rain, temperatures greater than 90° F (32° C) and very high humidity.

The northern coastal plain accommodated most of the population, which was estimated at just 8,000 to 10,000 persons in 1941, and had some plantations. There was a two-lane earth road along the north coast in the vicinity of Lunga Point, with 3-ton timber bridges across the many rivers and streams which flow from the mountains to the coast. Facilities were otherwise virtually non-existent, and most of the population moved to the south coast after the Japanese occupation of Tulagi, a smaller island just to the north of Guadalcanal, on 3 May 1942.

The formal US codename for Guadalcanal was 'Bevy', but the island was more generally known as 'Cactus', which was properly the area to be seized on the first day of 'Watchtower' on Tulagi as well as Guadalcanal, and in February 1943 Guadalcanal was properly redesignated as 'Mainyard'.

Though comparatively small in terms of the number of men involved, the Guadalcanal campaign was one of the most important of World War II in its strategic implications and effect on Allied (especially US) morale, and this undertaking by Allied warships and some 19,000 troops was the first offensive by US land forces in the Pacific war. Although the main landing was 'Watchtower' on Guadalcanal, the related 'Ringbolt' attacks were also made on Florida, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo islands in the same 'Cactus' (i) area.

The location of the Solomon islands group, to the east of New Guinea and north-east of Australia, made it a key element in the Japanese plans both to create an outer defence perimeter and to sever the Allied maritime lines of communications linking the USA and Australia. Japan already held a major base beyond the north-western end of this long chain of islands, at Rabaul on New Britain in the Bismarck islands group, but the Solomon islands group constitute a north-west/south-east chain so long that aircraft from Rabaul could not patrol the whole group to its south-eastern tip, let alone into the Pacific beyond that. The Japanese navy therefore intended to turn the Solomon islands into a major strategic base, and in 1942 began to occupy islands all along the chain for the building of air bases capable of accommodating patrol bombers. Guadalcanal was to be the major base in the middle of the chain, just within ferry range of Rabaul.

After seizing Tulagi, an islet just off Florida island across Savo Sound (soon to become 'Ironbottom Sound') from Guadalcanal, in the course of activities peripheral to 'Mo' (ii), leading to the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese immediately began to construct a seaplane base in order that scouting flights could be made to points farther to the south-east along the Solomon islands group, but then discovered that there was terrain suitable for airfields near the north coast of Guadalcanal. Japanese engineers landed on 8 June and set to work constructing a wharf, and after spotting smoke on 20 June as the Japanese began burning grass off a cattle pasture near Lunga Point, Allied coast watchers speculated that the Japanese had begun the construction of an airfield. This was confirmed by a reconnaissance flight over the island on 5 July. On 6 July the Japanese engineers were joined by 2,571 men of the 11^th Construction Unit and 13^th Construction Unit delivered by a 12-ship convoy. When completed, the runway would be 3,778 ft (1150 m) long, sufficient for the operation of bombers which would threaten Allied bases in the New Hebrides islands group and also maritime communications between the USA and Australia.

The Allies were little prepared for offensive action in the middle of 1942 and were, moreover, not unduly disturbed about the Japanese establishment of a seaplane base on Tulagi. The Allies had just won their first strategic victory in the Pacific campaign with the defeat of 'Mi' (ii), in which Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet had been decisively crushed in the Battle of Midway.

As early as March 1942, and possibly at the instigation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral Ernest J. King, the US chief of naval operations and commander-in-chief of the US Fleet, had suggested the possibility of a limited offensive through the New Hebrides, Solomon and Bismarck islands groups, starting from Efate in the New Hebrides islands group. The South Pacific Area had been established with the arrival of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in Nouméa on New Caledonia island during 17 May 1942: Ghormley had begun to collate the scant hydrographic information available about the Solomon islands group before departing Washington, DC. By 25 June King had recommended an early start to the offensive, using Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift’s 1^st Marine Division as the main assault force. By 2 July the proposed Solomons islands offensive had been approved as part of 'Cartwheel', with the the seizure of Tulagi and Guadalcanal themselves in the 'Ringbolt' and 'Watchtower' operations, each slated to start on 1 August. Other parts of the original plan for the South Pacific Area offensive included the occupation of Ndeni, the main island of the Santa Cruz islands group to the south-east of the Solomon islands group, to allow the construction of a forward airfield, the delivery of major reinforcements to Espíritu Santo, and the occupation of Funafuti, a sizeable atoll in the Ellice islands group.

The discovery of the incomplete airfield on Guadalcanal led General Douglas MacArthur, commanding the South-West Pacific Area, and Ghormley to recommend that 'Watchtower' should be postponed until more forces were available for what was now seen as a more difficult task. However, King felt that the Japanese development of an airfield made the operation more urgent than ever, and on 10 July ordered that 'Watchtower' be undertaken at the earliest possible moment despite the risks. This was one of the most important decisions of the war, and was arguably King’s single greatest contribution to the ultimate Allied victory. The campaign which resulted from the decision was, at the strategic level, a meeting engagement in which each side felt it necessary to reinforce a minor skirmish, at a place and time neither had intended, until it grew into a major campaign.

Vandegrift had been informed that his 1^st Marine Division would have at least six months to train in New Zealand, and believed that his formation was far from ready for commitment to combat. The division had been significantly reduced in terms of its regular units to provide cadres for new formations, and the replacements it had received were far from fully trained. In addition, the 7^th Marines had been detached to garrison Samoa and, believing that this regiment would see combat before the rest of the division, Vandegrift had given the regiment many of his best officers, men and equipment. By the time Vandegrift received the orders for 'Watchtower' on 26 July, his men were already in barracks in New Zealand and the division’s equipment had been unloaded at Wellington. While most of the marines continued training on New Zealand, their equipment was reloaded on four transport ships of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet by detachments of 300 marines per transport ship, after the US Navy had come to the conclusion that it could not rely New Zealand port workers: the powerfully unionised dock workers refused to work in the rain, and appeals to their patriotism failed because security considerations made it impossible to explain to them that this was not just another training exercise. A second echelon was loaded at Wellington and ready to sail on 22 July, while a third group of six transport ships was escorted to the South Pacific from San Diego by a task force centred on the fleet carrier Wasp. By 16 July it was clear that the invasion would have to be postponed until 7 August.

Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, at the time the commander of the amphibious forces allocated to the South Pacific Area, later claimed that Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, the commander of the Pacific Fleet’s cruiser forces and tasked with leading 'Watchtower', was against making the attempt on Guadalcanal, but it seems likely that Nimitz would have replaced Fletcher had he been this pessimistic. Nimitz informed Fletcher that he was still to be governed, as in the Battle of Midway, by the principle of calculated risk, which meant that he was not to expose his carriers to undue risk unless there was an opportunity to inflict greater damage on the Japanese. Fletcher therefore believed that his task was to dash in toward Tulagi and Guadalcanal, land the marines, and withdrew speedily with his carriers still intact, leaving the marines to get the airfield operational and thus be in a position to provide their own air cover. While he desired to achieve surprise, he himself was even more concerned that he not be caught by surprise, as the Combined Fleet had been in the Battle of Midway.

A final conference between the commanders on the fleet carrier Saratoga on 27 July lasted nearly four hours, and the accounts of the conference differ. The only contemporary record is represented by the notes taken by Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, the South Pacific Area’s chief-of-staff, who represented Ghormley. According to Vandegrift’s later account, Fletcher was nervous and tired, lacked knowledge or interest in the operation, and thought it would fail, but this is contradicted by Callaghan’s notes, which show that Fletcher asked many searching questions about the plan. Turner claimed as early as 1945 that Fletcher spoke against the plan and accused Turner of planning it poorly. Captain Thomas Peyton, Turner’s chief-of-staff, described the conference as an extended argument in which the two admirals talked to each other in a manner he had never heard before. Kinkaid later claimed that the meeting was forthright rather than angry, and that Turner asked for many things, most of which he did not receive as they were not in the realm of the possible. Fletcher himself subsequently claimed that at no time was there any friction between himself and Turner, but rather a frank exchange of opinions.

The major point of argument was the length of time which the carriers should remain in the area. Turner and Vandegrift wished Fletcher to provide air cover for as long as possible, but Fletcher was concerned about the danger inherent in operating his carriers close to Guadalcanal for an extended period, and he also expressed some doubt that the logistical support was adequate. A summary of Turner’s plan of 5 July called for carrierborne air cover up to D+2, and Fletcher later recalled that he expected to remain off Guadalcanal for three days, or four if the landings were checked for any reason: if the landings had taken place as planned, three days would in fact have been sufficient. Turner intended to have the transports unloaded and out of the area by the end of D+1, with five cargo ships remaining an additional day. There was considerable misunderstanding whether Fletcher intended to remain for two days or three days, reflected by the contradiction between Callaghan’s notes stating there would be two days of coverage and a later message from Ghormley indicating that he understood Fletcher to have declared he would remain for three days.

The Japanese main base in the south-west Pacific was the complex based on Rabaul in New Britain and Kavieng on New Ireland as the bastion of the Japanese land, sea and air forces responsible for the creation and defence of the south-eastern segment of the Japanese outer defence perimeter in the South-West Pacific: these forces were eventually formalised as General Hitoshi Imamura’s 8^th Area Army created on 9 November 1942, Lieutenant General Kumaichi Teramoto’s 4^th Air Army created on 28 July 1943, and Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue’s 4^th Fleet, South Seas Force, the last as successor to Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa’s 8^th Fleet, South Seas Force.

MacArthur had proposed an immediate assault on this major base area, but Nimitz had suggested a more cautious approach along the coast of New Guinea and up the Solomon islands chain. It was Nimitz’s concept which had been accepted, and the final plan called for an advance on the base area in three distinct phases: the first was the capture of Tulagi, the second a simultaneous advance to the north-west along the New Guinea coast and up the Solomon islands chain, and the third a final assault on the base area. Of these tasks, the last two would be controlled by MacArthur, but the first was allocated to Ghormley’s South Pacific Area command, whose boundary was shifted 1° to the west so that Tulagi would fall into its area. 'Watchtower' was the operation designed to achieve the first task, and the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff issued the appropriate directive on 2 July for implementation on 1 August. Later in the same month, Guadalcanal was added to the list of objectives when it became known that the Japanese were building an airfield on this island, a fact which suggested that the Japanese were considering offensive actions rather than just reconnaissance operations in the area, in the form either of attacks on Allied convoys bringing men and matériel into the South Pacific and South-West Pacific Areas, or further expansion down the Solomon islands chain.

The nearest available forces were those of the US Marine Corps being built up on Espíritu Santo, an island some 550 miles (885 km) away to the south-east, for the eventual Allied counter-offensive toward New Britain and New Ireland. With the approval of King, the US Joint Chiefs-of-Staff decided to use Vandegrift’s 1^st Marine Division (reinforced to a strength of 19,000 men and using the 2^nd Marines of Major General John Marston’s 2^nd Marine Division instead of its own 7^th Marines which, as noted above, had been detached for the defence of Samoa) for a counterstroke on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, garrisoned respectively by 1,500 and 2,200 men, most of them construction troops.

'Watchtower' was created in just one month on the basis of Turner’s Amphibious Force South Pacific, otherwise Task Force 62. This comprised Turner’s own Task Group 62.1 (19 troop and supply transports and four fast transports in six sections), the British Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley’s TG62.2 (Australian heavy cruisers Australia and Canberra, Australian light cruiser Hobart, US heavy cruiser Chicago and US destroyers Selfridge, Patterson, Ralph Talbot, Mugford and Jarvis of Destroyer Squadron 4, and Blue, Helm, Henley and Bagley of Destroyer Division 7), two Fire Support Groups (Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl’s TG62.3 Fire Support Group L with the US heavy cruisers Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes, and US destroyers Dewey, Ellet, Hull and Wilson, and Rear Admiral Norman Scott’s TG62.4 Fire Support Group M with the US light anti-aircraft cruiser San Juan and US destroyers Buchanan and Monssen), and the Minesweeper Group (TG62.5 with the fast minesweepers Hopkins, Trever, Zane, Southard and Hovey).

The TG62.1 Convoy, carrying 959 officers and 18,148 other ranks of the 1^st Marine Division, comprised Transport Group X-Ray (for Guadalcanal) with the 1^st Marine Division less the 3/2^nd Marines and 2/5^th Marines, and Transport Group Yoke (for Tulagi) with 3,900 marines, under the command of Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, of the 1/2^nd Marines, 2/5^th Marines, 1^st Marine Raider Battalion and 1^st Marine Parachute Battalion.

Transport Group X-Ray had four elements in the form of Transport Division A with the 5^th Marines less one battalion carried in the transports Fuller and American Legion and the cargo ship Bellatrix; Transport Division B with the headquarters of the 1^st Marine Division and the 1^st Marines carried in the transports McCawley, Barnett and George F. Elliot and the cargo ship Libra; Transport Division C with the Special Weapons Battalion, 5/11^th Marine Artillery, parts of the 3^rd Marine Defense Battalion and support elements carried in the transport Hunter Liggett and the cargo ships Alchiba, Fomalhaut and Betelgeuse; and Transport Division D with the 2^nd Marines less one battalion carried in the transports Crescent City, President Hayes and President Adams and the cargo ship Alhena.

Transport Group Yoke had two elements in the form of Transport Division E with the 2/5^th Marines, 2/2^nd Marines, Battery E of the 11^th Marines, elements of the 3^rd Marine Defense Battalion, 1^st Marine Parachute Battalion and elements of the 1^st Marine Raider Battalion carried in the transports Neville, Zeilin, Heywood and President Jackson; and Transport Division 12 with the 1^st Marine Raider Battalion less one company carried in the destroyers conversions Colhoun, Little, McKean and Gregory.

Cover for TF62 was provided by Rear Admiral Leigh H. Noyes’s Air Support Force, otherwise TF61.1 with Fletcher’s own Unit 1 (fleet carrier Saratoga carrying 34 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, 37 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bombers and 16 Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers, screened by Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright’s heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans, and destroyers Phelps, Farragut, Worden, MacDonough and Dale); Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s Unit 2 (fleet carrier Enterprise carrying 36 F4F-4, 36 SBD-3 and 15 TBF-1 warplanes, and battleship North Carolina, screened by Rear Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale’s heavy cruiser Portland, light anti-aircraft cruiser Atlanta, and destroyers Balch, Maury, Gwin, Benham and Grayson); and Noyes’s own Unit 3 (TF18 with the fleet carrier Wasp carrying 29 F4F-4, 30 SBD-3 and 10 TBF-1 warplanes, screened by the heavy cruisers San Francisco and Salt Lake City, and destroyers Lang, Sterett, Aaron Ward, Stack, Laffey and Farenholt).

The supporting Tanker Force (Fueling Group) comprised the fleet oilers Platte, Cimarron, Kaskaskia, Sabine and Kanawha.

For preparatory air action and support, the shore-based aircraft of Rear Admiral John S. McCain’s TF63 (South Pacific Air Forces) were assembled together with about 20 Boeing B-17 heavy bombers of Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Carmichael’s 19^th Bombardment Group, altogether totalling 16 B-17, 16 F4F and six scouting aircraft, on the island of Efate; 22 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina, nine B-17, 10 Martin B-26 Marauder, 38 Bell P-39 Airacobra, 16 F4F-3, six Lockheed A-28 Hudson, 17 SBD and three scouting aircraft on the island of New Caledonia; six PBY, three Short Singapore, 12 A-28, 12 F4F, 12 B-26, B-17 and nine Vickers Vincent aircraft on the Fiji islands group; 24 F4F and six scouting aircraft on the island of Tongatapu; and 17 SBD, 18 F4F and 10 scouting aircraft on the island of Samoa.

To cover the seaward approaches to the operational area, the submarines of Captain Ralph W. Christie’s TF42 (S-38, S-39, S-41, S-43, S-44 and S-46) were deployed from Brisbane to patrol locations off Kavieng and Rabaul on the islands of New Ireland and New Britain, and the submarines Drum and Greenling of the Pacific Fleet to a location off Truk atoll, the main Japanese base in the Caroline islands group.

Overall command of the operation was vested in Ghormley at Nouméa, and operational command in Fletcher.

The Allied forces gathered off the Fijian island of Koro and, and refuelled at a location to the south of the Fiji islands group on 1 August. The logistical aspects of the 'Watchtower' were already starting to fall apart: Ghormley had failed to dispatch Kaskaskia to Turner’s force, and Turner was therefore unable to refuel his destroyers. Two chartered tankers, E. J. Henry and Esso Little Rock, arrived late to rendezvous with Fletcher’s tankers. Fletcher refuelled from Cimarron in an area to the south of Efate on 3 August, but the oiler was carrying much less than a full load and Fletcher was unable to refuel his ships fully. Kinkaid estimated that his destroyers had fuel sufficient for three days at 15 kt and two days at 25 kt, which turned out to be a somewhat pessimistic estimate, but this was what he reported to Fletcher, and Fletcher therefore remained concerned about his fuel supply throughout the rest of the operation.

On 4 August the force passed to the north of New Caledonia island and came within the estimated range of Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, but in the event the landing force remained completely undetected until the morning of the assaults, in part as a result of the cover provided by a weather front. At one point a Japanese search aeroplane passed within 10 miles (16 km) of the force, but visibility was at the time less than 1 mile (1.6 km) because of the poor weather and the force was not detected. Fletcher took the calculated risk of flying no searches on 6 August, the day before the landings, in order to maintain the element of surprise. Fletcher had also opted not to start any bombardment by carrierborne warplanes until the day of the landings in order to give the Japanese as little time as possible to react.

By dawn on 7 August Fletcher had positioned his carriers in the Coral Sea to the south-west of Guadalcanal, where they could conduct flight operations into the south-east trade winds while staying within range of Guadalcanal. In tactical command, Noyes began to implement a complex scheme of flight operations which attempted simultaneously to provide fighter cover for both the carriers and the landings, to provide ground support for the Marines, and to be be ready to fall upon any Japanese carriers which might appear.

On 7 August the marines landed under cover of a powerful air and ship bombardment, the latter undertaken by the cruisers and destroyers of Crutchley’s Australian squadron. Tulagi and the neighbouring islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo were assaulted separately in 'Ringbolt' by a comparatively small force, while the main weight of the 1^st Marine Division landed in 'Watchtower' on both sides of the Tenaru river estuary at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, just to the west of the site selected by the Japanese for the airfield they had started to build: the US intelligence estimate greatly exaggerated the Japanese strength on Guadalcanal, believing that the Japanese had 5,275 men, including one reinforced regiment, rather than the 2,600 construction troops actually working on the airfield. For this reason Vandegrift had decided to make the US landing farther to the east than had originally been planned in the hope of outflanking the Japanese defenders. As a result, the 'Watchtower' landing met almost no opposition at all. However, insufficient thought had been given to the movement of supplies off the assault beach, and their accumulation in this potentially exposed position greatly delayed the unloading from the ships lying close offshore.

Tulagi was the Japanese headquarters for the area, and it took the marines three days of bitter fighting before they had secured this island and its two small neighbours.

The marines initially committed on Guadalcanal were the 3,298 men of Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s Combat Group A (1 and 3/5^th Marines, 2/11^th Marine Artillery and supporting elements) and the 4,531 men of Colonel Clifton B. Cates’s Combat Group B (1, 2 and 3/1^st Marines, 3/11^th Marine Artillery and supporting elements), with reinforcement available from the 3,537 men of Colonel Pedro A. de Valle’s Support Group (11^th Marine Artillery and support elements). Starting at 09.10, the landing on Guadalcanal was unopposed, and came ashore at a point to the east of Lunga Point in the centre of the island’s northern coast. Beach Red was 1,600 yards wide (1465 m) and lay about 6,000 yards (5485 m) to the east of the Japanese airfield. The initial landing was undertaken by Combat Group A, with the 1 and 3/5^th Marines landing on the western and eastern halves of the beach respectively. Combat Group B began to come ashore at 11.00 in a regimental column ordered as 2, 3 and 1/1^st Marines, and the divisional headquarters followed at 14.00. The Japanese had fled west without resistance. Because of congestion on the beach and insufficient shore parties to unload, the beach was extended 2,000 yards (1830 m) to the west on 8 August.

Once they had landed and chased off the small force of Japanese combat and construction troops building the airfield on the eastern side of the Lunga river’s lower course to the sea, the marines initially established a defensive perimeter around the airfield, moving the supplies which had been landed into dumps dispersed inside this perimeter, and finishing the airfield. Rather than establish a continuous perimeter, the marines initially created scattered battalion defensive positions, with the 1^st Marines realising that Mt Austen was too far distant to include in the perimeter which had originally been planned, and some 10,000 troops were now ashore. By this time the whole of the 2^nd Marines had been committed to Tulagi, for the Guadalcanal operation had gone more smoothly as the island had been garrisoned by only 150 combat troops who, with the larger number of construction troops, had fled into the island’s interior and, more generally, to the west.

The airfield was captured on 8 August, against only light opposition largely by the few men of the 81^st Guard Force, along with considerable supplies of rice and tinned food, a very significant seizure which increased the food available for 11,000 men to a 14-day supply at the rate of two meals per day. Completion of the airfield began at once using Japanese construction equipment abandoned as the Japanese decamped to the south. The airfield was named Henderson Field, after Major Lofton Henderson, a US Marine aviator lost in the Battle of Midway, and was destined to become the focal point of this decisive campaign of the Pacific War.

By 06.30 the Tulagi garrison had reported the US invasion by radio to Rabaul. Here Rear Admiral Sadayoshi Yamada, commander of the 25^th Air Flotilla, was about to launch an attack against Milne Bay on the south-eastern tip of Papua with a force of Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' warplanes armed with bombs. Yamada now sent three of the bombers to search the area around Guadalcanal. Unknown to Yamada, a Japanese coast watcher had reported the US carriers but could not establish radio contact. At 09.30 Yamada launched an attack by 27 G4M bombers, still armed with bombs, escorted by 18 Mitsubishi A6M Reisen 'Zero' fighters. Yamada then launched a second wave of nine Aichi D3A 'Val' dive-bombers each carrying two 132-lb (60-kg) bombs. This was a desperate move: the dive-bombers lacked the range to make their attack and return, and were therefore ordered to ditch close to the Japanese-held Shortland islands group on their return flights. However, the arrival of these comparatively short-ranged warplanes in the skies above Guadalcanal cause great consternation among the Americans, who assumed their presence indicated that a Japanese carrier was in the area.

The Americans had warning of the attack from Allied coast watchers, while the Japanese search aircraft just failed to sight Fletcher’s carriers. The G4M bombers therefore targeted the US transport shipping off Lunga Point. These were protected by 18 F4F carrierborne fighters, which intercepted the G4M bombers at 13.15, and a vicious air battle began. No fewer than nine of the F4F fighters were shot down, along with an SBD on a ground-attack mission, while the Japanese lost six G4M and two A6M warplanes. However, the Japanese scored no hits on Crutchley’s warship screen. The D3A dive-bombers arrived at 14.55 and scored one hit on the destroyer Mugford, which suffered only minimal damage, but lost five of their own number shot down. As noted above, the presence of dive-bombers at this remove from Rabaul, and then their retirement directly to the west rather than the north-west, served to persuade Kinkaid that there might be a Japanese carrier to the west, though an air search at revealed nothing.

On the morning of the following day, Yamada launched an attack by 26 G4M bombers armed with torpedoes rather than bombs, and escorted by 15 A6M fighters. Yamada also ordered a search of the area to the north-east and east of Tulagi by three bombers and two flying boats, but a flying boat again missed the US carriers by the narrowest of margins and the attack was therefore delivered against the US transport force. The bombers were sighted by coast watchers, but took a roundabout course to the north of Florida island and west to their targets, and as a result there was considerable confusion about their estimated time of arrival. As a result, they were already descending to make their torpedo runs as they were sighted. The attack was decimated, however, by the US anti-aircraft fire, 19 of the Japanese aircraft being shot down: one of these crashed onto the 8,378-ton transport George F. Elliot, which had to be abandoned after the resulting fire got out of control, but another managed to put a torpedo into the destroyer Jarvis, and a crashing bomber damaged the transport Burnett.

Prompted by the apparent vulnerability of his ships to the Japanese air attacks, and further concerned by the possibility of Japanese submarine attacks, during the evening of 8 August, and thus some 12 hours earlier than had been envisaged, Fletcher decided to pull back his carrier force and Turner’s amphibious ships, the latter still loaded with most of the marines' heavier equipment as well as almost all of the marines' divisional artillery in the form of 32 75-mm (2.95-in) 'pack' howitzers and 105-mm (4.13-in) howitzers. Moreover, rations for only five days had been landed.

Turner criticised this decision as cowardly, though Fletcher’s decision to withdraw was approved by Ghormley and was also fully in accord with Nimitz’s instructions to be governed by the principle of calculated risk.

Unbiased analysis suggests that Fletcher’s decision, given the information available to the US commander at the time, was considerably more prudent than his critics were prepared to concede. Turner had informed Fletcher that the transports would be unloaded and away from Guadalcanal by the end of the second day, leaving five cargo ships to finish unloading. Communications between Fletcher and Turner were very bad, and as a result the only progress report that Fletcher received from Turner indicated that things were going smoothly, though in fact they were not, and unloading was in fact taking far longer than had been anticipated. Fletcher was also concerned about his fuel supply, based on Kinkaid’s erroneous estimates.

Perhaps the most crucial element of Fletcher’s decision was his fully correct expectation that the Japanese would react very strongly to the Guadalcanal landings. Fletcher had already lost one-fifth of his fighter strength, more than at either the Battle of the Coral Sea or the Battle of Midway, and at this stage there were no replacements closer than Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian islands group. Fletcher felt that it was essential to conserve his force for the carrier battle he was certain would shortly take place. He was under the impression that the marines had all been landed and most of the transport force was already clearing the area. There was no question of his loitering in the area for the entire length of time required to get Henderson Field in operation, and he had been told by Nimitz that the marines were prepared to dig in and absorb air attacks. Remaining an extra day with his precious carriers to protect five cargo ships as they unloaded supplies did not seem prudent when he had a carrier battle for which to prepare.

During this time the main strength of Mikawa’s 8^th Fleet had departed Rabaul with the heavy cruisers Chokai (flagship), Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kako of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto’s Cruiser Division 6, the light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari of Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo’s Cruiser Division 18, and Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka’s Destroyer Squadron 6, which also provided the destroyer Yunagi). The Japanese force was sighted and reported by the submarine S-38.

The 1^st Marine Division had succeeded in its primary objectives in 'Watchtower', but was now left to face the Japanese counterstroke with no major external support, at least in the short term. Destroyers brought in additional supplies and men, and engineers hastily completed the airstrip so that the first fighters and attack aircraft of Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger’s 1^st Marine Aircraft Wing, the so-called 'Cactus Air Force' could be flown into Guadalcanal on 20 August, just one day before the reinforced Japanese ground forces began to probe into the US perimeter around the beach-head.

Immediately after the US landing, the Japanese had launched 'Ka' (ii) as a rapid response in the form of reinforcements from Rabaul to destroy the US forces and take back the airstrip. Mikawa initially loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them toward Guadalcanal on 7 August but then, learning that the number of US marines landed on Guadalcanal was greater than previously reported, recalled the transports. Mikawa was meanwhile hastily gathering a force of six more transport ships to deliver troops from Rabaul to reinforce the garrison of Guadalcanal and sent an urgent message to his scattered cruiser force to reassemble. The transport force was recalled, however, when its leading ship, the 5,628-ton Meiyo Maru, was torpedoed and sunk at 24.00 on 8 August by S-38. Even so, the reassembled cruiser force had steamed out of Rabaul at a time late on 7 August for Guadalcanal, where it would inflict on the US Navy the worst defeat in its history in the Battle of Savo Island, which was just the first of the many naval battles fought in parallel with the land operations.

Already available at Rabaul had been the heavy cruiser Chokai, light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari, and destroyer Yunagi, while the heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka, Kako and Kinugasa had steamed from Kavieng on New Ireland. These two elements met near Cape St George, the southernmost tip of New Ireland, during the evening of 7 August and shaped course to pass to the north of Buka island and then down the east coast of Bougainville island. Before the war the Japanese navy had trained extensively in night fighting tactics, a fact of which the Allies were unaware, and Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval force in a night battle off of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of 8/9 August and gain the advantage by exploiting his nocturnal battle expertise while avoiding air attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night.

Defending the US beach-head was a force of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers, but the Allies' numerical superiority was more than offset by Japanese force’s superior night fighting tactics and training, and its possession of the 24-in (610-mm) Type 93 'Long Lance' heavyweight anti-ship torpedo, which was faster and longer-ranged than its Allied counterparts, and carried a larger warhead. Furthermore, the Allied force was caught by surprise, was scattered, and was effectively out of command when the Japanese force arrived.

The way in which the Allies were taken by operational and tactical surprise reveals the poor command arrangements and lack of experience of the Allied forces in the South Pacific and South-West Pacific Areas. Mikawa’s force was sighted almost as soon as it left port, by S-38, which was unable to attain attack position but radioed a contact report. To reduce his ships' vulnerability to daytime air attacks during their approach to Guadalcanal, Mikawa halted his force to the east of Kieta on Bougainville the morning of 8 August, spread his ships as widely as possible in an effort to mask the force’s overall composition should any part of it be discovered by Allied air reconnaissance, and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to determine the location and strength of the Allied naval forces in the south-eastern part of the Solomon islands group. At 10.20 and 11.10 Mikawa’s force was discovered by Lockheed Hudson maritime reconnaissance aircraft the Royal Australian Air Force operating from Milne Bay in Papua. The first Hudson to sight the Japanese warships identified them as three cruisers, three destroyers and two seaplane tenders. The aeroplane’s crew tried to make a sighting report to the Allied radio station at Fall River in New Guinea but, receiving no acknowledgement, immediately abandoned the patrol and returned to Milne Bay at 12.42 to ensure that the report was distributed to the Allied forces as immediately as possible. The second Hudson completed its patrol after also failing to report its sighting by radio. Upon landing at Milne Bay at 15.00, the crew of this Hudson reported it had seen two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one ship of unknown type. For unknown reasons, the reports from the two aircraft were not distributed to the Allied ships off Guadalcanal until 18.45 and 21.30 respectively on 8 August. Mikawa’s own floatplanes had meanwhile completed a thorough reconnaissance of the Allied forces off Tulagi.

Turner, the amphibious force commander, was expecting a Japanese reaction but possessed no intelligence about the form it might take. The Hudsons which had sighted Mikawa’s force were allocated to MacArthur’s South-West Pacific Area headquarters, but Turner was under Ghormley’s South Pacific Area headquarters. Turner’s own Catalina patrol flying boats, operating from Ndeni island, were covering the sea lanes to and from Truk atoll, well to the north, and the B-17 bombers from Espíritu Santo assigned to cover 'The Slot' were operating at their extreme range and just missed sighting Mikawa’s force. As a result, Turner did not receive the crucial Hudson sighting report until 18.45 on 8 August, and then the Hudson’s misidentification of the composition of the Japanese force persuaded Turner that the Japanese force was planning to set up a seaplane base at Rekata Bay on the north coast of Santa Isabel Island in the Solomon islands group, and therefore instituted no special precautions against a night surface attack.

News of Mikawa’s force reached Fletcher at the same time that it reached Turner. Fletcher briefly considered launching an attack with the torpedo bombers of the VT-8 squadron, but was dissuaded from doing so by Saratoga's captain, who pointed out the hazards of attempting a night attack with crews lacking the necessary training. Fletcher no more expected the Japanese to press on that did Turner, and he was confident in any case that the Allied cruisers could take care of themselves in any surface action. Later that evening, Fletcher asked Ghormley for authorisation to withdraw his carrier task force, which was short of fuel and had suffered from considerable attrition to its fighter squadrons.

In the meantime, Mikawa’s floatplanes had returned by 12.00 with the information that the Allied naval disposition consisted of two groups of ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. Mikawa now reassembled his warship force and began its run toward Guadalcanal, entering 'The Slot' between the two lines of islands (Choiseul, Santa Isabel and Malaita to the north, and Vella Lavella, Kolombangara, New Georgia and Guadalcanal to the south and constituting the main length of the Solomon islands group) near Choiseul by 16.00 on 8 August. Mikawa’s run down 'The Slot' went unobserved by Allied forces.

Turner had requested McCain to have his aircraft fly more reconnaissance sorties over 'The Slot' during the afternoon of 8 August, but McCain neither ordered the missions nor informed Turner of the fact. Turner therefore continued to believe that 'The Slot' was under air surveillance throughout 8 August. To protect the transports unloading troops, equipment and supplies transports during the night of 8/9 August, Crutchley divided the Allied warships into three groups. The Southern Group (heavy cruisers Australia, Canberra and Chicago, and destroyers Patterson and Bagley) patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo island to block the entrance between Savo island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. The all-US Northern Group (the heavy cruisers Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes, and destroyers Helm and Wilson) undertook a box patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida islands. Under the command of Scott, the Eastern Group (the Australian light cruiser Hobart, the US light anti-aircraft cruiser San Juan, and the US destroyers Monssen and Buchanan) guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal islands, but received neither information or orders, and therefore did not become involved in the Battle of Savo Island.

Crutchley placed two US fleet destroyers equipped with SC surface-search radar to the west of Savo island to provide early warning of any approaching Japanese ships: Ralph Talbot and Blue patrolled the northern and southern passages respectively, with a gap of between 8 and 20 miles (13 and 32 km) between their unco-ordinated patrol patterns. At this time, the Allies were not fully aware of all of the limitations of their early-generation shipborne radars, such as the fact that their capability could be significantly degraded by nearby land masses to the extent that cruiser-size targets could seldom be detected at ranges beyond 10 miles (16 km). As it was, the two radar-equipped destroyers were at almost opposite ends of their patrol lines when the Japanese arrived, and the Japanese slipped neatly through the gap. The Japanese look-outs in fact spotted one of the destroyers, which failed to detect the Japanese on radar. Moreover, reports of strange aircraft overhead (in fact the Japanese cruisers' scout floatplanes) were discounted as friendly aircraft.

Concerned with the threat to the transport vessels from Japanese submarines, Crutchley used his remaining seven destroyers as close protection around the two transport vessel anchorages in the bay to the east of Lunga Point on Guadalcanal and off Tulagi island just to the south of Florida island. The crews of the Allied ships were tired after two days of constant alert and action in support of the landings, so most of the Allied ships lowered their readiness condition during the night of 8/9 August, with half of their crews on duty and the other half resting.

During the evening of 8 August, Turner called a conference, to be held on board his command ship off Guadalcanal, with Crutchley and Vandegrift in order to discuss the withdrawal of Fletcher’s carrier task force and the schedule by which the transport vessels should be pulled out of the area. At 20.55 Crutchley left the Southern Group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode, Chicago's captain, in temporary command. Awakened in his cabin to receive the news, Bode decided not to move his ship to the head of the Southern Group, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference Turner, Crutchley and Vandegrift discussed the Hudson sighting report of the 'seaplane tender' force and decided it would pose no threat during that night, since seaplane tenders were not ships which would normally seek a surface action. Vandegrift said that he needed to inspect the unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a time for the transports' withdrawal, and departed at 24.00 on his inspection. Crutchley decided not to return with Australia to the Southern Group, but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the captains of the other Allied warships of his intentions.

As Mikawa’s force approached from the north-west, the Japanese ships had launched three floatplanes to provide a final scouting report of the Allied ships and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the planned action. Although several of the Allied ships either heard or observed one or more of these floatplanes, beginning at 23.45, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an immediate threat and thus did not report the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.

Mikawa’s force was steaming in a single column led by Chokai, followed by Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryu, Yubari and Yunagi. At some time between 00.44 and 00.54 on 9 August, the look-outs in Mikawa’s ships spotted Blue about 5.5 miles (8.85 km) ahead of the Japanese column, and in order to avoid this destroyer Mikawa ordered a course change for his column to pass to the north of Savo island. He also ordered his ships to reduce speed to 22 kt to reduce the wakes that might otherwise have rendered his ships more visible. Four minutes later, Mikawa’s look-outs spotted either Ralph Talbot, about 10 miles (16 km) distant, or a small trading vessel.

The Japanese ships held their course while at the same time training more than 50 of their guns on Blue in anticipation of opening fire at the first indication that the approaching destroyer had sighted them. When she was less than 1 mile (1.6 km) away from Mikawa’s force, Blue suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious of the long column of Japanese warships. Mikawa now ordered his ships to return to a course to the south of Savo island and to increase speed, first to 26 kt and then to 30 kt. At 01.25 Mikawa released his ships to operate independently, and at 01.31 ordered every ship to attack.

At about this time, and just to the south of Savo island, Yunagi left the Japanese column and reversed course, perhaps as a result of losing sight of the Japanese ships ahead of her or perhaps in response to orders to keep watch over the Japanese force’s rear. One minute later, Japanese look-outs sighted a warship to port. This was the destroyer Jarvis, departing the Guadalcanal area independently for Australia for repair after suffering heavy damage earlier in the day. Whether or not Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, for her radio equipment had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes, but all of these missed. The Japanese ships passed as close as 1,100 yards (1000 m) to Jarvis, near enough for the officers on Tenryu's bridge to look down onto the destroyer’s deck. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships, she did not respond in any noticeable way.

Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese look-outs sighted the Southern Group’s cruisers and destroyers about 12,500 yards (11430 m) distant, silhouetted by the glow from a burning Allied transport. Several minutes later, at about 01.38, the Japanese cruisers began launching torpedo salvoes at the ships of the Southern Group. At the same time, Chokai's look-outs spotted the Northern Group’s vessels at a range of 18,000 yards (16460 m), and the ship turned to port to meet this new threat, the rest of the Japanese column following, while still preparing for a gunfire engagement with the Southern Group’s ships. Patterson was alert and ready, for her captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening reports of unknown aircraft, and had his crew ready for action. At 01.43, therefore, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, 5,000 yards (4570 m) ahead, and immediately sent a warning by both radio and signal lamp. Patterson's captain ordered an increase to full speed, star shells to be fired in the direction of the Japanese column, and torpedoes to be launched, but his order was not heard over the noise of the destroyer’s guns.

At about the same moment, Japanese floatplanes dropped parachute flares directly over Canberra and Chicago. The former was able to respond immediately, her captain ordering an increase in speed, a turn to starboard to keep the ship between the Japanese ships and the Allied transports anchored at Guadalcanal, and her guns to start firing at any targets which could be sighted. Less than one minute later, as Canberra's 8-in (203-mm) guns began to bear on the Japanese ships, Chokai and Furutaka opened fire on the Australian heavy cruiser, scoring numerous hits within a few seconds. Aoba and Kako joined with more gunfire, and within the next three minutes Canberra was hit by as many as 24 8-in (203-mm) shells. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded her captain, and destroyed both her boiler rooms, this last depriving the entire ship of power before she could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser came slowly to a halt, on fire, listing to starboard, and unable to fight her fires or pump flooded compartments for lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the ship’s port side, Canberra's starboard-side damage was the result either of shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side. If torpedoes did hit Canberra on the starboard side, then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship, and at this time the destroyer Bagley was the only ship on that side of the Australian heavy cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier.

Chicago's crew, observing the illumination of their ship by air-dropped flares and the sudden turn by Canberra ahead of them, came alert and woke Bode, who ordered his 5-in (127-mm) guns to fire star shells in the direction of the Japanese column. These shells did not function and, soon after this, Chicago's look-outs sighted incoming torpedoes which the cruiser attempted to evade. But at 01.47 one of the torpedoes, probably from Kako, hit Chicago's bow, sending through the ship a shock wave which damaged the main battery director. A second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell hit her main mast. Chicago continued to steam to the west, leaving behind the transports it was her task to protect. The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column, probably scoring on Tenryu a hit which caused modest damage. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the Southern Group, of which he was still technically in command. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to communicate a warning to any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship continued to head away from the battle area.

During this time, Patterson engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column, the US destroyer receiving a shell hit aft, causing moderate damage, but continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships, and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage. Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as she headed to the north-east along the eastern shore of Savo island.

Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra had done so, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column, and one or two of her torpedoes may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further part in the battle.

Yunagi exchanged fire with Jarvis before steaming to the west out of the battle area with the intention of rejoining the Japanese column to the north and west of Savo island.

At 01.44, as Mikawa’s ships headed toward the Northern Group, Tenryu and Yubari separated from the rest of the Japanese column and taking a more westerly course. Either as a result of a steering problem or to avoid the possibility of a collision with Canberra, Furutaka followed Yubari and Tenryu. Thus the Northern Group was about to be bracketed by fire from each side.

At the time that Mikawa’s ships began their engagement with the Southern Group, the captains of all three of the Northern Group’s cruisers were asleep with their ships at 10 kt. Mikawa now moved to attack the Northern Group which, as a result of sheer incompetence, had received no warning from the Southern Group. After illuminating the Northern Group’s ships with their searchlights, the Japanese opened fire. Astoria managed to fire about 12 salvoes, one of her shells hitting Chokai in the chart room and another a turret, before the US heavy cruiser was shattered by a hail of shells and sank. Quincy was brightly illuminated by Japanese searchlights and got off only two salvoes before shell hits set fire to her floatplane, shattered a turret, and detonated a 5-in (127-mm) gun magazine; then a torpedo hit flooded her machinery spaces, and the ship quickly sank. Vincennes managed to hit Kinugasa once but, yet again, Japanese shells set fire to her floatplanes and the ship became a target for gunfire and torpedoes. Vincennes was hit by at least three torpedoes and many shells before sinking.

Now the Japanese started to become confused and make mistakes. Mikawa had scored a tremendous tactical victory, but seems to have been put off balance by the hits scored on his flagship. His force was scattered, all his torpedoes were expended, and his flagship was now at the rear of the cruiser column. Thus the now-scattered Japanese ships were exiting the Sealark Sound, and Mikawa had to decide if he should turn back to attack the defenceless Allied transports. Given that Aoba had been damaged, that Chokai had received several hits from Quincy and Astoria, blowing off one of her turrets, destroying her chart room near which Mikawa was standing and killing 34 men, and that his formation was now disorganised, Mikawa decided on a return to Rabaul. Mikawa was probably also spurred in his decision by the fact that the break of day was approaching and, believing that the US carriers were still in the area, probably decided to test his luck no further. Mikawa may also have been concerned about the probability of Allied air attacks at dawn, which would have found his ships scattered in the vicinity of Guadalcanal if he had entered the Sealark Channel between Guadalcanal and Florida islands to attack the transports. It is also likely that Mikawa believed his force had achieved its mission, inasmuch as the destruction of their screen would force the Americans to evacuate their forces. Mikawa may have hoped that his rapid withdrawal following such a stinging blow would draw the US carriers after him into range of Japanese land-based aircraft.

As Mikawa withdrew, his force encountered Ralph Talbot as she turned to the west, and although the destroyer managed to get off four torpedoes, she was herself hit and forced to withdraw into a rain squall.

Canberra had been so badly damaged that her surviving crew was taken off before the wreck was sunk by the fire of other Allied ships: her captain and 83 other men had died in the attack. Kako was sunk by the US submarine S-44 near Rabaul on the next day with heavy loss of life.

The Battle of Savo island was one of the most complete and humiliating defeats which the US Navy has ever suffered and, as an immediate result, the Allied warships and transports were withdrawn to the New Hebrides island group. The Japanese had sunk four Allied cruisers and severely damaged a fifth cruiser and also a destroyer. More than 1,000 Allied seamen had been killed and more than 700 others wounded. The Japanese suffered only light damage, though the Americans drew slight consolation from the sinking of Kako while returning to Kavieng.

Although the Allied transports were left untouched, the loss of the cruiser cover forced Turner to pull out the transports (18 ships escorted by six destroyers) after they had unloaded only about half their stores, thereby significantly increasing the impact of the Japanese tactical victory by leaving the invasion force without much of the equipment and supplies it needed. Turner decided to continue unloading until 12.00 on 9 August, but the marines on Guadalcanal were then left with just four units of fire and a 37-day supply of food, and had therefore to live for a time off captured Japanese rice before they received their next supply of essential supplies, as well as ammunition and aviation fuel, on 18 September.

Turner successfully deflected blame for the humiliating defeat toward Fletcher, whom Turner condemned for withdrawing the carriers at a crucial moment. The weight of evidence, however, is that it would have made no difference if Fletcher had remained with his carriers. Fletcher did not actually begin his withdrawal until the early hours of 9 August. Mikawa’s force was still more than 150 miles (240 km) distant as the sun set on 8 August, which put Mikawa beyond dusk search range even if Fletcher had opted for such a search. Communications were still fragmentary and Fletcher did not learn of the Allied cruiser losses off Savo island until 06.45 on 9 August, at which point he would have had little chance of launching even a retaliatory strike against Mikawa’s retreating force. Fletcher’s withdrawal had prompted Turner to summon Crutchley to the midnight conference which left the cruiser screen leaderless, but it is unclear why it was necessary to for Crutchley to be called away from his command in this manner. However, Turner’s skill at offloading the blame, together with his courage in lingering for an additional 12 hours to unload a few more crucial supplies on 9 August and his excellent record later in the war, were sufficient to let him escape serious criticism. Turner was also lucky inasmuch as the 25^th Air Flotilla at Rabaul was sent in search of Fletcher’s carriers on this day and left the transport ships alone.

From 15 August until several months later, all supplies for Guadalcanal arrived by small convoys of high-speed transports, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied land-based aircraft from the New Hebrides island group flew frequent covering missions. In manpower terms, the Battle of Savo Island had cost the Japanese 71 men (38 killed and 33 wounded), and the Allies 1,979 men (1,270 killed and 709 wounded). Despite the fact that Mikawa had not accomplished his primary goal, namely the destruction of the Allied transports, the tactical victory which the Japanese had gained in the Battle of Savo island gave them a temporary superiority at sea, and they could therefore start to strengthen their forces on Guadalcanal as they launched their attempts to expel the marines from their lodgement round Lunga Point. The Japanese never fully appreciated either the US strength on the island or the rate at which it was developed, however, and thus resorted to piecemeal reinforcement followed by disjointed rather than cohesive attacks. It must be admitted, though, that this was in part attributable to the way in which reinforcement units reached Rabaul from many parts of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' at different times for delivery to Guadalcanal as and when an opportunity presented itself. As a result the Japanese were not able to build up their forces to the extent at which they possessed equality, let alone superiority, to the US forces.

The marines now established a perimeter around the airfield, for Vandegrift judged that his strength was inadequate for major offensive action until he had been reinforced, the airfield had been brought into service, and his lines of supply had been secured.

On 10 August, eager to get air support, Vandegrift had announced that the airstrip was ready to receive fighters, and that fuel and ammunition were available; there were as yet, however, no ground crews on the island. On 15 August a group of four destroyer transports made high-speed runs into Ironbottom Sound to bring in 120 sailors from CUB-1, a largely untrained naval engineer unit intended to build up the airfield, plus additional aircraft fuel and munitions for Henderson Field.

On 15 August, a marine sentry spotted a group of 20 local men with rifles, led by a single European, marching toward the perimeter in close order. The European was Martin Clemens, the chief coast watcher on Guadalcanal, who had decided that this showy approach was his best chance to avoid coming under fire in error. Clemens and Vandegrift quickly developed a rapport, and Clemens’s scouts later played a vital role in the battle for the island.

By this time the Japanese had switched responsibility for the conduct of the land campaign on Guadalcanal from the navy to the army, and more specifically to Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake’s 17^th Army, which had been established on 2 May at Rabaul to undertake operations on New Guinea. The 17^th Army was already heavily committed to the campaign on New Guinea and thus had only a few units available for despatch to Guadalcanal. Of these, Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi’s 35^th Brigade was in the Palau islands group, the 4^th Regiment in the Philippine islands gr